Statutory Interpretation The Technique of Statutory ... - Francis Bennion

Guides to Legislative Intention IV: Linguistic Canons
203 Words of exception
The expressio unius principle is often applied to words of exception. An excepting provision may
except certain categories either from the Act in which the provision is contained, or from the law
generally. It is presumed that these are the only exceptions of the kind intended. The Road Traffic
Regulation Act 1967, s 79 states that no statutory provision imposing a speed limit on motor vehicles
shall apply to any vehicle on an occasion when it is being used for fire brigage, ambulance or police
purposes. Speed limits are not the only statutory restrictions which might hinder such vehicles in an
emergency, yet under the expressio unius principle these other restrictions, such as the duty to stop at a
red light, would continue to apply (see Buckoke v Greater London Council [1971] 1 Ch 655).
Words providing remedies etc
Where an Act sets out specific remedies, penalties or procedures it is presumed that other
remedies, penalties or procedures that might have been applicable are by implication excluded (eg
Felix v Shiva [1983] QB 82 90-91; Payne v Lord Harris of Greenwich [1981] 1 WLR 754, 767).
Where other cause for the expressio unius principle
The expressio unius principle does not apply where it appears that there is a reason for singling out
the words of designation other than an intention to exclude other terms. Thus they may be used
merely as examples, or be included ex abundanti cautela, or for some other purpose. By the Poor Relief
Act 1601, s 1 a poor-rate was imposed on occupiers of 'lands, houses, tithes and coal mines'. In R v
Inhabitants of Sedgley (1831) 2 B & Ad 65 the argument that other mines were also intended to be
rated, and that coal mines were mentioned merely as an example, was rejected (see also C Maurice &
Co Ltd v Minister of Labour [1968] 1 WLR 1337, 1345; Prestcold (Central) Ltd v Minister of Labour
[1969] 1 WLR 89).
As to items mentioned ex abundanti cautela see McLaughlin v Westgarth (1906) 75 LJPC 117, 118
(savings in private Acts); Duke of Newcastle v Morris (1870) LR 4 HL 661, 671 (peers' privilege of
freedom from arrest) and the Canadian case of Docksteader v Clark (1903) 11 BCR 37. For an
example of a case where there was some other reason for singling out the item in question for
express mention see Dean v Wiesengrund [1955] 2 QB 120.
If an item which on the application of the expressio unius principle would be excluded is of a class
which came into existence only after the passing of the enactment, it is probably right to disregard
the principle as an aid to construction (A-G for Northern Ireland's Reference (No 1 of 1975) [1977] AC
105, 132).