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118 Christian Pennera 1958, but grew only moderately after that, hitting the hundred mark at the end of the sixties 19 . On 4 March 1953 the Court drew up its Rules of Procedure which were based partly on the model supplied by the International Court of Justice 20 . There was confusion at the time about the languages of the new Europe, and the Court felt bound to point out in its Rules that it had four official languages (Article 27). It also determined the language which would govern all written and oral pleadings in each case. However, the Court specified that "the language in which the draft decision is drawn up shall be determined by the Court". In reality, from the start French was chosen as the "working language" for all internal work, a practice which has continued almost without exception until today 21 . The Court’s Work under the AEGIS of the ECSC In the early months the Court's role was not an onerous one. So true was this that, when the registrar recorded the first cases which, unfortunately, were settled out of court, champagne was drunk in celebration, so it is said. The serious business started with proceedings initiated by France, followed a few days later by Italy, against the decisions of the High Authority marking the start of a long series of cases referred to today as the "scrap cases". In its first two rulings, rendered on the same day 22 , the Court threw into sharp relief a fundamental rule which was invariably to dictate the stance it took, namely, that the treaty must be interpreted and applied in the light of its fundamental aims. Indeed, Articles 2, 3 and 4 of the Treaty, which lay down its aims and means of action, constituted "the fundamental provisions establishing the Common Market and common objectives of the Community (...) the Treaty shall oblige the High Authority to take into account all the aims" laid down therein in the definition, for example, of practices which are not allowed. In going about its affairs the High Authority was required to bear in mind, over and beyond the immediate aims pursued, the Community's task and general objectives. Apart from that, the Court called the High Authority to order : if a provision in the Treaty applying to the High Authority used the verb "must", the High Autho- 19. Meanwhile, with accessions succeeding one another and a growing number of cases, these figures have increased noticeably. The number of posts recorded in the Court's budget for 1994, including the Court of First Instance which was added to the Court in October 1988, is well over eight hundred persons. 20. Official Journal of the ECSC, 7.3.1953, p. 37 ; A. VAN HOUTTE, "La Cour de justice des Communautés européennes, Organisation et procédure", Cahiers de droit européen, 1983, p. 3 and thereafter. 21. For language aspects see P. BERTELOOT, "Babylone à Luxembourg –,Jurilinguistique à la Cour de justice", Europa Institut, Universität des Saarlandes, No. 136, 1988, 32 pp. 22. Cases 1/54 and 2/54, 21 December 1954, [1954 to 1956] ECR 1 and 37.

The Court of Justice and its Role as a driving Force in European Integration 119 rity had no discretionary power of appraisal and was obliged to act as the Treaty demanded it to do. A few years later and still under the aegis of the ECSC, the Court was to call this judgment back to mind when it made the first few articles of the Treaty into a collection of binding standards for the implementation of the Treaty. The Court said "The express reference made to Article 3 does not release the High Authority from its duty to observe the other articles of the Treaty and in particular Articles 2, 4 and 5 which, together with Article 3, must always be observed because they establish the fundamental objectives of the Community. Those provisions are binding and must be read together if they are to be properly applied." 23 The first two decisions of 1955 offered the particular characteristic that the initiators or applicants were two legal persons, i. e. Italian firms. It so happens that, although the Treaty does allow proceedings for annulment to be started by private persons, they are permitted to rely only on a very uncertain ground of annulment known as "misuse of powers" a narrow interpretation of which would have meant, in effect, that the Court was barring private individuals from access to Community justice and reducing the scope of the remedy almost to zero. However, brushing aside the view expressed by the Advocate General who had been exhorting it to "resist the temptation for any court, especially if it is of last instance, to make law accord with equity" the Court decided that for proceedings to be admissible, it would suffice if the applicant could formally "allege misuse of powers". To be allowed to plead, the plaintiff did not have to prove that there had been misuse of powers, which was left for appraisal by the Court of the merits of the case 24 . It was clearly the Court's intention to make sure that a private applicant would be able to take individual action effectively and easily, which was far from clear on the basis of the text of the Treaty on its own. In 1956, in the first case of the year, there surfaced the capital concept of direct applicability. After noting that certain trading practices were banned both by Article 4 and by other articles in the Treaty, such as Article 67, the Court declared that provisions relating to one and the same measure should be considered together, for the sake of proper application upon the same occasion. In pursuit of its judgments for the year 1954 the Court declared that "the provisions of Article 4 are sufficient of themselves and are directly applicable when they are not restated in any part of the Treaty". In practice, therefore, the "special charges imposed by the Member States in any form whatsoever" referred to in Article 4 (c) of the Treaty were henceforth banned. That is how the fundamental principle of the direct applicability of Community law came to be laid down and, consequently, the primacy of Community law over conflicting domestic law. The potential for this principle, of course, was not to be 23. Case 8/57, 21 June 1958, [1957 and 1958] ECR 245. 24. Cases 3 and 4/54, 11 February 1955, [1954 to 1956] ECR 63 and 91. The text of the corresponding article in the EEC Treaty (173) proved ultimately to be much more restrictive towards the individual, and the Court was unable to interpret it extensively ; in which respect see, for example, Cases 16 and 17/62, 14 December 1962, [1962] ECR 471.

118<br />

Christian Pennera<br />

1958, but grew only mo<strong>de</strong>rately after that, hitting the hundred mark at the end of<br />

the sixties 19 .<br />

On 4 March 1953 the Court drew up its Rules of Procedure which were based<br />

partly on the mo<strong>de</strong>l supplied by the International Court of Justice 20 . There was<br />

confusion at the time about the languages of the new Europe, and the Court felt<br />

bound to point out in its Rules that it had four official languages (Article 27).<br />

It also d<strong>et</strong>ermined the language which would govern all written and oral pleadings<br />

in each case. However, the Court specified that "the language in which the<br />

draft <strong>de</strong>cision is drawn up shall be d<strong>et</strong>ermined by the Court". In reality, from the<br />

start French was chosen as the "working language" for all internal work, a practice<br />

which has continued almost without exception until today 21 .<br />

The Court’s Work un<strong>de</strong>r the AEGIS of the ECSC<br />

In the early months the Court's role was not an onerous one. So true was this that,<br />

when the registrar recor<strong>de</strong>d the first cases which, unfortunately, were s<strong>et</strong>tled out of<br />

court, champagne was drunk in celebration, so it is said. The serious business started<br />

with proceedings initiated by France, followed a few days later by Italy, against<br />

the <strong>de</strong>cisions of the High Authority marking the start of a long series of cases referred<br />

to today as the "scrap cases".<br />

In its first two rulings, ren<strong>de</strong>red on the same day 22 , the Court threw into sharp<br />

relief a fundamental rule which was invariably to dictate the stance it took, namely,<br />

that the treaty must be interpr<strong>et</strong>ed and applied in the light of its fundamental aims.<br />

In<strong>de</strong>ed, Articles 2, 3 and 4 of the Treaty, which lay down its aims and means of<br />

action, constituted "the fundamental provisions establishing the Common Mark<strong>et</strong><br />

and common objectives of the Community (...) the Treaty shall oblige the High<br />

Authority to take into account all the aims" laid down therein in the <strong>de</strong>finition, for<br />

example, of practices which are not allowed.<br />

In going about its affairs the High Authority was required to bear in mind, over<br />

and beyond the immediate aims pursued, the Community's task and general objectives.<br />

Apart from that, the Court called the High Authority to or<strong>de</strong>r : if a provision<br />

in the Treaty applying to the High Authority used the verb "must", the High Autho-<br />

19. Meanwhile, with accessions succeeding one another and a growing <strong>number</strong> of cases, these figures<br />

have increased noticeably. The <strong>number</strong> of posts recor<strong>de</strong>d in the Court's budg<strong>et</strong> for 1994, including<br />

the Court of First Instance which was ad<strong>de</strong>d to the Court in October 1988, is well over eight hundred<br />

persons.<br />

20. Official Journal of the ECSC, 7.3.1953, p. 37 ; A. VAN HOUTTE, "La Cour <strong>de</strong> justice <strong>de</strong>s Communautés<br />

<strong>européennes</strong>, Organisation <strong>et</strong> procédure", Cahiers <strong>de</strong> droit européen, 1983, p. 3 and thereafter.<br />

21. For language aspects see P. BERTELOOT, "Babylone à Luxembourg –,Jurilinguistique à la Cour<br />

<strong>de</strong> justice", Europa Institut, Universität <strong>de</strong>s Saarlan<strong>de</strong>s, No. 136, 1988, 32 pp.<br />

22. Cases 1/54 and 2/54, 21 December 1954, [1954 to 1956] ECR 1 and 37.

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