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Statutory Interpretation The Technique of Statutory ... - Francis Bennion

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*** Page 158 - Chapter Eleven<br />

Guides to Legislative Intention III: Presumptions<br />

Derived from the Nature <strong>of</strong> Legislation<br />

<strong>The</strong> present chapter deals with the ten presumptions derived from the nature <strong>of</strong> legislation, which<br />

are that:<br />

1 the text is the primary indication <strong>of</strong> intended meaning<br />

2 the text is prima facie to be given a literal construction<br />

3 the court is to apply the remedy provided for the 'mischief<br />

4 an enactment is to be given a purposive construction<br />

5 regard is to be had to the consequences <strong>of</strong> a particular construction<br />

6 an 'absurd' result is not intended<br />

7 errors in the legislation are to be rectified<br />

8 evasion <strong>of</strong> the legislation is not to be allowed<br />

9 the legislation is intended to be construed by the light <strong>of</strong> ancillary rules <strong>of</strong> law and legal<br />

maxims<br />

10 an updating construction is to be applied wherever requisite.<br />

Nature <strong>of</strong> legislative presumptions A presumption affords guidance, arising from the nature <strong>of</strong> legislation<br />

in a parliamentary democracy, as to the legislator's prima facie intention regarding the working <strong>of</strong><br />

the enactment. It looks in particular to the effective implementation <strong>of</strong> what the legislator has enacted.<br />

Presumption that text to be primary indication <strong>of</strong> intention<br />

In construing an enactment, the text <strong>of</strong> the enactment, in its setting within the Act or instrument<br />

containing it, is to be regarded as the pre-eminent indication <strong>of</strong> the legislator's intention. British<br />

courts, towards the end <strong>of</strong> the twentieth century, regard the text <strong>of</strong> Acts <strong>of</strong> the United Kingdom<br />

Parliament with great respect. When called upon to construe an Act, the court takes its primary duty<br />

as being to look at the text and say what, in itself, it means: '<strong>The</strong> safer and more correct course <strong>of</strong><br />

dealing with a question <strong>of</strong> construction is to take the words themselves and arrive if possible at their<br />

meaning without, in the first instance, reference to cases' (Barrel! v Fordree [1932] AC 676, 682).<br />

158

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