Statutory Interpretation The Technique of Statutory ... - Francis Bennion

186 Part II — Statutory Interpretation
a contract. If an Act can be said to form or ratify a contract its meaning cannot properly be
'developed' in the usual way, an obvious example being an Act implementing an international
convention. (The convention itself may be subject to 'development', but that is another matter.)
Thus in a Canadian constitutional appeal Lord Sankey LC said:
The process of interpretation as the years go on ought not to be allowed to dim or whittle down the provisions
of the original contract upon which the federation was founded, nor is it legitimate that any judicial construction of
the provisions of ss 91 and 92 should impose a new and different contract upon the federating bodies. (Re the
Regulation and Control of Aeronautics in Canada [1932] AC 54, 70.)
It was held in A-G for Alberta v Huggard Assets Ltd [1953] AC 420 that the Tenures Abolition Act
1660 was of the nature of a compact between the king and his people in England and Wales, and
thus did not extend to after-acquired territories of the Crown such as those in Canada.
An obvious instance of the Act which partakes of the nature of a compact is the private Act. The
courts treat this as a contract between its promoters (or that portion of the public directly interested in
it) and Parliament (Milnes v Mayor etc of Huddersfield (1886) 11 App Cas 511; Perchard v
Heywood (1800) 8 TR 468).
Increase in counter-mischief
Where, owing to developments occurring since the original passing of an enactment, a counter-mischief
comes into existence or increases, it is presumed that Parliament intends the court so to construe the
enactment as to minimise the adverse effects of the counter-mischief (eg R v Wilkinson [1980] 1 WLR
396).