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number 1 - Centre d'études et de recherches européennes Robert ...

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The Western European Union Armaments Pool 63<br />

Power Geneva conference in July had shown that the scope for negotiation with<br />

Russia was very slight, no obstacles stood in the way of cooperation rapidly unfolding<br />

within the comprehensive context established at the Messina me<strong>et</strong>ing of the<br />

Six.<br />

Conclusions<br />

The history of the aborted project for an Armaments Pool reveals forces and interests<br />

moving behind the diplomatic scene of the European integration process.<br />

In<strong>de</strong>ed, at first sight, those who are familiar with the story of the European Defence<br />

Community will find it difficult to escape feelings of déjà vu. Deeper analysis,<br />

however, makes it clear that such forces, interests and reasoning belong to a successive<br />

phase of West European history.<br />

After the London conference in October 1954 had left no doubt that France<br />

could not overcome the general opposition to a move towards supranational control<br />

over armaments production in Western Europe, the armaments agency played a<br />

dual role in French policy. Initially and until March 1955 the French lea<strong>de</strong>rs kept it<br />

on the agenda for domestic consumption. Hereby they stuck to extremist positions<br />

that were clearly unacceptable for their partners, putting forward supranationalism<br />

as the extreme guarantee against the German "threat" and involving renowned<br />

European activists such as Lapie. On the international plane, however, the plan and<br />

the Paris negotiations helped foster the move towards <strong>de</strong> facto integration of<br />

French and German armaments production which it had not been possible to<br />

impose by treaty. When Mendès France visited A<strong>de</strong>nauer at Ba<strong>de</strong>n-Ba<strong>de</strong>n in early<br />

January, on the eve of the ad hoc conference, he readily conce<strong>de</strong>d that what really<br />

mattered was not the agency itself but rather economic cooperation the case for<br />

which should be stressed.<br />

By the time the WEU came into life the spectre of a sud<strong>de</strong>n, massive and<br />

uncontrolled shift of Germany's industrial capacity towards armaments production<br />

had become a receding nightmare in Paris. Ironically, in a few weeks' time, the<br />

French were to start showing a measure of impatience at Germany's reluctance to<br />

embark upon armaments production.<br />

Unsurprisingly all the West European countries, strongly backed by Washington<br />

and secon<strong>de</strong>d by London, resisted what they consi<strong>de</strong>red to be a naked French<br />

attempt to secure a privileged position in armaments production through diplomatic<br />

means or technical <strong>de</strong>vices. Germany successfully fought her battle for equality.<br />

Britain <strong>de</strong>fen<strong>de</strong>d not just her insularity but above all her commercial interests while<br />

Italy and the Benelux escaped being overwhelmed by the Franco-German initiative.<br />

The match was simply postponed.<br />

Elena Calandri

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