number 1 - Centre d'études et de recherches européennes Robert ...

number 1 - Centre d'études et de recherches européennes Robert ... number 1 - Centre d'études et de recherches européennes Robert ...

cere.public.lu
from cere.public.lu More from this publisher
12.04.2015 Views

12 Alan S. Milward was the resurrection of the nation-state after its collapse between 1929 and 1945. 10 A fourth idea is that the loss of sovereignty of the European nation-state is inevitable because of the long-run path of economic and social development. 11 The state, this idea emphasises, has lost all control of its own destinies because of the permeability of its frontiers. Its domestic policies can differ from those of other states only in such insignificant ways as to make resistance to integration pointless and costly. Proponents of these four ideas write about different things. The first attracts historians who write about diplomacy and defence. The second attracts those who write about ideas and people and search for hidden motivations behind the public record. The third attracts those who write about the state, its policies, economic growth, the interactions between policy and markets, and the links between democracy and social change. The last attracts historians of the international economic system and its long-run evolution. The problem in the present stage of research is how to construct a hypothesis about integration which has the same heuristic usefulness as each of these separate lines of enquiry but which brings them together. At the least, historians working in these different fields should be brought to confront each other; at the best, such a confrontation might lead them to adopt each others' techniques and instead of working in an isolated intellectual tradition reach a new synthesis. European integration, if we define it as the voluntary surrender of some elements of state sovereignty, may not be new, in principle. There are plausible examples from medieval history. But in modern history on the scale in which it has occurred since 1945 it is a new phenomenon. It is, however, a phenomenon whose only new institutional characteristics are the supranational institutions of the successive European Communities and the European Union. With every respect for the aspirations of those who support these institutions, they have not been the locus of power and decision-making. Everything else than those institutions must have a historical continuity; people and their ideas, the states themselves, which were in most cases much more assertive and securely founded than in the inter-war period, and the gradual long-run developments in the European economy and the societies of which it was composed. The backward linkages of historical continuity must therefore be built into any hypothesis. Where such backward linkages appear in the present historiography they are as separated as the ideas on present trends. Those who see integration primarily as the 9. For a recent example of a work in which this is the underlying idea, C. HACKETT, Cautious Revolution: The European Community Arrives, Westport, Ct., 1990. For one in which it is also a prominent, but not the sole, idea, P. WINAND, Eisenhower, Kennedy and the United States of Europe, New York, 1993. 10. Recent expositions of this idea are A.S. MILWARD, The European Rescue of the Nation-State, London, 1992; L. TSOUKALIS, The New European Economy. The Politics and Economics of Integration, 2nd ed., Oxford, 1993. 11. A. BRESSAND and K. NICOLAIDIS, "Regional Integration in a Networked World Economy" and M. SHARP, "Technology and the Dynamics of Integration" in W. WALLACE, The Dynamics, op. cit.; A. BRESSAND, "Beyond Interdependence: 1992 as a global challenge", International Affairs, vol. 66, no. 1, 1990.

Allegiance – The Past and the Future 13 outcome of the traditional foreign policy objectives of states see the historical continuities in that recently fashionable subject 'The Rise and Fall of Nations'. 12 The United Kingdom, France and Germany all 'fell' and with them Europe, excluding Russia and the Soviet Union which, like the USA, 'rose'. The European Communities are an attempt to protect Europe from the worst effects of its fall, on the whole a predictable foreign policy response to the relentless flow of historical change. 13 From this idea comes the interest in discovering a pre-history of post-1945 integration in the inter-war period, in the way in which it may have been foreshadowed by French diplomacy in the post-1918 settlement or in the Briand proposals, for example. 14 Those who see integration as an act of human will similarly seek its intellectual pre-history in the inter-war period, particularly in European federalist thinking and in the small number of marginal political figures, such as Coudenhove-Kalergi, who propagandised the idea of a European 'unity'. 15 The assumption seems to be that there are intellectual links to the founding fathers of the European Community, although if there are they are proving remarkably hard to discover. Those who interpret integration as the refoundation of the nation-state see a historical continuity from the institution of universal suffrage after the First World War, the growth of mass democratic political parties and their growing domination of both parliaments and executive government, and the inter-war experiments with welfare and employment policies. 16 The Weimar Republic peeps shyly from their work as an infant prototype of the ambitious post-1945 state. For those, lastly, who see integration as a culmination of irreversible long-run economic trends the continuities are more broken. The permeability of European national frontiers to the movement of goods, capital and people was on all measurements greater between 1870 and 1914 than in the inter-war period and especially greater than in the 1930s. It is thus the inter-war period with its temporary reversal of these immutable economic trends which is the historical puzzle. European integration is the predictable political response to the development of a universal international capitalist economy, a universal path of technological development, and the inevitable fact that the proportion of 'national' income earned outside the frontier will grow as a universal pattern of development requires national economies to 12. P. KENNEDY, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers. Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000, London, 1988. 13. An argument specifically made by B. SUPPLE, "Economic History and the Decline of Britain", The Economic History Review, vol. XIVII, no. 3, 1994. 14. "Britain’s First "No" to Europe: Britain and the Briand Plan 1929-1930" in European Studies Review, vol. 10, 1980; P. STIRK (ed.), European Unity in Context: The Interwar Period, London, 1989. 15. A. BOSCO, Federal Union and the Origins of the "Churchill Proposal", The Federalist Debate in the United Kingdom from Munich to the Fall of France 1938-1940, London, 1992. S. Pistone, "Il ruolo di Altieri Spinelli nella genesi dell’art. 38 della comunità Europea di Defesa e del progetto di Comunità Politica Europea" in G. TRAUSCH (ed.), Die europäische Integration vom Schuman- Plan bis zu den Verträgen von Rom, Beiträge des Kolloquiums in Luxemburg 17.-19. Mai 1989, Baden-Baden, 1993. 16. A.S. MILWARD and V. SØRENSEN, "Interdependence or integration? A national choice", in A.S. MILWARD et al., The Frontier, op. cit.

Allegiance – The Past and the Future 13<br />

outcome of the traditional foreign policy objectives of states see the historical continuities<br />

in that recently fashionable subject 'The Rise and Fall of Nations'. 12 The<br />

United Kingdom, France and Germany all 'fell' and with them Europe, excluding<br />

Russia and the Sovi<strong>et</strong> Union which, like the USA, 'rose'. The European Communities<br />

are an attempt to protect Europe from the worst effects of its fall, on the whole<br />

a predictable foreign policy response to the relentless flow of historical change. 13<br />

From this i<strong>de</strong>a comes the interest in discovering a pre-history of post-1945 integration<br />

in the inter-war period, in the way in which it may have been foreshadowed by<br />

French diplomacy in the post-1918 s<strong>et</strong>tlement or in the Briand proposals, for<br />

example. 14 Those who see integration as an act of human will similarly seek its<br />

intellectual pre-history in the inter-war period, particularly in European fe<strong>de</strong>ralist<br />

thinking and in the small <strong>number</strong> of marginal political figures, such as Cou<strong>de</strong>nhove-Kalergi,<br />

who propagandised the i<strong>de</strong>a of a European 'unity'. 15 The assumption<br />

seems to be that there are intellectual links to the founding fathers of the European<br />

Community, although if there are they are proving remarkably hard to discover.<br />

Those who interpr<strong>et</strong> integration as the refoundation of the nation-state see a historical<br />

continuity from the institution of universal suffrage after the First World War,<br />

the growth of mass <strong>de</strong>mocratic political parties and their growing domination of<br />

both parliaments and executive government, and the inter-war experiments with<br />

welfare and employment policies. 16 The Weimar Republic peeps shyly from their<br />

work as an infant prototype of the ambitious post-1945 state.<br />

For those, lastly, who see integration as a culmination of irreversible long-run<br />

economic trends the continuities are more broken. The permeability of European<br />

national frontiers to the movement of goods, capital and people was on all measurements<br />

greater b<strong>et</strong>ween 1870 and 1914 than in the inter-war period and especially<br />

greater than in the 1930s. It is thus the inter-war period with its temporary reversal<br />

of these immutable economic trends which is the historical puzzle. European integration<br />

is the predictable political response to the <strong>de</strong>velopment of a universal international<br />

capitalist economy, a universal path of technological <strong>de</strong>velopment, and the<br />

inevitable fact that the proportion of 'national' income earned outsi<strong>de</strong> the frontier<br />

will grow as a universal pattern of <strong>de</strong>velopment requires national economies to<br />

12. P. KENNEDY, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers. Economic Change and Military Conflict<br />

from 1500 to 2000, London, 1988.<br />

13. An argument specifically ma<strong>de</strong> by B. SUPPLE, "Economic History and the Decline of Britain",<br />

The Economic History Review, vol. XIVII, no. 3, 1994.<br />

14. "Britain’s First "No" to Europe: Britain and the Briand Plan 1929-1930" in European Studies<br />

Review, vol. 10, 1980; P. STIRK (ed.), European Unity in Context: The Interwar Period, London,<br />

1989.<br />

15. A. BOSCO, Fe<strong>de</strong>ral Union and the Origins of the "Churchill Proposal", The Fe<strong>de</strong>ralist Debate in<br />

the United Kingdom from Munich to the Fall of France 1938-1940, London, 1992. S. Pistone, "Il<br />

ruolo di Altieri Spinelli nella genesi <strong>de</strong>ll’art. 38 <strong>de</strong>lla comunità Europea di Defesa e <strong>de</strong>l prog<strong>et</strong>to di<br />

Comunità Politica Europea" in G. TRAUSCH (ed.), Die europäische Integration vom Schuman-<br />

Plan bis zu <strong>de</strong>n Verträgen von Rom, Beiträge <strong>de</strong>s Kolloquiums in Luxemburg 17.-19. Mai 1989,<br />

Ba<strong>de</strong>n-Ba<strong>de</strong>n, 1993.<br />

16. A.S. MILWARD and V. SØRENSEN, "Inter<strong>de</strong>pen<strong>de</strong>nce or integration? A national choice", in A.S.<br />

MILWARD <strong>et</strong> al., The Frontier, op. cit.

Hooray! Your file is uploaded and ready to be published.

Saved successfully!

Ooh no, something went wrong!