Statutory Interpretation The Technique of Statutory ... - Francis Bennion
Statutory Interpretation The Technique of Statutory ... - Francis Bennion
Statutory Interpretation The Technique of Statutory ... - Francis Bennion
Create successful ePaper yourself
Turn your PDF publications into a flip-book with our unique Google optimized e-Paper software.
*** Page 158 - Chapter Eleven<br />
Guides to Legislative Intention III: Presumptions<br />
Derived from the Nature <strong>of</strong> Legislation<br />
<strong>The</strong> present chapter deals with the ten presumptions derived from the nature <strong>of</strong> legislation, which<br />
are that:<br />
1 the text is the primary indication <strong>of</strong> intended meaning<br />
2 the text is prima facie to be given a literal construction<br />
3 the court is to apply the remedy provided for the 'mischief<br />
4 an enactment is to be given a purposive construction<br />
5 regard is to be had to the consequences <strong>of</strong> a particular construction<br />
6 an 'absurd' result is not intended<br />
7 errors in the legislation are to be rectified<br />
8 evasion <strong>of</strong> the legislation is not to be allowed<br />
9 the legislation is intended to be construed by the light <strong>of</strong> ancillary rules <strong>of</strong> law and legal<br />
maxims<br />
10 an updating construction is to be applied wherever requisite.<br />
Nature <strong>of</strong> legislative presumptions A presumption affords guidance, arising from the nature <strong>of</strong> legislation<br />
in a parliamentary democracy, as to the legislator's prima facie intention regarding the working <strong>of</strong><br />
the enactment. It looks in particular to the effective implementation <strong>of</strong> what the legislator has enacted.<br />
Presumption that text to be primary indication <strong>of</strong> intention<br />
In construing an enactment, the text <strong>of</strong> the enactment, in its setting within the Act or instrument<br />
containing it, is to be regarded as the pre-eminent indication <strong>of</strong> the legislator's intention. British<br />
courts, towards the end <strong>of</strong> the twentieth century, regard the text <strong>of</strong> Acts <strong>of</strong> the United Kingdom<br />
Parliament with great respect. When called upon to construe an Act, the court takes its primary duty<br />
as being to look at the text and say what, in itself, it means: '<strong>The</strong> safer and more correct course <strong>of</strong><br />
dealing with a question <strong>of</strong> construction is to take the words themselves and arrive if possible at their<br />
meaning without, in the first instance, reference to cases' (Barrel! v Fordree [1932] AC 676, 682).<br />
158