number 1 - Centre d'études et de recherches européennes Robert ...

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John Gillingham
nuclear weapons development; before the Treaty of Rome was even initialled it had
a timetable for the testing and deploying them. 49 France was by no means ready to
compromise on nuclear issues. The American side presented problems as well.
Although Eisenhower and Dulles resolutely backed the EURATOM proposal in the
interests of integration, it encountered such dogged opposition from the Atomic
Energy Commission that, in the end, it never became operational. There was, quite
simply, no way to prevent the organization from diverting nuclear material obtained
from the United States to national weapons programmes. Without such deliveries,
however, the proposal had no value as an integrative mechanism from Washington's
viewpoint; the trans-Atlantic linkage would be broken and the new organization
lack the resources with which to get operations underway. 50
EURATOM dominated American integration policy during the relance, which
was fortunate if only because the State Department kept its hands off what most of
its leading lights considered an unpromising attempt to form a customs union.
Official Washington nonetheless responded graciously once it was in operation. 51
Big business, to the extent that could be said to have cared at all, recognized that
capital flows more easily than trade: direct investment was easier than exportation.
52 American labor was almost wholly unconcerned with the issue of a European
customs union. Among major economic interest, only the farm lobby raised
anti-protectionist warning flags. 53
The main practical consequence of the EURATOM episode was the partial
rehabilitation of the CSC. A 9 January 1956 memorandum from Dulles to Eisenhower
reiterated the official line: The CSC was "a proven and successful institution in
European political and economic life" and the Community, "still recovering from
the EDC setback", would require "concrete United States support" in order to
discharge the new responsibilities devolving upon it as a result of the EURATOM
initiative. Once again: it was too important to put at risk. 54 Absurdly enough, the
comeback grew out of a dispute over the supply of scrapiron, a raw material needed
for steel production that was in short supply owing largely to Europe's post-Korea
boom.
Scrap was a perennial problem for the High Authority. Prices were volatile and
varied nationally. The dependence of the different regions on the material differed
in degree as did reliance upon domestic sources of supply. National cartels existed
in each member state to deal with such difficulties. The problem was that West Germany,
with low scrap requirements and abundant supplies, held the whip hand. The
49. J. DELMAS, "Die Entstehung und Entwicklung einer militärischen Atompolitik in Frankreich
(1945-1956)" (manuscript), p. 7.
50. FRUS 1955-1957/IV "Letter from the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission (Strauss) to
the Secretary of State", 7 March 1957.
51. FRUS 1955-1957/IV "Memorandum from the Undersecretary of State for Economic Affairs (Dillon)
to the Chairman of the Council on Foreign Economic Policy (Randall)", 11 April 1957.
52. FRUS 1955-1957/IV "Memorandum from the Deputy Director of the Office of International Trade
and Resources (Frank) to the Undersecretary of State for Economic Affairs (Dillon), 24 May 1957.
53. Romero, p. 173
54. FRUS 1955-1957/IV "Memorandum from the Secretary of State to the President", 9 January 1956.