number 1 - Centre d'études et de recherches européennes Robert ...
number 1 - Centre d'études et de recherches européennes Robert ... number 1 - Centre d'études et de recherches européennes Robert ...
22 John Gillingham postwar Europe can be better appreciated and the sources of European integration more thoroughly understood than at present. 2 The European Coal and Steel Community was historically significant less for what it did than because of its mere existence. The diplomacy that led to its founding gave West Germany an escape from the European doghouse. It also sealed a tacit and enduring understanding by which the potentially stronger power, Germany, would subsidize the weaker one, France, into equal partnership. The CSC enshrined this commitment. Undergirding it was an acknowledgement by both parties that the United States would make and enforce the rules. Although Jean Monnet, who inspired the Schuman Plan proposal, drafted these rules, they were modelled on the American antitrust tradition. As the first President of the High Authority, in office from August 1952 when the CSC commenced operations, to June 1955 when he finally stepped down, Monnet's main challenge was to break up the trusts and cartels that regulated coal and steel outputs in Western Europe. 3 The incompatibility between the reformist ideology of Washington and traditional continental "organized capitalism" nevertheless paralyzed the Coal and Steel Community. The High Authority did not in any sense "govern" the heavy industries of Germany, France, the Benelux nations, and Italy, which continued to do business as usual. 4 Nor did it have any of the "spillover effects" attributed to it by optimistic social scientists 5 ; the CSC neither spontaneously generated complementary institutions nor otherwise gave rise to new ways of doing business and changed relationships between government and industry. Indeed the whole episode of inspiring, negotiating, and operating the coal and steel community if anything simplified and accelerated the restoration process. It strengthened an only slightly reformed old order and helped foreclose the chance of generating a new one. In practice supranationalism was a farce and treated as such by the governments of the The Six which, after resuming the negotiations in May 1955 that led ultimately to the Treaty of Rome, abandoned it as a model. Its most important legacy was to have set in motion a diplomatic process which, taken in hand by the Europeans themselves, developed new approaches, better suited to local conditions, that in the end fulfilled the hopes of American policy-makers 6 . The myth of supranationalism nevertheless had in its most extreme form what amounted to a stranglehold on American integration policy during the 1950's. Its real heyday was in the years of Eisenhower and Dulles, and the same somewhat cloudy concept even continued to command loyalty during the presidency of John F. Kennedy. 7 Its hold can be explained partly by parallels in the American experi- 2. See A. S. MILWARD, The European Rescue of the Nation-State, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1992, pp. 11-13. 3. See J. GILLINGHAM, Coal, Steel and the Rebirth of Europe: The Germans and French from Ruhr Conflict to Economic Community, Cambridge, 1991. 4. Ibid, pp. 319-332. 5. Ibid, ix-x. 6. Ibid, pp. 361-363. 7. P. WINAND, "The European Challenge: Eisenhower, Kennedy and the United States of Europe," doctoral dissertation, Université Libre de Bruxelles, 1991, passim.
American Monnetism and the European Coal-Steel Community in the Fifties 23 ence: Why could not Europe, in breaking away from its past, form a federal union as did the thirteen colonies in parting company with the British? More immediately, the chokehold had to do with the existence of a State Department clique derided by its policy-making enemies as "The Theologians". 8 These were disciples Monnet had gathered after the war, men committed to framing American policy around his ideas. The faction operated under the patronage of Secretary of State Dulles, a pious devotee of Monnetism, as well as with the blessing of President Eisenhower, a man also under the Frenchman's spell. 9 To discuss the influence of this faction without prior description of its origins would invite suspicion as a conspiracy theorist. Fortunately, the memoirs, both published and unpublished, of many of its members together with a growing body of officially-sponsored writings as well as a budding scholarly literature leave no doubt about its immense influence. 10 What does remain to be determined is its full extent and the nature of its legacy. One cannot expect too much of a brief essay like this one, if only because American foreign policy is a coat of many colors. The National Security Council is where, since 1947, the patches comprising it have been stitched together into a complete garment, however ill-fitting. The influence of particular agencies of government, then as now, varies immensely by issue. No line of policy is ever without institutional challengers. On the issue of European integration in the 1950’s, some of the more prominent among them were the Departments of Commerce, Treasury, and Agriculture; the Federal Trade Commission; the Bureau of the Budget; the Atomic Energy Commission; the Marshall Plan and its successor organizations; the Pentagon and the security apparatus; important ad hoc creations like the Council on Foreign Economic Policy; and, as always, the United States Congress. The State Department itself was by no means single-minded, even as regards Europe. Advocacy for Asia and the Third World was strong and Europeanists were themselves divided. Opposed to the "Monnetists" were "Atlanticists" whose guru was the world federalist, Clarence Streit. 11 Suspicious of French designs as well as of Monnet, they warned incessantly that a Europe of The Six could someday turn hostile to the United States. Their objective was to cement the nations of the continent, along with Britain, into a security structure built around American nuclear power, to turn NATO, as it were, into an economic and political organization by replacing institutional buttresses of bricks and mortar with pre-stressed girders of ferro-concrete. 12 8. Th. ACHILLES, "Memoirs of an Irresponsible Memory", ms.737N f. 9. Ibid, 520I. 10. See most recently D. BRINKLEY and C. HACKETT (eds.), Jean Monnet: The Path to European Unity, New York, 1991. 11. Achilles, 329E f 12. Ibid, 460H-495I; Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS),1952-1954/VI "Memorandum by the Minister in France (Achilles), 28 November 1952
- Page 1 and 2: JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION HIS
- Page 3 and 4: Dieses Dokument wurde erstellt mit
- Page 5 and 6: Introductory note - Introduction -
- Page 7 and 8: Introductory note - Introduction -
- Page 9 and 10: Dieses Dokument wurde erstellt mit
- Page 11 and 12: Allegiance - The Past and the Futur
- Page 13 and 14: Allegiance - The Past and the Futur
- Page 15 and 16: Allegiance - The Past and the Futur
- Page 17 and 18: Allegiance - The Past and the Futur
- Page 19 and 20: Allegiance - The Past and the Futur
- Page 21 and 22: Allegiance - The Past and the Futur
- Page 23: Dieses Dokument wurde erstellt mit
- Page 27 and 28: American Monnetism and the European
- Page 29 and 30: American Monnetism and the European
- Page 31 and 32: American Monnetism and the European
- Page 33 and 34: American Monnetism and the European
- Page 35 and 36: American Monnetism and the European
- Page 37 and 38: American Monnetism and the European
- Page 39 and 40: Dieses Dokument wurde erstellt mit
- Page 41 and 42: The Western European Union Armament
- Page 43 and 44: The Western European Union Armament
- Page 45 and 46: The Western European Union Armament
- Page 47 and 48: The Western European Union Armament
- Page 49 and 50: The Western European Union Armament
- Page 51 and 52: The Western European Union Armament
- Page 53 and 54: The Western European Union Armament
- Page 55 and 56: The Western European Union Armament
- Page 57 and 58: The Western European Union Armament
- Page 59 and 60: The Western European Union Armament
- Page 61 and 62: The Western European Union Armament
- Page 63 and 64: The Western European Union Armament
- Page 65 and 66: The Western European Union Armament
- Page 67 and 68: Dieses Dokument wurde erstellt mit
- Page 69 and 70: The Bomb and Europe 67 I Only after
- Page 71 and 72: The Bomb and Europe 69 as incompati
- Page 73 and 74: The Bomb and Europe 71 had no idea
American Monn<strong>et</strong>ism and the European Coal-Steel Community in the Fifties 23<br />
ence: Why could not Europe, in breaking away from its past, form a fe<strong>de</strong>ral union<br />
as did the thirteen colonies in parting company with the British? More immediately,<br />
the chokehold had to do with the existence of a State Department clique <strong>de</strong>ri<strong>de</strong>d<br />
by its policy-making enemies as "The Theologians". 8 These were disciples<br />
Monn<strong>et</strong> had gathered after the war, men committed to framing American policy<br />
around his i<strong>de</strong>as. The faction operated un<strong>de</strong>r the patronage of Secr<strong>et</strong>ary of State<br />
Dulles, a pious <strong>de</strong>votee of Monn<strong>et</strong>ism, as well as with the blessing of Presi<strong>de</strong>nt<br />
Eisenhower, a man also un<strong>de</strong>r the Frenchman's spell. 9 To discuss the influence of<br />
this faction without prior <strong>de</strong>scription of its origins would invite suspicion as a conspiracy<br />
theorist. Fortunately, the memoirs, both published and unpublished, of<br />
many of its members tog<strong>et</strong>her with a growing body of officially-sponsored writings<br />
as well as a budding scholarly literature leave no doubt about its immense influence.<br />
10 What does remain to be d<strong>et</strong>ermined is its full extent and the nature of its<br />
legacy.<br />
One cannot expect too much of a brief essay like this one, if only because American<br />
foreign policy is a coat of many colors. The National Security Council is<br />
where, since 1947, the patches comprising it have been stitched tog<strong>et</strong>her into a<br />
compl<strong>et</strong>e garment, however ill-fitting. The influence of particular agencies of<br />
government, then as now, varies immensely by issue. No line of policy is ever<br />
without institutional challengers. On the issue of European integration in the<br />
1950’s, some of the more prominent among them were the Departments of Commerce,<br />
Treasury, and Agriculture; the Fe<strong>de</strong>ral Tra<strong>de</strong> Commission; the Bureau of the<br />
Budg<strong>et</strong>; the Atomic Energy Commission; the Marshall Plan and its successor organizations;<br />
the Pentagon and the security apparatus; important ad hoc creations like<br />
the Council on Foreign Economic Policy; and, as always, the United States Congress.<br />
The State Department itself was by no means single-min<strong>de</strong>d, even as regards<br />
Europe. Advocacy for Asia and the Third World was strong and Europeanists were<br />
themselves divi<strong>de</strong>d. Opposed to the "Monn<strong>et</strong>ists" were "Atlanticists" whose guru<br />
was the world fe<strong>de</strong>ralist, Clarence Streit. 11 Suspicious of French <strong>de</strong>signs as well as<br />
of Monn<strong>et</strong>, they warned incessantly that a Europe of The Six could someday turn<br />
hostile to the United States. Their objective was to cement the nations of the continent,<br />
along with Britain, into a security structure built around American nuclear<br />
power, to turn NATO, as it were, into an economic and political organization by<br />
replacing institutional buttresses of bricks and mortar with pre-stressed gir<strong>de</strong>rs of<br />
ferro-concr<strong>et</strong>e. 12<br />
8. Th. ACHILLES, "Memoirs of an Irresponsible Memory", ms.737N f.<br />
9. Ibid, 520I.<br />
10. See most recently D. BRINKLEY and C. HACKETT (eds.), Jean Monn<strong>et</strong>: The Path to European<br />
Unity, New York, 1991.<br />
11. Achilles, 329E f<br />
12. Ibid, 460H-495I; Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS),1952-1954/VI "Memorandum by<br />
the Minister in France (Achilles), 28 November 1952