Statutory Interpretation The Technique of Statutory ... - Francis Bennion

Guides to Legislative Intention III: Presumptions 167
consequences (whether merely neutral or positively advantageous) may be called 'beneficent'. For this
purpose a consequence clearly intended by Parliament is to be treated as beneficent even though the
judge personally dislikes it.
Consequences for the parties and the law
In judging consequences it is important to distinguish consequences to the parties in the instant case
and consequences for the law generally. It will usually be a straightforward matter to determine the
effect on the court's final order of a finding in favour of one possible construction rather than another.
But the court must also bear in mind that under the doctrine of precedent its decision may be of
binding, or at least persuasive, authority for the future.
The court may be less unwilling to adopt an 'adverse' construction where some functionary is interposed
whose discretion may be so exercised as to reduce the practical ill-effects (see, eg, IRC v Hinchy [1960]
AC 748).
Judges are particularly ready to apply a strained construction on consequential grounds where this will
assist the work of the courts. Thus in R v Stratford-on-Avon District Council, ex pane Jackson [1985] 1
WLR 1319 the Court of Appeal held that, although the literal meaning of RSC Ord 53, r 4 is to lay
down a time limit for making substantive applications for judicial review, it should be construed
instead as referring to applications for leave to make such substantive applications. This reading
confirmed the existing practice of the courts, which is 'the only sensible course from a practical point
of view' (p 772).
Consequences tending both ways
Since the consequences to be borne in mind are often of a wide variety it is not surprising that they
may tend in both directions. Each of the opposing constructions may involve some adverse and some
beneficent consequences. Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest pointed this out in relation to anti-racist
legislation:
In one sense there results for some people a limitation on what could be called their freedom: they may no
longer treat certain people, because of their colour or race, or ethnic or national origins, less favourably than they
would treat others. But in the same cause of freedom, although differently viewed, Parliament has, in statutory
terms now calling for consideration, proscribed discrimination . . . (Charter v Race Relations Board [1973] AC
868, 889).
Where the result of a literal construction is sufficiently 'adverse', consequential construction usually
indicates a decision requiring a strained construction of the enactment (eg Mann v Malcolmson (The
Beta) (1865) 3 Moo PCC NS 23).