number 1 - Centre d'études et de recherches européennes Robert ...

The Western European Union Armaments Pool 57
channelling American aid through the Brussels Pact. In Paris, Dulles vaguely
agreed to a cover up.
The Armaments Control Agency was to receive information regarding the
levels of United States "end items aid" in connection with its function of controlling
arms stocks, while any further question of distribution or channelling of aid
would be deferred to the Paris conference in January. 66
In the wake of the French note of 3 January American diplomacy stuck to the
position adopted after the EDC defeat, namely, that European institutions and their
powers should be exclusively in the hands of the Europeans themselves. On these
grounds the State Department turned down moderate French requests for "lobbying"
the Armaments Pool 67 and did not send representatives to the Paris Conference.
Reality, however, was slightly different. All the European governments
anxiously inquired about the American position and kept the State Department constantly
informed. Dulles was aware of European reservations regarding the French
project and shared many of the worries of those in Europe who opposed it. So although
the EDC experience restrained Dulles from openly taking part, Washington's
diplomacy was able to inspire "sabotage" of the Pool. In the guidelines sent to the
Paris Embassy before the opening of the conference, the State Department deprecated
the duplication of NATO functions in the provisional period and doubted
whether France's partners could accept the permanent regime. Washington encouraged
Erhard's free trade concepts rather than the suspect French dirigism but the
State Department cautioned the European governments to avoid an open break at
the Conference. As a way out, it suggested either revising the French proposal by
eliminating the objectionable features of the first stage and virtually abolishing the
second one, or supporting the British plan for absorbing European standardization
and coordinating production in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. 68
Moving forward – The WEU Working Group's Paris Conference
Although the fate of the Armaments Pool appeared gloomy even before the
opening of the conference, on 17 January the NATO deputies of WEU members
met at the Palais de Chaillot. A few days before the start of the conference Mendès
65. Foreign Relations of the United States, Washington, US Government Printing Office (hereafter
FRUS),1952-1954, vol. V, pp. 1378-1384; for Foster Dulles attitude see P. MELANDRI, "Les difficiles
relations franco-américaines" in F. BEDARIDA, J.P. RIOUX, Mendès France, pp. 261-
278:273.
66. NA, RG 59, 3114, tel. Hughes (Paris), no. POLTO 1355, January 19, 1955, secret.
67. DDF, 1955, doc. no. 22, tel. de Juniac (Washington) to Mendès France, no.234 à 250, January
11,1955, secrét, réservé, pp. 57-60; NA, RG 59, box 3114, 740.5/1-1855, J.F. Dulles to US
Embassy, Paris, no. 2557, 18, 1955, secret, asked to inform de Juniac of US intention to leave the
question to the European governments.
68. NA, RG 59, 3114, 740.5/1-1555 CSHJ, tel. Murphy to US Embassy, Paris, no. TOPOL 995,
January 15, 1955, secret.