number 1 - Centre d'études et de recherches européennes Robert ...

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Elena Calandri
Once again, the more outspoken opposition came from Beyen. Having no hope
of attracting the British into a supranational system by slowing the integration process
and fearing that removal of the clauses granting Britain special status would
jeopardize the freshly established bonds between Britain and the Six he questioned
the core of Mendès France's project, id est the attempt to turn the inter-governmental
cooperation of the Brussels Pact into more binding integration. He also criticized
the project on political and economic grounds. The provisional period
appeared to him unnecessarily to duplicate NATO functions and revived his old
suspicions about French ambitions to develop a European structure that would rival
NATO. Since Dutch heavy industry was working to a great extent for the Defence
Ministry it risked having its hands tied. Furthermore, Dutch commercial partners
such as Sweden and Switzerland would remain outside the Six. 62
British attitudes confirmed Dutch worries. Although the press praised the
French initiative and René Massigli was able to write to the Quai d'Orsay that the
Defence Minister, Harold Macmillan, and Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick, Permanent Undersecretary
at the Foreign Office, had assured him that the plan was being carefully
examined 63 Whitehall characterized it as "irrealistic and unpractical" and did not
waste time in burying it.
Nevertheless, the British shared the common concern that its abrupt dismissal
might affect ratification of the Paris Agreement by the French Conseil de la République.
Thus, as early as 10 January, they focused on working out a formula to "kill
it with kindness". As an American diplomat reported to the State Department,
"(...)(the) Foreign Office considers timing of any such recommendation (to be a) critical
factor. It should be proposed after it becomes clear to arms pool working group
members (including, it is hoped, French) that French proposals are unworkable, but
before (the) negotiations have dragged on so long that French public believes they
have actually failed". 64
The American administration had kept a low official profile throughout the
affair. Mendès France's policies in the summer of 1954 had sown deep and lasting
distrust in the mind of John Foster Dulles, who blamed Mendès France for the EDC
defeat and for exciting deep-rooted French neutralism. In the tense atmosphere at
the London and Paris conferences the United States had interpreted the French plan
as merely an attempt to delay settlement of the crisis and to maintain controls on
German rearmament. In London Dulles, who shared Erhard's mistrust of the somewhat
"New Deal" aspects of the pool proposal, had severely criticized it for discriminating
against Germany. 65 He also coldly rejected French requests for
62. NA, RG 59, 3113, 740.5/1-755, tel. Matthews (The Hague), n.981, January 7, 1955, secret; on
Dutch attitude from September 1954 to June 1955 in A.G. HARRYVAN and A.E. KERSTEN,
"The Netherlands, Benelux and the Relance Européenne 1954-1955", in E. SERRA (ed.), Il rilancio,
pp. 125-157.
63. AMRE, série Papiers d'agents, 217 René Massigli, 80, tel. R. Massigli, no. 122-123, 11 January
1955 and no.139-141, 12 January 1955; R. MASSIGLI, Comédie, p. 492.
64. NA, RG 59, 3113, 740.5/1-1055, tel. Butterworth (London), no. 3030, January 10, 1955, secret.