number 1 - Centre d'études et de recherches européennes Robert ...

46
Elena Calandri
Under the chairmanship of Lord Hood a working group discussed both memoranda
over the next few days. It was a very lively discussion indeed since the German
delegate rejected the definition of a "strategically exposed region" covering
only Germany, while the French delegate refused to countenance all the continental
countries having to renounce the manufacture of ABC weapons.
Britain's undertaking to keep military units on the Continent was an important
achievement for France and made the London Conference a turning point in the
German question. A Franco-German meeting was scheduled in November to seek a
settlement for the Saar so the WEU powers on armaments were the only part of the
package Mendès France was unable to secure. On 1 October the armaments issue
was again considered by the foreign ministers in a very tense atmosphere, Mendès
France making it clear that he was ready to make the conference fail on it. 28 On 2
October, Adenauer cut the Gordian knot of the definition of what constituted the
"strategically exposed area" by voluntary renunciation of ABC weapons production,
a declaration which Foster Dulles quickly interpreted on a rebus sic stantibus
basis. But Germany obtained the right to produce virtually all other kinds of
armaments including aircraft but not guided missiles on her territory. In the end the
Seven agreed on an Agency which would control the stocks of arms held by WEU
continental members and enforce Germany's commitments. The American and
Canadian governments would notify the Agency of all military aid given to the
European allies while, in accordance with the suggestion put forward by the Canadian
Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Lester Pearson, a working group would examine
further assignments in the fields of standardization and joint production and report
back to the next conference to be held in Paris later in October for signing the
agreements. 29
Domestic Constraints, economic Security, global Policy and Mendès France's
German Policy
In France the plan for the armaments pool had gathered widespread support in parliament,
each group being keen to use it to foster its own aims. As the charismatic,
but little-loved leader of a divided country, Mendès France needed to pay the
utmost attention to the domestic mood which could jeopardize both the survival of
his government and the ratification of the forthcoming Paris Agreements. The
rejection of the EDC had stimulated pro-European feelings towards the French premier
but the anti-cédistes as well were far from ready to accept uncontrolled German
rearmament and urged that France's international position should be better
protected. Finally, Mendès France needed to avoid alienating those forces spread
throughout the parliamentary spectrum who wanted to keep open the door for
28. PRO: FO 1086/180, N.P.C.(54) 32, 1 Octobre 1954; K. ADENAUER, Erinnerungen.
29. DDF, 1954, Annexes; also R. MASSIGLI, Une comédie des erreurs. 1943-1956. Souvenirs et
réflexions sur une étape de la construction européenne, Paris 1978, p. 483.