Statutory Interpretation The Technique of Statutory ... - Francis Bennion

150 Part II — Statutory Interpretation
and legal proceedings should not be removed or impaired, except under clear authority of law. The
rule of law requires that the law should apply equally, and that all should be equal before it (Richards v
McBride (1881) 51 LJMC 15, at p 16). It also requires that all penalties be inflicted by due process of
law, which in turn demands that there should be no unauthorised interference with that process. In
general, no citizen should without clear authority be 'shut out from the seat of justice' {Aspinall v
Sterling Mansell Ltd [1981] 3 All ER 866, 867). This applies even to a convicted prisoner (Raymond v
Honey [1983] AC 1, 12). These principles are embedded in various ancient constitutional enactments.
Thus a chapter of Magna Carta enshrines the Crown's promise that a man shall not be condemned
'but by lawful judgment of his peers, or by the law of the land'. It goes on: 'we will sell to no
man, we will not deny or defer to any man either justice or right' (25 Edw 1 (1297) c 29). The
statute 28 Edw 3 c 3 (1354) enacts that 'no man of what estate or condition that he be, shall be put out
of land or tenement, nor taken, nor imprisoned, nor disinherited, nor put to death, without being
brought to answer by due process of law'. The Bill of Rights (1688) forbids excessive bail, excessive
fines, and cruel and unusual punishments; and requires jurors to be duly empannelled and returned.
Alleged deprivation of the common law right to trial by jury will be strictly construed (Looker v
Halcomb (1827) 4 Bing 183, 188).
The right to bring, defend and conduct legal proceedings without unwarranted interference is a basic
right of citizenship (In re the Vexatious Actions Act 1896—in re Bernard Boaler [1915] 1 KB 21, 34-5).
While the court has control, subject to legal rules, of its own procedure, this does not authorise
any ruling which abridges the basic right. In the case of a defendant, the right covers 'the right to
defend himself in the litigation as he and his advisers think fit [and ] choose the witnesses that he
will call' (Starr v National Coal Board [1977] 1 WLR 63, 71).
The removal of legal remedies is strictly construed (Boulting v Association of Cinematograph, Televsion
and Allied Technicians [1963] 2 QB 606), as are provisions allowing technical defences (Sanders v
Scott [1961] 2 QB 326). It is presumed that a party is not to be deprived of his right of appeal
(Mackey v Monks [1918] AC 59, 91). A litigant who has obtained a judgment is by law entitled not
to be deprived of that judgment without 'very solid grounds' (Brown v Dean [1910] AC 373, 374. An
important aspect of rights in relation to law is the right not to have legal burdens thrust upon one.
It is a detriment to be obliged to carry out statutory duties against one's will, or to incur the risk of
being the subject of legal proceedings. This is so even though no economic loss is involved. (R v
Loxdale (1758) 1 Burr 445; R v Cousins (1864) 33 LJMC 87; Finch v Bannister [1908] 2 KB 441; Gaby v
Palmer (1916) 85 LJKB 1240, 1244.)
Articles 5 and 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights give elaborate protection for rights in
legal proceedings. This covers