number 1 - Centre d'études et de recherches européennes Robert ...

The Western European Union Armaments Pool 59
By early February the French delegation acknowledged the difficulties assailing
the negotiations under way. 75 However, it found reason for satisfaction in the
development of the Franco-German partnership. In response to a German initiative
a bilateral Franco-German dialogue had been started up within the conference. Although
no change of heart on supranationalism was forthcoming the French delegate,
Pierre Baraduc, was confident that the technical reasons behind the French
proposals in the shape of the need for large-scale production, the peculiarity of
armaments production etc. would become clear as discussions went ahead in the
technical sub-groups and that Erhard's "ideological" opposition to regulation would
weaken. 76 In addition to the Paris meetings contacts fanned out at both official and
private level on the subject of economic cooperation. Discussions about cooperation
between French and German aircraft firms had progressed too. To what extent
did Germany's Economics ministry encourage it in order to further the German
position in the negotiations and offer a sop to French parliamentary and public opinion
with an eye to the debate within the Conseil de la République? In early March,
François Poncet reported upon Erhard's and Sacher's disillusionment with the
initial approach, their criticism of the inconsistency of French projects for joint enterprises
in Africa and the continuing attempt to manipulate the principle of the
division of labour in order to leave key sectors of production to France. 77 However,
the seeds for economic cooperation sown in the autumn of 1954 were germinating.
And so it came to pass that, by the spring of 1955 the Paris conversations were
being accompanied by a steady flow of other initiatives.
The Centre d'études de politique étrangère was once more actively involved and
its Comité d'études franco-allemandes hosted meetings of representatives of both
countries' industrial unions. From Germany, French officers dispatched accounts of
ideas and initiatives in German industrial and financial circles, among them plans
for the joint development of France's overseas territories which ranked first. 78 German
industry's sudden awareness of the charms of international collaboration
whose powerful and overwhelming influence on Europe's renaissance in 1955 can
here be hinted at only indirectly was not confined to France. Neither were the
French government and industrialists alone in Europe in their view of just how profitable
Germany's fully restored market would be and how necessary it was to seek
an accommodation with German industry. What the French did was to stress the
value of their plan for joint production which stood in sharp contrast to, for
75. In his report Baraduc made a reference to a suggestion advanced at the beginning of the conference
by the Benelux ministers to base the armaments agency on the ECSC, it was not followed up:
AMAE, Wormser, 24, P. Baraduc, 28 February 1955, Annexe B, Note remise le 4 fevrier au Président
Edgar Faure.
76. AMAE, Wormser, 24, P. Baraduc, 28 February 1955, Annexe B, Note remise le 4 février au Président
Edgar Faure.
77. AMAE, Wormser, 86, A. François Poncet (Bad Godesberg), no. 704, 5 March 1955.
78. AMAE, Wormser, 87, no.622 HC/OMS/COM/S, Note d'information, 26 March 1955; Coignard
remarked that "en fin de compte les Allemands paraissent estimer que le temps des promesses et
des idées générales est révolu, et attendent que leur soit présenté un plan précis, assorti de garanties
véritables."