number 1 - Centre d'études et de recherches européennes Robert ...

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Elena Calandri
In response the Foreign Minister consistently sought to convince Washington
about channelling armaments flows through the WEU organs, but these attempts
were once again foiled. 86
The final debate began in council on 23 March. The amendments were withdrawn
following Faure's declaration confirming the government's commitment to
establish an armaments pool with a common budget and real powers in the fields of
research, production and the distribution of foreign aid. 87 On 28 March the Council
ratified the Paris Agreements and the path was clear for German rearmament.
The WEU working group continued to meet in Paris until the end of April. Its
final report endorsed the principle of non-compulsory coordination of production
and the least possible independence for the WEU from the NATO Standardization
Agency. At its first session, on 7 May, the WEU Council approved the working
group's report and established the Standing Armaments Committee (SAC) whose
task it defined as "promoting cooperation". The Committee was to work in close
contact with NATO and the national representatives on the Committee were the
same who served on the NATO standardization group so any attempt to endow the
WEU with effective powers in armaments production would be condemned to fail.
Armaments production remained a national concern and NATO retained the competence
for standardization and armaments cooperation. 88
Charles Cristofini was appointed to head the Committee and assume the functions
of WEU Assistant Secretary General. There was no doubt that he would seek
to use Agency powers to satisfy the aims he had pursued in the autumn of 1954
when setting up relations with the German military authorities and fostering the use
of French weaponry by the Continent's armed forces. However, so limited was the
range of action of the Commissariat and so consistent the stone walling by his partners
– Britain above all –, Belgian and Dutch fears that he might attempt to broaden
the Commissariat's activities and develop "dangerous" bonds with the WEU Armaments
Control Agency 89 , appear somewhat excessive.
And indeed Paris worries about future German policy had not vanished entirely.
For some time Pinay had been nurturing the idea of increasing the powers and functions
of the WEU. It must be possible to "recreate some parts of the EDC within
the framework of the WEU" to bind Germany to Western Europe through economic
and military agreements negotiated under the provisions of the seven power
treaty. 90 By the spring of 1955, however, the dual track for France's German policy
had been laid. The Adenauer-Pinay meeting in the spring of 1955 confirmed the
case for Franco-German cooperation in armaments production. After the Four
86. NA, RG59, b.3116, various tels, e.g. 740.5/3-1955, Dulles to Paris Embassy; T.C. Achilles to J.
Sauvagnargues, 10 March 1955; box 3117, 740.5/4-455, tel. Hughes (Paris), no. POLTO 1960.
April 4, 1955.
87. L'Année politique, 1955, p. 348.
88. Low NATO's effectiveness in this field had already been recognized in 1953. The Finebel group
had been established to foster standardization among continental armies.
89. Such worries were reported to the US authorities, see NA, RG59, 3118, 740.5/5-2355, 23 May
1955; 3119, 740.5/6-655, 6 June 1955.
90. PRO: FO 371/118117, WF 1951/18, J.G.S. Beith (Paris) 19 April 1955.