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8 Alan S. Milward There is even less left of the economic theories of the same period that linked market expansion in the form of trade liberalisation to economic growth as a permanent characteristic of the modern state, the interest is far more in explaining the continuation of mercantilism and the 'new' protectionism. 2 Having demonstrated in its adolescence that the ideas of its parents were inapplicable to the modern world, the history of European integration is now faced in adult life with the task of replacing them with something better. As it sets about this task what themes could it pursue? Functionalism and neo-functionalism have all retreated to the periphery of the territory of political science. In economics the so-called 'new growth theory' puts more weight on the microeconomics of market adjustment and trade regulation than on the assertion that market expansion improves productivity rates and incomes and that European integration was a classic example of this process. The serious historical issues of how far the common market of the European Economic Community did contribute to higher growth rates of national income for its member states than, for example, in the United Kingdom before 1973, and how far the relatively faster growth rate of the United Kingdom than the original member states after that date was due to entry into that common market, are only now beginning to be tackled by historians. Their answers will surely be much more complicated than the simplistic assumptions of early growth theory. 3 For many political scientists the process of European integration is now seen, rather as traditional historians of diplomacy tend to see it, a process directed by the interplay of the foreign policy of great and medium-sized powers in search of the traditional objectives of influence and security. There is a solid core of historiography of the period in which long-run cultural, economic, and social trends do not appear, presumably because they are not thought to explain much. Casting aside its former theoretical dependence on these long-run trends, political science seems increasingly to accept that any theoretical explanation of European integration 1. An important stage in this retreat was marked by the publication of R.O. KEOHANE and S. HOFF- MANN, «Conclusions: Community Politics and Institutional Change» in W. WALLACE (ed.), The Dynamics of European Integration, London, 1990, and ibid., "Institutional Change in Europe in the 1980s" in R.O. KEOHANE and S. HOFFMANN (eds.), The New European Community. Decision Making and Institutional Change, Boulder, 1991. The enthusiastic reception given to A. MORAVC- SIK, "Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal Intergovernmentalist Approach", Journal of Common Market Studies, vol. 31, no. 4, December 1993, which dispenses entirely with the theory of supranational institutions in offering a model of present integration shows how far the retreat has gone. 2. A.J. BOEKESTIJN, "Economic Integration and the Preservation of Post-War Consensus in the Benelux Countries", Economic and Social History in the Netherlands, vol. V, 1993. 3. For an interesting attempt to measure the difference made by institutional arrangements to rates of national income growth and a discussion of the possible influence of European cooperative and integrationist arrangements on economic growth, B. EICHENGREEN, "Institutions and Economic Growth: Europe after World War II", paper presented to the Centre for Economic Policy Research Conference on the Economic Performance of Europe after the Second World War, 17/19 December 1993, Oxford.

Allegiance – The Past and the Future 9 should start from and perhaps be confined to those areas of state activity which used to be called 'Die Grosse Politik'. The timing by which government archives are opened for inspection – almost nowhere can they be inspected less than thirty years after the event – has enhanced this trend. The biggest contribution of historical research to European integration over the last three years has been made by a cluster of publications dealing with the United Kingdom's first attempt to join the European Economic Community and its failure in 1963. 4 Without exception these publications have depicted the United Kingdom's application and its pre-history of negotiation as the attempt of a declining but still important middle ranking power to retain its worldwide influence by shifting away from its weakening association with the Commonwealth to closer links with Europe. The motivation in this case for European integration has been invariably depicted as an adjustment of the United Kingdom's world strategic position. Similarly, General de Gaulle's veto on the British entry has been portrayed as solely a strategic decision. The major event which currently preoccupies historians in their pursuit of a history of European integration has in fact been analysed as though it were solely a matter of alliances and nuclear weapons. 5 Interestingly enough, the official enquiry into the failure of the negotiations undertaken by the British government immediately came to a similar conclusion. No matter what economic or institutional concessions the United Kingdom might have made in the negotiations, it argued, the general would have still forbidden British entry on strategic and foreign policy grounds. There can be no doubt that prime minister Macmillan did seek entry into the EEC for foreign policy purposes, to preserve what he could of the United Kingdom's world interests. Most of the conversations between de Gaulle and Macmillan, the sources which have been most used in recent publications, are about foreign policy and the long-term position of their countries. 6 But to draw the sweeping inference from this that for de Gaulle the EEC existed primarily for foreign policy and defence reasons seems unwise and premature. The complexity of the motives which led France to sign the Treaty of Rome has recently been elaborated. Although the essential reason for accepting the Treaty was indeed to secure Fran- 4. S. BURGESS and G. EDWARDS, "The Six Plus One: British Policy-Making and the Question of European Economic Integration, 1955", International Affairs, vol. 64, 1988; A. DOBSON, "The Special Relationship and European Integration" Diplomacy and Statecraft, vol. 2, no. 1, 1991; S. GEORGE, Britain and European Integration Since 1945, Oxford, 1991; G. WARNER and A. DEIGH- TON, "British Perceptions of Europe in the Postwar Period" in R. GIRAULT (ed.), Les Europe des Européens, Paris, 1993; J.W. YOUNG, Britain and European Unity 1945-1992, London, 1993. 5. On the role of nuclear weapons in the first negotiations for the United Kingdom’s entry into the EEC, I. CLARK, Nuclear Diplomacy and the Special Relationship. Britain’s Deterrent and America 1957-1962, Oxford, 1994. For an appreciation of the role of the EEC in French security policy, G.G. SOUTOU, "La France, l’Allemagne et les Accords de Paris, Relations internationales, no. 52, 1987, and "Les problèmes de sécurité dans les rapports franco-allemands de 1956 à 1963", ibid., no. 58, 1989. 6. It is a mixture of the records of those conversations and private papers left by MacMillan which led his biographer to this conclusion. A. HORNE, Macmillan, vol. 2, 1957-1986, London, 1989. But Horne was not concerned with the rest of the government.

8<br />

Alan S. Milward<br />

There is even less left of the economic theories of the same period that linked mark<strong>et</strong><br />

expansion in the form of tra<strong>de</strong> liberalisation to economic growth as a permanent<br />

characteristic of the mo<strong>de</strong>rn state, the interest is far more in explaining the<br />

continuation of mercantilism and the 'new' protectionism. 2 Having <strong>de</strong>monstrated in<br />

its adolescence that the i<strong>de</strong>as of its parents were inapplicable to the mo<strong>de</strong>rn world,<br />

the history of European integration is now faced in adult life with the task of<br />

replacing them with som<strong>et</strong>hing b<strong>et</strong>ter. As it s<strong>et</strong>s about this task what themes could<br />

it pursue?<br />

Functionalism and neo-functionalism have all r<strong>et</strong>reated to the periphery of the<br />

territory of political science. In economics the so-called 'new growth theory' puts<br />

more weight on the microeconomics of mark<strong>et</strong> adjustment and tra<strong>de</strong> regulation<br />

than on the assertion that mark<strong>et</strong> expansion improves productivity rates and incomes<br />

and that European integration was a classic example of this process. The<br />

serious historical issues of how far the common mark<strong>et</strong> of the European Economic<br />

Community did contribute to higher growth rates of national income for its member<br />

states than, for example, in the United Kingdom before 1973, and how far the<br />

relatively faster growth rate of the United Kingdom than the original member states<br />

after that date was due to entry into that common mark<strong>et</strong>, are only now beginning<br />

to be tackled by historians. Their answers will surely be much more complicated<br />

than the simplistic assumptions of early growth theory. 3<br />

For many political scientists the process of European integration is now seen,<br />

rather as traditional historians of diplomacy tend to see it, a process directed by the<br />

interplay of the foreign policy of great and medium-sized powers in search of the<br />

traditional objectives of influence and security. There is a solid core of historiography<br />

of the period in which long-run cultural, economic, and social trends do not<br />

appear, presumably because they are not thought to explain much. Casting asi<strong>de</strong> its<br />

former theor<strong>et</strong>ical <strong>de</strong>pen<strong>de</strong>nce on these long-run trends, political science seems<br />

increasingly to accept that any theor<strong>et</strong>ical explanation of European integration<br />

1. An important stage in this r<strong>et</strong>reat was marked by the publication of R.O. KEOHANE and S. HOFF-<br />

MANN, «Conclusions: Community Politics and Institutional Change» in W. WALLACE (ed.), The<br />

Dynamics of European Integration, London, 1990, and ibid., "Institutional Change in Europe in the<br />

1980s" in R.O. KEOHANE and S. HOFFMANN (eds.), The New European Community. Decision<br />

Making and Institutional Change, Boul<strong>de</strong>r, 1991. The enthusiastic reception given to A. MORAVC-<br />

SIK, "Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal Intergovernmentalist<br />

Approach", Journal of Common Mark<strong>et</strong> Studies, vol. 31, no. 4, December 1993, which dispenses<br />

entirely with the theory of supranational institutions in offering a mo<strong>de</strong>l of present integration shows<br />

how far the r<strong>et</strong>reat has gone.<br />

2. A.J. BOEKESTIJN, "Economic Integration and the Preservation of Post-War Consensus in the Benelux<br />

Countries", Economic and Social History in the N<strong>et</strong>herlands, vol. V, 1993.<br />

3. For an interesting attempt to measure the difference ma<strong>de</strong> by institutional arrangements to rates of<br />

national income growth and a discussion of the possible influence of European cooperative and integrationist<br />

arrangements on economic growth, B. EICHENGREEN, "Institutions and Economic<br />

Growth: Europe after World War II", paper presented to the <strong>Centre</strong> for Economic Policy Research<br />

Conference on the Economic Performance of Europe after the Second World War, 17/19 December<br />

1993, Oxford.

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