number 1 - Centre d'études et de recherches européennes Robert ...

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Wolfram Kaiser
sing well. Moreover, the EEC's development was beginning to be perceived as an
unparalleled success story and French membership as the key to continued economic
progress. The arrangements of the Rome Treaties could hardly have been more
favourable. Not only had the French secured substantial financial support for their
agriculture and overseas territories, the small customs union also provided an apparently
ideal route to modernization through limited competition, which was practically
largely restricted to Germany and the Benelux countries and would only
increase gradually. As a result, the economic status quo in Western Europe seemed
entirely satisfactory to the French, particularly after the 1962 CAP agreement. The
British government, on the other hand, increasingly felt pressed for time. In London
Britain's meagre economic performance during the 1950s was now increasingly
beginning to be perceived as the result of deeper structural problems and as
a sign of long-term relative decline, which accentuated an underlying nervousness
within both government and industry about the potential loss of expanding continental
markets to German competition.
The third reason why Macmillan believed that de Gaulle was in a very strong
political position over Sixes and Sevens was that within the EEC, French interests
were also institutionally ideally secured. The Free Trade Area negotiations had
already vividly illustrated the extent to which the EEC's institutional arrangements
encouraged the progressive development of a new esprit communautaire with a
high premium on internal consensus in external affairs. As the other Five, but particularly
the Bonn government, would not allow the marginalisation of France, it
was clear that neither an economic arrangement between the EEC and EFTA nor
British EEC membership could be achieved without explicit French consent.
Thus, as early as October 1959 Macmillan came to the conclusion that if Britain
wanted to secure her European economic and political interests, the latter now
clearly beginning to dominate the internal debate about Britain's future relationship
with the EEC, de Gaulle would have to be bribed into accepting a European settlement.
10 The Prime Minister became increasingly preoccupied with the idea of a
strategic trade-off between Britain's European interests and France's ambitions in
the field of defence and security. If unwelcome from the point of view of Britain's
NATO policy, de Gaulle's memorandum on tripartism at least seemed to leave this
diplomatic avenue to a mutually advantageous overall solution open. Initially,
Macmillan hoped that to offer somewhat closer trilateral cooperation among
France, the United States and Britain could suffice. More formal mechanisms for
consultation, the Foreign Office agreed, would not do much harm if the Americans
could be brought to accept the idea. 11 The much treasured "special relationship"
with the US government would continue unimpaired because it was primarily
based on the habit of continuous informal bilateral consultation on the political and
administrative levels. However, when Macmillan appealed to President Eisenhower
in a personal letter in February 1960 to agree to the introduction of formalized
trilateral talks, this was flatly rejected. 12 It was still regarded by the US government
10. Macmillan to Lloyd: PRO PREM 11/2679 (22 October 1959).
11. Lloyd to Macmillan: PRO PREM 11/2998 (15 February 1960).