Statutory Interpretation The Technique of Statutory ... - Francis Bennion
Statutory Interpretation The Technique of Statutory ... - Francis Bennion
Statutory Interpretation The Technique of Statutory ... - Francis Bennion
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Guides to Legislative Intention III: Presumptions 161<br />
the existing law may appear the reverse to their successors <strong>of</strong> a different political hue. Until the<br />
successors get round to repealing an Act with which they disagree, it stands as the will <strong>of</strong> the Parliament<br />
that made it. <strong>The</strong> same applies where a decisive change has occurred in the views <strong>of</strong> a political party<br />
since the Act's passing (eg R v Secretary <strong>of</strong> State for the Environment, ex pane Greater London Council<br />
(1983) <strong>The</strong> Times, 2 December).<br />
It is important not to let confusion creep in by treating the mischief as somehow altered by later events.<br />
<strong>The</strong>se may indeed require to be taken into account, but not as altering or glossing the historical facts<br />
which occasioned the passing <strong>of</strong> the Act.<br />
Hey don's Case<br />
In medieval times the country was largely governed by common law. <strong>The</strong>n, as social progress set in,<br />
there arose many varieties <strong>of</strong> social mischief. <strong>The</strong>se exposed legal mischiefs, which marred the<br />
common law and required correction by Parliament. Arguments began to arise among common<br />
lawyers as to the attitude the judges administering the common law should adopt towards legislative<br />
interventions. <strong>The</strong> judges, having framed 'our lady the common law', were not disposed to<br />
acknowledge flaws in their creation. <strong>The</strong> question became pressing, and at the instance <strong>of</strong> the king<br />
was considered by the Barons <strong>of</strong> the Exchequer in Hey don's Case (1584) 3 Co Rep 7a. <strong>The</strong>y passed the<br />
following resolution (I have modified the wording slightly to assist reference and improve clarity):<br />
That for the sure and true interpretation <strong>of</strong> all statutes in general (be they penal or beneficial, restrictive or<br />
enlarging <strong>of</strong> the common law), four things are to be discerned and considered:<br />
(1) what was the common law before the making <strong>of</strong> the Act;<br />
(2) what was the mischief and defect for which the common law did not provide;<br />
(3) what remedy the Parliament hath resolved and appointed to cure the disease <strong>of</strong> the commonwealth; and<br />
(4) the true reason <strong>of</strong> the remedy,<br />
and then the <strong>of</strong>fice <strong>of</strong> all the judges is always to make such construction as shall:<br />
(a) suppress the mischief and advance the remedy, and<br />
(b) suppress subtle inventions and evasions for the continuance <strong>of</strong> the mischief pro privato commodo (for<br />
private benefit), and<br />
(c) add force and life to the cure and remedy according to the true intent <strong>of</strong> the makers <strong>of</strong> the Act pro bono<br />
publico (for the public good).<br />
This resolution, which forms the basis <strong>of</strong> the so-called 'mischief rule' <strong>of</strong> statutory interpretation, has<br />
been approved in many cases down to the present day (eg Salkeld v Johnson (1848) 2 Ex 256, 272;<br />
Blackwell v England (1857) 8 El & Bl Rep 541; River Wear Commissioners v Adamson (1877) 2 App<br />
Cas 743, 764; Re May fair