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American Monn<strong>et</strong>ism and the European Coal-Steel Community in the Fifties 33<br />
guous language, admitted <strong>de</strong>feat but recommen<strong>de</strong>d pressing on anyway. 45 The key<br />
passage noted that "If the High Authority had ma<strong>de</strong> no loans to firms believed to be<br />
involved in restrictive arrangements pending the outcome of its investigations or<br />
efforts to modify broadly the structure of coal mark<strong>et</strong>ing in the CSC area, coal<br />
companies would have been eliminated from consi<strong>de</strong>ration as loan recipients, since<br />
the loan would have had to be drawn by 30 June 1955." 46 The State Department<br />
nevertheless continued to lend cre<strong>de</strong>nce to the innumerable plans and projects<br />
rolled out of the Luxembourg papermill and above all rejected the i<strong>de</strong>a that faith<br />
either in the Coal and Steel Community or the supranational principle upon which<br />
it had been constructed had in any way been misplaced.<br />
EURATOM and the Scrapping of the CSC<br />
The so-called re-launching of Europe in June 1955 in<strong>de</strong>ed breathed new life into<br />
Monn<strong>et</strong>ism in general and the CSC in particular. The problem with the organization,<br />
"The Theologians" now argued, was that it operated in a sector of industry<br />
governed by entrenched interests; the supranational principle should therefore be<br />
applied elsewhere, in a related field just beginning to <strong>de</strong>velop – atomic power for<br />
instance. Coppé had floated such a notion as a trial balloon at his 28 April 1955<br />
me<strong>et</strong>ing in Washington and received an encouraging response. Was it not a brilliant<br />
i<strong>de</strong>a to link the European I<strong>de</strong>a to an industry of the future rather than those of the<br />
past? His interlocutors seized upon the logic of connecting energy to coal, which<br />
called for broa<strong>de</strong>ning the comp<strong>et</strong>ence of the High Authority as well as the opportunities<br />
opened for long-term planning and <strong>de</strong>velopment presented by the exciting<br />
new technology. 47 In addition, they could not have overlooked the fact that by controlling<br />
the supply of fissile material the United States could restrain the <strong>de</strong>velopment<br />
of national nuclear programs. The EURATOM proposal was ready to be<br />
hatched, and in<strong>de</strong>ed soon was. The Messina conference of 3-5 June, convoked to<br />
re-start the integration process, placed it at the top of the European agenda. Along<br />
with the plans for a customs union, it would become part of the Treaty of Rome.<br />
EURATOM was stillborn not least of all because atomic power would not prove<br />
to be the promised panacea. More immediately, West German industry wanted to<br />
<strong>de</strong>velop its own nuclear technology and, supported by the government, had no<br />
intention of subjecting itself to regulation by a supranational authority. 48 By the<br />
time the i<strong>de</strong>a was first broached, moreover, France had <strong>de</strong>ci<strong>de</strong>d to proceed with<br />
45. FRUS 1955-1957/IV "Report by the Department of State to the Council on Foreign Economic<br />
Policy", 28 October 1955.<br />
46. Ibid.<br />
47. FRUS 1955-1957/IV Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington April 20,<br />
1955.<br />
48. USNA, RG469 Box 68 "Euratom:pol" "Annual Report on Atomic Energy Developments in the<br />
Fe<strong>de</strong>ral Republic of Germany through March 31, 1957".