number 1 - Centre d'études et de recherches européennes Robert ...

The Western European Union Armaments Pool 41
l'Allemagne, qui ferait valoir la nécessité de ne pas stériliser le capital intellectuel et
technique que représente l'Allemagne de l'Ouest pour la défense occidentale... Pour
prévenir cette évolution, un programme de coopération franco-allemande dans un
cadre européen est indispensable". 11
Not only had cooperation with Germany become necessary. Changing relationships
in the West were making it urgent as well. Despite the impasse in the EDC
ratification process, news from military quarters confirmed that things were
moving and induced French diplomacy to adopt a long-term view. It was argued,
for example, by the French component of the Military Security Office in Koblenz
that since American and British attitudes were rendering controls short lived and
fragile, the French should cast about for long-term indirect means of keeping German
rearmament under control. Since West Germany did not yet have any armaments
industry, and her lack of geographical depth was an argument which pleaded
against implanting military production on her territory, the time was ripe for advancing
proposals for "constructive programmes for the joint financing, study and
manufacture of armaments" which could be safely sited in France where
manufacturing for the military was both advanced and underexploited. 12 News
about the activities of German technicians in a number of different countries as
well as about American employment of German technicians in Spain, confirmed
that time for taking the initiative was indeed running short. 13
On 8 September, the same day the Brussels Pact escamotage for German rearmament
was first mentioned in Paris the government endorsed, in an unofficial
note, the idea of an armaments community. 14 The day after, the Economic and Financial
Directorate of the Foreign Affairs Ministry gave it a fresh start. On 11 September,
Olivier Wormser circulated a note on the subject among high-ranking
officers of the Foreign and Defence Ministries.
Then, on 15 September, when Eden arrived in Paris to discuss plans for the
London conference he transmitted the note to the President of the Council. 15 He
indicated three "impératifs" which any six-power agreement on German rearmament
should comply with, namely,
a)" Permettre de connaître et de limiter la nature et la quantité d'armes disponibles
pour l'Allemagne d'une part, l'importance et l'autonomie du potentiel militaire allemand
d'autre part;
b) Permettre d'implanter les industries d'armement le plus à l'ouest et au sud possible,
éventuellement en Afrique du Nord, cette conception étant stratégiquement
saine et politiquement heureuse;
11. AMAE, Wormser, 23, s/direction d'Europe centrale, Note, 10 July 1954.
12. AMAE, Wormser, 23 Coignard, s.d. sept 1954.
13. AMAE, Wormser, 23 Note, 20 September 1954.
14. P.-O. LAPIE, De Blum à de Gaulle, p. 498.
15. AMAE, Wormser, 23, Olivier Wormser, Note, 11 September 1954, delivered to A. Gros, General
Faure, Jean-Marie Soutou, Pierre Boegner, Parodi, Margerie, and François Seydoux; ID, Note pour
le Président, 15 September 1954.