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54<br />

Elena Calandri<br />

ans was to perform the first task while an Armaments Production Committee was to<br />

establish programmes and place or<strong>de</strong>rs for the materials approved by the Standardization<br />

Committee. From 1 January 1957 onwards the permanent regime was to<br />

come into effect automatically and the Pool<br />

"(...)aurait à établir pour tous les pays membres <strong>de</strong>s programmes d'ensemble <strong>de</strong> production<br />

coordonnée d'armements en s'efforçant <strong>de</strong> pousser la standardisation aussi<br />

loin que possible, <strong>et</strong> elle définirait les plans d'investissements correspondant aux fabrications<br />

à exécuter. D'autre part elle assurerait l'exécution <strong>de</strong>s programmes soit<br />

directement en passant elle-même les comman<strong>de</strong>s pour le compte <strong>de</strong>s Gouvernements,<br />

soit en autorisant les comman<strong>de</strong>s passées par les Gouvernements."<br />

Un<strong>de</strong>r the <strong>de</strong>finitive regime, both the WEU Council of Ministers and the Permanent<br />

Committee – which would have meanwhile replaced the two committees of<br />

the provisional period – were to reach <strong>de</strong>cisions on the basis of a two thirds majority,<br />

except on standardization, where unanimity would be required. Decisions<br />

would be binding on all members and production programmes would be exten<strong>de</strong>d<br />

to cover all production for the forces assigned to NATO. But the Pool would review<br />

only production for non-NATO national forces and for export. Finally, the French<br />

aired an even more far-reaching hypothesis to the effect that the permanent committee<br />

of national representatives and the director could both be replaced by an<br />

in<strong>de</strong>pen<strong>de</strong>nt board of commissioners, appointed by the Council of Ministers reaching<br />

its <strong>de</strong>cisions by simple majority. 55<br />

The draft did not drop any of the aims outlined in London, the only change<br />

being insertion of the provisional regime which <strong>de</strong>layed implementation until<br />

January 1957. The r<strong>et</strong>urn to a supranational scheme could be explained as a<br />

response to Benelux criticism of the ambiguous nature of the Pool, as well as a concession<br />

to pro-European opinion. But it is hard to believe that the French government<br />

thought this suggestion would be accepted, especially as it was putting<br />

forward a supranational concept while eliminating the special status which the<br />

London draft accor<strong>de</strong>d to Britain. At the same time, the clauses concerning production<br />

for non-NATO-forces and for export barely concealed the aim of protecting<br />

France's special status.<br />

In the fortnight before the me<strong>et</strong>ing of the working group diplomatic activity<br />

flourished. The Italian government was alone in applauding the French draft.<br />

As an official of the Italian Foreign Ministry explained to an American colleague,<br />

Rome felt virtually compelled to support any initiative that would foster European<br />

integration. 56 In fact, Italy's position was <strong>de</strong>veloping along lines s<strong>et</strong> out in<br />

advance. During Mendès France's visit to Rome from 10 to 13 January Presi<strong>de</strong>nt<br />

Scelba and Foreign Minister Martino approached the broad question of Italy's place<br />

in Europe and sought guarantees regarding her association with Franco-German<br />

un<strong>de</strong>rtakings. Finally, they confirmed their reservations to the effect that the pool<br />

arrangement should not take away from Italy any production which might other-<br />

55. DDF, 1955, Annexes, Mémorandum du Gouvernement français sur la standardisation <strong>et</strong> la production<br />

<strong>de</strong>s armements, pp. 243-251.<br />

56. NA, RG 59, 3113, Memorandum of Conversation, January 11, 1955.

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