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48 Elena Calandri policy" of Britain, which preferred a worldwide mercantile policy instead of joining in European integration. He set the agenda for a union of Europe's industries. "Ce projet – he conceded – ne peut malheureusement pas se réaliser en un seul stade. Il y a lieu, croyons-nous, d'unir pour commencer les industries françaises, allemandes et italiennes, auxquelles il sera ensuite possible de faire s'adjoindre les industries belges, hollandaises, suédoises et espagnoles. A cette union seulement, il est possible d'envisager l'adhésion de l'Angleterre qui, en maintenant sa position extérieure, se trouverait dans une position extrèmement mauvaise. Ainsi se trouverait enfin réalisée l'industrie aéronautique européenne complète, vers laquelle nous tendons". 35 On 8 October Adenauer accepted an invitation for German military experts to go to France to visit a display devoted to French aircraft production. Subsequently Parodi endorsed Cristofini's suggestion that weapons for the army be put on display as well. Finally, the French upgraded the whole exercise which it was hoped could be organized before Adenauer's visit to Paris for the Nine Power conference. It would be transformed from a simple display of French products into an occasion for in depth discussion of how to develop Franco-German technical cooperation. 36 Foreign Ministry zeal in the field of armaments did not occur in isolation but rather as part of an ongoing movement towards a Franco-German entente, which was to be sealed in October at the Adenauer-Mendès France meeting on the Saar question. The meeting, held in the suburb of La-Celle-Saint-Cloud the day before the opening of the Paris Conference, was in fact a turning point in bilateral relations. The conversations touched upon the topics singled out in previous months at the French Foreign Ministry as suitable for fruitful long-term cooperation. The two leaders settled the Saar question, signed minor but symbolic agreements on cultural cooperation, war graves and deportation victims and set the scene for far-reaching economic relations. They agreed upon an increase of French agricultural exports to Germany, the creation of canals along the Moselle, the setting up of a Franco-German Economic Committee specially designed to foster, as the official joint declaration put it, "(...)la réalisation des plans élaborés, parfois depuis plusieurs années, par des groupements économiques des deux côtés du Rhin en vue d'une étroite collaboration des capitaux, des techniques et de l'industrie(...)" in Europe and overseas. 37 So France's German policy moved away from military security to the economic sphere. Rapprochement with Bonn corresponded with Mendès France's prior aim which was to put right France's economic situation. In the summer of 1954, while he concentrated upon disentangling France from Indochina and the EDC the Minister of Finance, Edgar Faure, had been sharpening the teeth of economic measures launched in the spring and which centred upon tight budgets and eco- 35. AMAE Wormser, 86, Bernard Duperier, Note sur les situations respectives des industries aéronautiques françaises et allemandes, to Mendès France, Parodi, Charpentier, 15 October 1954. He argued that, after having recovered in London the right to built air craft on her territory, Germany would abandon plans for North Africa, and admitted that owing to infrastructures and labour conditions, plans for a big military industrial pole there were unrealistic. 36. AMAE, Wormser, 86, A. Parodi to François Poncet, no. 1061, 15 October 1954. 37. DDF, 1954, Annexes, no. 290; K. ADENAUER, Erinnerungen, pp. 444-445.

The Western European Union Armaments Pool 49 nomic expansion led by exports. The French agricultural surplus was growing into an economic and political problem and the government was determined to find markets for it. In Mendès France's policy, however, economic balance was not an end in itself but aimed rather at re-establishing his country as an influential and independent force in the West while rendering credible France's role as one of the Big Four. Defence could hardly be Mendès France's choice for cooperation with Bonn or indeed with any other country since he believed that military power and nuclear status were political tools for France’s individual role in the world arena. 38 Suggestions from the Ministry of Defence to use the armaments agency to pool European financial and technical resources and foster France's accession to nuclear status "alone or in a community" were not retained 39 so the French premier's genuine interest and rational appreciation of relations with Bonn did not obliterate the ambiguity of his attitude towards Germany. It was complemented and partly explained by an equally opaque attitude towards Moscow and East-West relations. Convinced that the post-Stalin Soviet leadership might be driven to accept realistic, if not cordial, relations with the West based on mutual interest he considered German rearmament to be a preliminary step in this direction. So it was that, speaking before the General Assembly of the United Nations on 22 November, he proposed that the East European countries adopt the WEU rules of control and publicity concerning weapons stockpiles which could then become part of a joint system of control and disarmament in Europe. Eventually, in early January 1955, he invited the heads of government of Moscow, London and Washington to meet together at a four-power European security summit. 40 European Political and Economic Manoeuvres Until the meeting at La-Celle-Saint-Cloud, the other European governments and the US government mainly regarded – and severely criticized – the armaments pool as a French tool for discriminating against Germany and furthering French industrial interests. This perception changed subsequently. The shadow of a cartel between French and German heavy industry had begun to worry Italian economic and political circles. It was the Ministry for Industry and Commerce that first sounded the alarm. Since external, i.e. American financial participation in the pool's operations was not allowed Italy would be confined, by rea- 38. See I. BUSSCHAERT, "Les questions militaires et stratégiques dans la pensée et dans l’action de Pierre Mendès France", in R. GIRAULT, Pierre Mendès France, pp. 153-170. 39. AMAE, Wormser, 23, ministère de la Défense nationale, cabinet du ministre, Fiche, undated. 40. P. GUILLEN, "Pierre Mendès France et l'Allemange" and G.-H. SOUTOU, "Pierre Mendès France et l'Union Soviétique", in R. GIRAULT (ed.), Pierre Mendès France, pp. 177-207; A. VARSORI, "Alle origini della prima distensione: la Francia di Pierre Mendès France e la ripresa del dialogo con Mosca (1954-1955)", Storia delle Relazioni Internazionali, VIII, 1992, no.1-2.

48<br />

Elena Calandri<br />

policy" of Britain, which preferred a worldwi<strong>de</strong> mercantile policy instead of joining<br />

in European integration. He s<strong>et</strong> the agenda for a union of Europe's industries.<br />

"Ce proj<strong>et</strong> – he conce<strong>de</strong>d – ne peut malheureusement pas se réaliser en un seul sta<strong>de</strong>.<br />

Il y a lieu, croyons-nous, d'unir pour commencer les industries françaises, alleman<strong>de</strong>s<br />

<strong>et</strong> italiennes, auxquelles il sera ensuite possible <strong>de</strong> faire s'adjoindre les industries<br />

belges, hollandaises, suédoises <strong>et</strong> espagnoles. A c<strong>et</strong>te union seulement, il est possible<br />

d'envisager l'adhésion <strong>de</strong> l'Angl<strong>et</strong>erre qui, en maintenant sa position extérieure, se<br />

trouverait dans une position extrèmement mauvaise. Ainsi se trouverait enfin réalisée<br />

l'industrie aéronautique européenne complète, vers laquelle nous tendons". 35<br />

On 8 October A<strong>de</strong>nauer accepted an invitation for German military experts to<br />

go to France to visit a display <strong>de</strong>voted to French aircraft production. Subsequently<br />

Parodi endorsed Cristofini's suggestion that weapons for the army be put on display<br />

as well. Finally, the French upgra<strong>de</strong>d the whole exercise which it was hoped could<br />

be organized before A<strong>de</strong>nauer's visit to Paris for the Nine Power conference. It<br />

would be transformed from a simple display of French products into an occasion<br />

for in <strong>de</strong>pth discussion of how to <strong>de</strong>velop Franco-German technical cooperation. 36<br />

Foreign Ministry zeal in the field of armaments did not occur in isolation but<br />

rather as part of an ongoing movement towards a Franco-German entente, which<br />

was to be sealed in October at the A<strong>de</strong>nauer-Mendès France me<strong>et</strong>ing on the Saar<br />

question. The me<strong>et</strong>ing, held in the suburb of La-Celle-Saint-Cloud the day before<br />

the opening of the Paris Conference, was in fact a turning point in bilateral relations.<br />

The conversations touched upon the topics singled out in previous months at<br />

the French Foreign Ministry as suitable for fruitful long-term cooperation. The two<br />

lea<strong>de</strong>rs s<strong>et</strong>tled the Saar question, signed minor but symbolic agreements on cultural<br />

cooperation, war graves and <strong>de</strong>portation victims and s<strong>et</strong> the scene for far-reaching<br />

economic relations.<br />

They agreed upon an increase of French agricultural exports to Germany, the<br />

creation of canals along the Moselle, the s<strong>et</strong>ting up of a Franco-German Economic<br />

Committee specially <strong>de</strong>signed to foster, as the official joint <strong>de</strong>claration put it,<br />

"(...)la réalisation <strong>de</strong>s plans élaborés, parfois <strong>de</strong>puis plusieurs années, par <strong>de</strong>s groupements<br />

économiques <strong>de</strong>s <strong>de</strong>ux côtés du Rhin en vue d'une étroite collaboration<br />

<strong>de</strong>s capitaux, <strong>de</strong>s techniques <strong>et</strong> <strong>de</strong> l'industrie(...)" in Europe and overseas. 37<br />

So France's German policy moved away from military security to the economic<br />

sphere. Rapprochement with Bonn correspon<strong>de</strong>d with Mendès France's prior<br />

aim which was to put right France's economic situation. In the summer of 1954,<br />

while he concentrated upon disentangling France from Indochina and the EDC<br />

the Minister of Finance, Edgar Faure, had been sharpening the te<strong>et</strong>h of economic<br />

measures launched in the spring and which centred upon tight budg<strong>et</strong>s and eco-<br />

35. AMAE Wormser, 86, Bernard Duperier, Note sur les situations respectives <strong>de</strong>s industries aéronautiques<br />

françaises <strong>et</strong> alleman<strong>de</strong>s, to Mendès France, Parodi, Charpentier, 15 October 1954. He<br />

argued that, after having recovered in London the right to built air craft on her territory, Germany<br />

would abandon plans for North Africa, and admitted that owing to infrastructures and labour conditions,<br />

plans for a big military industrial pole there were unrealistic.<br />

36. AMAE, Wormser, 86, A. Parodi to François Ponc<strong>et</strong>, no. 1061, 15 October 1954.<br />

37. DDF, 1954, Annexes, no. 290; K. ADENAUER, Erinnerungen, pp. 444-445.

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