number 1 - Centre d'études et de recherches européennes Robert ...

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10 Alan S. Milward ce's place in the world, this was also defined as securing France's place in the international economic framework. The Treaty defended France against the arrival of an international economic regime whose only regulatory agencies were GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) and the IMF (International Monetary Fond) and incorporated the restructured French empire into the commercial framework and supranationally regulatory European regime which it envisaged. The Quai d'Orsay was not on balance in favour of the Treaty. 7 The arrival in power of de Gaulle could hardly have cancelled the conclusions of the long and anxious debate in Paris which finally led to the decision to sign in spite of the anxieties and reluctance of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Indeed the failure of his early attempt to modify the régime of agricultural income support in France suggests that de Gaulle, for all his great powers, was bound by the same long-run political and economic circumstances which led the Fourth Republic to the EEC. De Gaulle's opposition to British entry was only clearly communicated to the British government through the British ambassador in Paris on 22 May 1962, and even then the opposition was not absolute and the negotiations in Brussels were allowed to continue despite the general's pessimism about their success. The harsh conclusions of the official British enquiry, that de Gaulle never wanted Britain in the EEC and that his opposition was decisive, can certainly not be accepted until the French archives have been properly examined. But there may well have been further limitations to the powers of de Gaulle and Macmillan which the narrow concentration of recent publications on their diplomacy fails to take into account. Suppose de Gaulle had not been opposed to British entry and on strategic grounds had preferred British membership. Could France, could even all the other member-states, have accepted the large and numerous exemptions from the economic and social clauses of the Treaty of Rome which the United Kingdom was still demanding when the negotiations were broken off? This was not put to the test. Little is known accurately about the paths of decisionmaking in the first years of the Gaullist regime. We do not actually know that de Gaulle's veto was uninfluenced by economic and social considerations. We do not know that it was he alone, as much of the comment implies, who took the decision. We can see from the British record that the French economic bureaucracy was divided, and some strongly opposed to British membership. Moreover, within the British government Macmillan had few unequivocal supporters in his pursuit of membership, and equivocation was, it seems, often based on economic, social, and cultural grounds, or even on prejudice. There seems therefore little reason why a preliminary history of the British application, based so far almost entirely on foreign office and cabinet papers, should be allowed to further encourage the retreat of political science to mere pragmatism and the growing assumption that the EEC was merely an alliance system, a form of interdependence and not a second stage of supranational integration. Were it so, no theory of integration would be needed, because the assumption would then 7. F.M.B. LYNCH, "Restoring France: The Road to Integration", in A.S. MILWARD et al., The Frontier of National Sovereignty. History and Theory 1945-1992, London, 1993.

Allegiance – The Past and the Future 11 follow that the Treaty of Rome was a rejection of the ideas implicit in the Treaty of Paris. To come to such a conclusion, which would also be to ignore the conclusions of research from other sources then foreign ministry papers, would perhaps best expose the danger of pursuing the history of diplomacy as though it had nothing to do with the history of economy and society. It would be wiser to consider the recent spate of publications on the first British application as interesting preliminary comments, from a strictly British perspective, based on a very narrow selection of evidence and paying only scant attention to the history of the Communities themselves. 8 In reality, many of the underlying assumptions in earlier comprehensive theories of integration remain untested by historians. This is particularly the case with assumptions made about long-run social and economic developments. The underlying assumption of Deutsch's 'community' theory, for example, that within western Europe and the north Atlantic area there was a sudden upward leap in the frequency of contacts between elites has not been studied in any systematic way. Neither have the many assertions of theorists of the international economy that increasing international trade in goods and capital has combined with changes in technology to make controls on national frontiers, and thus the demarcation of the nation-state's boundaries, meaningless, together with the concept of 'national income' which governments in the 1950s used as a basic tool of government. There are only observations about these ideas, no chronologically or technologically specific history which could confirm, refute or modify them or make them operable for detailed historical analysis. These are not the only examples. If historical research into the history of European integration is now to have its own proper agenda, including its own theoretical hypotheses, it should certainly not reject the assumptions of earlier integration theory, except where they have been disproved. The working hypotheses of historians in the present state of ignorance have to be heuristic. They must encourage and facilitate as wide a field of enquiry as possible. At the moment there seem to exist four different, but overlapping, ideas about the fundamental causes of the process of European integration. One is the idea, which the recent literature on the British application seems to support, that it responds to the traditional objectives of the foreign policy of states, a sort of alliance system adjusted to the realities of the world after 1945. Another is the idea that it originates in the modification, perhaps even the rejection, of the traditional objectives of the foreign policies of states. This idea emphasises the altruism of integration and reposes on the belief that its profoundest cause is the will to unify Europe, or parts of it. Integration springs from a deeply-held desire to change, for ever, the nation-state structure of the continent. 9 A third idea is that the process of integration was deliberately conceived and developed to preserve the nation-state by supporting a range of new social and economic policies whose very purpose 8. For the best recent summary of the relationship between the history of the separate states and that of the Community up to the signing of the Treaty of Rome, and one which puts the diplomatic history of integration into a more balanced perspective, P. GERBET, La naissance du Marché Commun, Paris, 1987.

Allegiance – The Past and the Future 11<br />

follow that the Treaty of Rome was a rejection of the i<strong>de</strong>as implicit in the Treaty of<br />

Paris. To come to such a conclusion, which would also be to ignore the conclusions<br />

of research from other sources then foreign ministry papers, would perhaps best<br />

expose the danger of pursuing the history of diplomacy as though it had nothing to<br />

do with the history of economy and soci<strong>et</strong>y. It would be wiser to consi<strong>de</strong>r the recent<br />

spate of publications on the first British application as interesting preliminary comments,<br />

from a strictly British perspective, based on a very narrow selection of evi<strong>de</strong>nce<br />

and paying only scant attention to the history of the Communities<br />

themselves. 8<br />

In reality, many of the un<strong>de</strong>rlying assumptions in earlier comprehensive theories<br />

of integration remain untested by historians. This is particularly the case with<br />

assumptions ma<strong>de</strong> about long-run social and economic <strong>de</strong>velopments. The un<strong>de</strong>rlying<br />

assumption of Deutsch's 'community' theory, for example, that within western<br />

Europe and the north Atlantic area there was a sud<strong>de</strong>n upward leap in the frequency<br />

of contacts b<strong>et</strong>ween elites has not been studied in any systematic way. Neither have<br />

the many assertions of theorists of the international economy that increasing international<br />

tra<strong>de</strong> in goods and capital has combined with changes in technology to<br />

make controls on national frontiers, and thus the <strong>de</strong>marcation of the nation-state's<br />

boundaries, meaningless, tog<strong>et</strong>her with the concept of 'national income' which<br />

governments in the 1950s used as a basic tool of government. There are only observations<br />

about these i<strong>de</strong>as, no chronologically or technologically specific history<br />

which could confirm, refute or modify them or make them operable for d<strong>et</strong>ailed<br />

historical analysis. These are not the only examples. If historical research into the<br />

history of European integration is now to have its own proper agenda, including its<br />

own theor<strong>et</strong>ical hypotheses, it should certainly not reject the assumptions of earlier<br />

integration theory, except where they have been disproved. The working hypotheses<br />

of historians in the present state of ignorance have to be heuristic. They must<br />

encourage and facilitate as wi<strong>de</strong> a field of enquiry as possible.<br />

At the moment there seem to exist four different, but overlapping, i<strong>de</strong>as about<br />

the fundamental causes of the process of European integration. One is the i<strong>de</strong>a,<br />

which the recent literature on the British application seems to support, that it<br />

responds to the traditional objectives of the foreign policy of states, a sort of<br />

alliance system adjusted to the realities of the world after 1945. Another is the i<strong>de</strong>a<br />

that it originates in the modification, perhaps even the rejection, of the traditional<br />

objectives of the foreign policies of states. This i<strong>de</strong>a emphasises the altruism of<br />

integration and reposes on the belief that its profoun<strong>de</strong>st cause is the will to unify<br />

Europe, or parts of it. Integration springs from a <strong>de</strong>eply-held <strong>de</strong>sire to change, for<br />

ever, the nation-state structure of the continent. 9 A third i<strong>de</strong>a is that the process of<br />

integration was <strong>de</strong>liberately conceived and <strong>de</strong>veloped to preserve the nation-state<br />

by supporting a range of new social and economic policies whose very purpose<br />

8. For the best recent summary of the relationship b<strong>et</strong>ween the history of the separate states and that of<br />

the Community up to the signing of the Treaty of Rome, and one which puts the diplomatic history<br />

of integration into a more balanced perspective, P. GERBET, La naissance du Marché Commun,<br />

Paris, 1987.

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