number 1 - Centre d'études et de recherches européennes Robert ...

American Monnetism and the European Coal-Steel Community in the Fifties 31
anything involving costs in coal somehow also involves costs in steel, he diverted
the discussion by insisting – as was in fact patently untrue – that "most cokeries in
the Community are located near the coal mines and belong to the mining firms,
instead of being located near and owned by the steel plants as is generally the case
in the United States. The gas produced by the coking plants, to the extent that it is
not used in the same ovens, is generally piped into the industrial gas network for
sale to the processing industries and to domestic consumers. It is often piped long
distances; for example from (...) the Ruhr to Berlin." 35 It was as if the famous Verbundwirtschaft,
a root source of German industrial strength and object of nearly a
decade of intermittent decartelization warfare, did not exist!
Since no one present at the meeting had either the wit, knowledge, or intention
to challenge the statement, Monnet pressed home his advantage. He candidly
admitted that the High Authority had not drawn up an investment program, cagily
hinted that such an approach smacked of socialism, and reassuringly added that the
individual firm could best determine its own investment requirements. He did not
deny that the High Authority (HA) would take a percentage cut on loans to firms,
requested the longest possible duration for the loan, and proposed that it be allowed
to make repayment in local currencies. In response to Humphrey's query as to why
the HA had failed to approach the World Bank, he answered revealingly that "this
would defeat the desired purpose of demonstrating continued United States support
for an integrated Europe." 36
He might have added that neither the World Bank, the Ex-Im Bank, nor any
other non-private bank could have made a loan without at least some strings
attached. But what Monnet had in mind was nothing less than carte blanche: "Perhaps,"
he mused, "the United States Government could in the very near future
announce that it will ask Congress to approve a loan to the Coal and Steel Community
of a certain amount, with terms and conditions to be determined by subsequent
negotiation," adding that this method would meet the need for reaffirmation of
United States support for the European Community." Such a reaffirmation could
not be bought at a discount, he warned: "Whereas a smaller loan would, of course,
still be interesting as a business proposition, a loan in the order of $400 million was
necessary to give full political significance to United States recognition of the new
prospects for economic development opened by the European Community (sic)." 37
Overriding the heated insistence of Dulles that anything less than the $400 million
demanded by Monnet would fail to produce the desired results, Stassen authorized
only $100 million. 38 In April 1954 President Eisenhower signed a bill
appropriating this amount on very generous terms, twenty-five years at 3 7/8 percent
not payable until 1958. The reduction, though drastic, hardly constituted a
defeat for Monnet. The money was unneeded. The High Authority levied a turn-
35. FRUS 1952-1954/VI "Draft Memorandum of Conversations", 15 December 1953.
36. Ibid.
37. Ibid.
38. FRUS 1952-1954/VI "Memorandum by the Director of the Foreign Operations Administration
(Stassen) to the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Kyes)", 12 February 1954.