number 1 - Centre d'études et de recherches européennes Robert ...

50
Elena Calandri
son of her financial weakness, to a subordinate position. This, together with
national specialization and technical backwardness would destroy Italian heavy
industry. Moreover, the industrialization of French North Africa would create competition
for Italian products in the Mediterranean. The Ministry strongly urged that
if the government did decide, for political reasons, to support the French plan it
should defend national economic interests by requesting that American financial
contributions be admitted and that bilateral economic links with the United States
be allowed as well. Existing production capabilities should be fully exploited
before creating new capacity while Southern Italy and the Italian islands should be
considered for industrial development "before or at least at the same time" as
French North Africa. 41 Italian industrialists, meeting on 13 November in Milan to
discuss the case of the threatened Franco-German cartel, urged the Government to
insert Italy into the Franco-German system and decided to seek understandings
with French and German industrialists. 42
The Foreign Ministry added to the economic worries. It considered that exclusion
from a Paris-Bonn axis would be as dangerous as getting involved in a French
autonomist manoeuvre which would annoy the United States. Hence, it sought a
broad discussion of Franco-Italian relations with Mendès France, which was scheduled
for January 1955. 43
Instructions sent to Quaroni on 3 December recommended a balanced approach
which, in an attempt to protect Italy's European image by proposing that the project's
integration features be reinforced, would cautiously establish a three-power
dialogue while firmly thrusting to the fore Italy's economic demands and requests
for political equality. 44 With peculiar realism and a sceptical view of French politics,
Quaroni implemented the instructions. 45
The Franco-German economic rapprochement antagonized London as well.
Since late 1953, the British government had been looking with benevolence on the
purposefulness deployed by French governments in confronting the country's economic
problems. It had applauded the launching of the Second Modernization and
Equipment Plan, congratulated Edgar Faure's initial achievements and praised
Mendès France's economic realism.
41. ASMAE, serie Ambasciata di Parigi (hereafter Parigi), 1955, b.55 fasc. Patto di Bruxelles – UEO –
Agenzia Armamenti, Ministero dell'Industria e del Commercio – Servizio Coordinamento Commesse
e Affari Patto Atlantico to Ministero degli Affari Esteri, 19 November 1954, no. 23170/30/9.
42. ASMAE, Parigi, 1955, b.55, fasc. Patto di Bruxelles..., Nota, All.B.
43. ASMAE, Parigi, 1955, b.55 fasc. Patto di Bruxelles..., P. Quaroni to G. Martino, December 10,
1954; P. GUILLEN, "Les questions européennes dans les rapports franco-italiens de la rencontre
de Santa Margherita (février 1951) au voyage de Pierre Mendès France à Rome (janvier 1955)" in
J.B. DUROSELLE, E. SERRA, Italia e Francia 1946-1954, Milano, Franco Angeli, 1988, pp.31-
49; A. DULPHY, P. MILZA, "Pierre Mendès France et l'Italie", in F. BEDARIDA, J.P. RIOUX,
Pierre Mendès France et le mendésisme, Paris 1985; B. BAGNATO, "Il viaggio di Pierre Mendès
France in Italia (gennaio 1955), Storia delle Relazioni Internazionali, 1992/1-2.
44. ASMAE, AP, Italia, G. Martino to Italian Embassy, Paris, December 3, 1954.
45. See e.g. ASMAE, Parigi, 1955, b.55, fasc. Patto di Bruxelles, P. Quaroni to G. Martino, December
10, 1954. See also E. SERRA, "Pietro Quaroni e la Francia", in J.B. DUROSELLE, E. SERRA,
Italia e Francia, pp.278-297:292.