number 1 - Centre d'études et de recherches européennes Robert ...

58
Elena Calandri
France had resigned as foreign minister to dedicate himself to restoring France's
economic situation. Edgar Faure had become the head of the Quai d'Orsay. In early
January René Massigli, Ambassador in London and a supporter of European nonsupranational
policy, was called to replace Alexandre Parodi as Secretary General
of the Quai d'Orsay.
The meeting opened with statements of each country's position. Significantly,
the Italian representative jockeyed for position and spoke first, thus avoiding
having to deal with counter proposals. 69 The Dutch and Belgians confirmed their
criticisms of the French proposal of 3 January. As Adenauer had promised Erhard
headed the German delegation while Blank was his first technical adviser. 70 Erhard
submitted the German memorandum which welcomed the standardization and
rationalization of armaments production but rejected supranational dirigism, discrimination,
or any special status for armaments production. 71 Only a few days later,
the atmosphere of the conference was described as follows by a member of the
American Embassy.
"No one has, of course, openly formulated at (the) conference (the) tactic of dragging
out discussions and avoiding major disagreements. Hence there is a certain air
of unreality. In (an) atmosphere of mutual exchange of bouquets, (the) real objectives
remain unstated. Tempo so far has been that of a stately pavane, with each delegation
going through (the) set motions. Only (the) Dutch and (the) Germans have
gotten slightly out of step, but this did not seriously interfere with (the) basic
rhythm.(...) Such queasiness as exists arises largely from (the) fact that no one can be
quite sure just who is fooling who, or whether anybody is being fooled at all. (The)
hope of (the) members of (the) conference apparently is that at least the members of
the Council of the Republic will be fooled, to whom an Armaments Pool with teeth
is important, either as a symbol of supra-nationality or as an instrument of further
control of (the) Germans". 72
The meeting's first round ended on 29 January with the decision to establish two
sub-groups on standardization and production which was interpreted in some quarters
as a way to slow down negotiations until after the debate in the Conseil de la
République. 73 Upon leaving Paris on 2 February, Erhard declared that the negotiations
on armaments had lost their political content and would, in fact, continue for
a long time owing to their technical complexity without disrupting the course of the
Paris Agreements. 74
69. ASMAE, A.P. Italia 1955, b.409, fasc. Pool degli armamenti UEO, telespresso no.21/0131 Ministero
degli Affari esteri to various Embassies, 19 January 1955.
70. According to Coignard, on the eve of the conference Blank delivered to Adenauer and Erhard a
memorandum urging moderation, in order to reach agreement rapidly and start armaments production:
AMAE, Wormser, 87, Note d'information, no.231/HC/OMS/COM/S, 4 February 1955.
71. DDF, 1955, Annexes, Suggestions du ministre fédéral de l'Economie concernant une coopération
dans le domaine de l'armement dans le cadre de l'Europe occidentale, January 14, 1955.
72. NA, RG 59, 3114, 740.5/1-2655, tel. Hughes (Paris), no. POLTO 1409, January 26, 1955, secret.
73. E.g. NA, RG59, 3114, 740.5/2-355, tel. Dumbrow (Rome), no.2809, 3 February 1955.
74. AMRE, Wormser, 87, Haut Commissariat de la République française en Allemagne, Note d'information
sur certaines réactions allemandes à propos des négociations sur un pool des armements,
Coblence, 4 February 1955, no.231/HC/OMS/COM/S.