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34 John Gillingham nuclear weapons development; before the Treaty of Rome was even initialled it had a timetable for the testing and deploying them. 49 France was by no means ready to compromise on nuclear issues. The American side presented problems as well. Although Eisenhower and Dulles resolutely backed the EURATOM proposal in the interests of integration, it encountered such dogged opposition from the Atomic Energy Commission that, in the end, it never became operational. There was, quite simply, no way to prevent the organization from diverting nuclear material obtained from the United States to national weapons programmes. Without such deliveries, however, the proposal had no value as an integrative mechanism from Washington's viewpoint; the trans-Atlantic linkage would be broken and the new organization lack the resources with which to get operations underway. 50 EURATOM dominated American integration policy during the relance, which was fortunate if only because the State Department kept its hands off what most of its leading lights considered an unpromising attempt to form a customs union. Official Washington nonetheless responded graciously once it was in operation. 51 Big business, to the extent that could be said to have cared at all, recognized that capital flows more easily than trade: direct investment was easier than exportation. 52 American labor was almost wholly unconcerned with the issue of a European customs union. Among major economic interest, only the farm lobby raised anti-protectionist warning flags. 53 The main practical consequence of the EURATOM episode was the partial rehabilitation of the CSC. A 9 January 1956 memorandum from Dulles to Eisenhower reiterated the official line: The CSC was "a proven and successful institution in European political and economic life" and the Community, "still recovering from the EDC setback", would require "concrete United States support" in order to discharge the new responsibilities devolving upon it as a result of the EURATOM initiative. Once again: it was too important to put at risk. 54 Absurdly enough, the comeback grew out of a dispute over the supply of scrapiron, a raw material needed for steel production that was in short supply owing largely to Europe's post-Korea boom. Scrap was a perennial problem for the High Authority. Prices were volatile and varied nationally. The dependence of the different regions on the material differed in degree as did reliance upon domestic sources of supply. National cartels existed in each member state to deal with such difficulties. The problem was that West Germany, with low scrap requirements and abundant supplies, held the whip hand. The 49. J. DELMAS, "Die Entstehung und Entwicklung einer militärischen Atompolitik in Frankreich (1945-1956)" (manuscript), p. 7. 50. FRUS 1955-1957/IV "Letter from the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission (Strauss) to the Secretary of State", 7 March 1957. 51. FRUS 1955-1957/IV "Memorandum from the Undersecretary of State for Economic Affairs (Dillon) to the Chairman of the Council on Foreign Economic Policy (Randall)", 11 April 1957. 52. FRUS 1955-1957/IV "Memorandum from the Deputy Director of the Office of International Trade and Resources (Frank) to the Undersecretary of State for Economic Affairs (Dillon), 24 May 1957. 53. Romero, p. 173 54. FRUS 1955-1957/IV "Memorandum from the Secretary of State to the President", 9 January 1956.
American Monnetism and the European Coal-Steel Community in the Fifties 35 High Authority in an uncharacteristically sound and decisive move, created a mechanism to coordinate and level prices as well as regulate supply communitywide; it re-allocated the German surplus, in return for which the national cartels, including the reluctant Germans, declared themselves "voluntary organizations". To complement this set up, the High Authority founded a sole purchasing agency for imports, which bought only from designated American sellers. 55 In March 1955 the Commerce Department attacked this system on the grounds that it drained scrap from the US economy, presumably raising prices and causing shortages 56 and proposed instituting export controls. 57 At his 20 April meeting in Washington, Coppé warned that such a measure would force the High Authority to declare an emergency, impose maximum prices, and in general benefit cartelism. 58 On 15 June, "following several months of negotiation," the State Department, however, registered "a complete victory" over the Commerce Department; the existing program would continue and export controls not be imposed. 59 The Messina process apparently had made the difference. The persistence of shortages nonetheless kept the issue alive for the rest of the year. René Mayer, Monnet's successor as the CSC president, warned on 9 February 1956 that controls on scrap exports would result in the imposition of emergency measures for Community coal and steel outputs as well as scrap. 60 In October the Commerce Department resumed the campaign 61 and in the face of mounting exports actually suspended export licenses in February of the following year as a prelude to the introduction of controls. 62 Once again, however, the CSC, assisted by the State Department, prevailed. The sellers' cartel was abolished and an agency of the United States government prevented from protecting American interests with the very methods whose use its money promoted in Europe. 63 The scrapiron dispute was a final, inglorious chapter in the history of American promotion of supranationalism during the 1950's. The downdraft that began to blow through the 55. FRUS 1955-1957/IV "Report by the Department of State to the Council on Foreign Economic Policy", 16 March 1955 (CSC Scrap Importing Arrangements); also J. GILLINGHAM, Coal, Steel, and the Rebirth of Europe, pp. 323-325. 56. FRUS 1955-1957/IV "Memorandum from the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Barbour) to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Kalijarvi), 28 March 1955". 57. Ibid. 58. FRUS 1955-1957/IV "Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, April 20, 1955". 59. FRUS 1955-1917/IV "Memorandum from Ruth H. Phillips of the Office of European Regional Affairs to the Director of the Office (Palmer)", 15 June 1955. 60. FRUS 1955-1957/IV "Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of Commerce, February 9, 1957". 61. FRUS 1955-1957 "Memorandum from the Director of the Office of European Regional Affairs (Timmons) to the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Elbrick)", 4 October 1956. 62. FRUS 1955-1957/IV "Telegram, from the Acting United States Representative to the European Coal and Steel Community (Boochever) to the Department of State", 21 February 1957. 63. Ibid.
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American Monn<strong>et</strong>ism and the European Coal-Steel Community in the Fifties 35<br />
High Authority in an uncharacteristically sound and <strong>de</strong>cisive move, created a<br />
mechanism to coordinate and level prices as well as regulate supply communitywi<strong>de</strong>;<br />
it re-allocated the German surplus, in r<strong>et</strong>urn for which the national cartels,<br />
including the reluctant Germans, <strong>de</strong>clared themselves "voluntary organizations".<br />
To complement this s<strong>et</strong> up, the High Authority foun<strong>de</strong>d a sole purchasing agency<br />
for imports, which bought only from <strong>de</strong>signated American sellers. 55<br />
In March 1955 the Commerce Department attacked this system on the grounds<br />
that it drained scrap from the US economy, presumably raising prices and causing<br />
shortages 56 and proposed instituting export controls. 57 At his 20 April me<strong>et</strong>ing in<br />
Washington, Coppé warned that such a measure would force the High Authority to<br />
<strong>de</strong>clare an emergency, impose maximum prices, and in general benefit cartelism. 58<br />
On 15 June, "following several months of negotiation," the State Department,<br />
however, registered "a compl<strong>et</strong>e victory" over the Commerce Department; the existing<br />
program would continue and export controls not be imposed. 59 The Messina<br />
process apparently had ma<strong>de</strong> the difference.<br />
The persistence of shortages non<strong>et</strong>heless kept the issue alive for the rest of the<br />
year. René Mayer, Monn<strong>et</strong>'s successor as the CSC presi<strong>de</strong>nt, warned on 9 February<br />
1956 that controls on scrap exports would result in the imposition of emergency<br />
measures for Community coal and steel outputs as well as scrap. 60 In October the<br />
Commerce Department resumed the campaign 61 and in the face of mounting<br />
exports actually suspen<strong>de</strong>d export licenses in February of the following year as a<br />
prelu<strong>de</strong> to the introduction of controls. 62 Once again, however, the CSC, assisted<br />
by the State Department, prevailed. The sellers' cartel was abolished and an agency<br />
of the United States government prevented from protecting American interests with<br />
the very m<strong>et</strong>hods whose use its money promoted in Europe. 63 The scrapiron<br />
dispute was a final, inglorious chapter in the history of American promotion of<br />
supranationalism during the 1950's. The downdraft that began to blow through the<br />
55. FRUS 1955-1957/IV "Report by the Department of State to the Council on Foreign Economic<br />
Policy", 16 March 1955 (CSC Scrap Importing Arrangements); also J. GILLINGHAM, Coal,<br />
Steel, and the Rebirth of Europe, pp. 323-325.<br />
56. FRUS 1955-1957/IV "Memorandum from the Deputy Assistant Secr<strong>et</strong>ary of State for European<br />
Affairs (Barbour) to the Deputy Assistant Secr<strong>et</strong>ary of State for Economic Affairs (Kalijarvi), 28<br />
March 1955".<br />
57. Ibid.<br />
58. FRUS 1955-1957/IV "Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, April<br />
20, 1955".<br />
59. FRUS 1955-1917/IV "Memorandum from Ruth H. Phillips of the Office of European Regional<br />
Affairs to the Director of the Office (Palmer)", 15 June 1955.<br />
60. FRUS 1955-1957/IV "Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of Commerce, February 9,<br />
1957".<br />
61. FRUS 1955-1957 "Memorandum from the Director of the Office of European Regional Affairs<br />
(Timmons) to the Acting Assistant Secr<strong>et</strong>ary of State for European Affairs (Elbrick)", 4 October<br />
1956.<br />
62. FRUS 1955-1957/IV "Telegram, from the Acting United States Representative to the European<br />
Coal and Steel Community (Boochever) to the Department of State", 21 February 1957.<br />
63. Ibid.