number 1 - Centre d'études et de recherches européennes Robert ...

44
Elena Calandri
ABC weapons and the heavy weapons listed in Annex 2, Article 107 of the Paris
Treaty, was going on in strategically exposed regions, the Council would direct and
control the manufacture of all other armaments, namely, Category B.
On 20 September the plan was outlined in Strasbourg before the Council of
Europe Assembly at which Winston Churchill had first mooted the idea of a European
army in August 1950. In a cold atmosphere, Mendès France explained the
French Assembly's vote as a condemnation of the far-reaching supranational implications
of the Paris Treaty and of Britain's inadequate involvement in the Continent's
security. However, he argued, a return to the Brussels Pact pure and simple
would not suffice, for its inter-governmental character would frustrate the need for
closer cooperation among the Western European nations. He suggested, therefore,
the admission of Italy and Germany to the five-power alliance, the spirit of which
France wanted to revive by injecting into it a dose of supranationality. The day
before Pierre-Olivier Lapie had been explaining to delegates how supranationality
was to be applied to armaments. 22
One week later the foreign ministers of the Six, of Britain, the United States and
Canada met in London. All the ministers summoned to Lancaster House agreed to
set limits on Germany's rearmament and to establish ways and means of putting to
the test her commitment to abstain from the manufacture of certain types of armaments
as well as the desirability of supervising weapons stockpiles across the Continent
of Europe. The British as well as the German memoranda to the conference,
retained the EDC Treaty provisions concerning the manufacture of ABC weapons
in strategically exposed areas. 23
Mendès France, however, went much further. He claimed continuity with the
Treaty of Paris, also as regards the role assigned to the armaments issue. In his
opening statement on 28 September he declared that he would consent only to a
package that included the means of controlling German rearmament, settlement of
the Saar question and an Anglo-American commitment to maintain a military presence
in Europe until expiry of the Brussels Pact. The rationale behind Germany's
dual admission to NATO and the WEU found its fullest application in the field of
armaments as Mendès France explained :
"(...) notre effort pour établir une limitation et un contrôle des armements ne peut pas
trouver son implantation exclusivement dans le NATO, puisque le NATO a pour
objet fondamental de chercher à organiser une meilleure défense commune à l'Occident
et que pour réaliser ce but le NATO (...) cherche systématiquement à établir des
forces de plus en plus larges (...)".
To be effective, controls should apply not only to armaments in stock but in production
as well. A general rule would thus put the entire Continent's production
under the control of the agency, which would be the sole client for continental
industry, the only exception being production for export and for national forces not
committed to NATO. The distribution of American aid would rank among the
22. L'année politique, 1954, pp. 437-439.
23. PRO: FO 1086/180, N.P.C.(54) 2 and N.P.C.(54) 3.