Complementarity: Contest or Collaboration? - FICHL
Complementarity: Contest or Collaboration? - FICHL
Complementarity: Contest or Collaboration? - FICHL
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The Principle of <strong>Complementarity</strong>: a Means Towards a M<strong>or</strong>e Pragmatic Enf<strong>or</strong>cement<br />
of the Goal Pursued by Universal Jurisdiction?<br />
rum state and the crime, universal jurisdiction requires no such nexus. 52<br />
Instead it finds its basis in the notion that certain jus cogens and other<br />
perempt<strong>or</strong>y n<strong>or</strong>ms of international law are so widely and universally end<strong>or</strong>sed,<br />
and that their violations are so harmful, that they constitute a profound<br />
attack not just on the immediate victims <strong>or</strong> to the state community<br />
to which victims are related, but on the international community as a<br />
whole. As a result of this offence to the international community, the the<strong>or</strong>y<br />
of universal jurisdiction asserts that all states have a legitimate interest<br />
and are entitled – and even obliged in some circumstances – to bring proceedings<br />
against the perpetrat<strong>or</strong>s, even if there is no link between the f<strong>or</strong>um<br />
state and the crime. 53 Universal jurisdiction allows f<strong>or</strong> the trial of<br />
international crimes committed anywhere in the w<strong>or</strong>ld by and against<br />
anybody. In many respects, it is an unprecedented mechanism empowering<br />
states to prosecute and try alleged perpetrat<strong>or</strong>s of c<strong>or</strong>e international<br />
crimes.<br />
Traditionally, the ratio legis of universal jurisdiction is justified by<br />
two main ideas. First, as stated, some crimes are so grave that they harm<br />
the entire international community. Second, the gravity of these crimes<br />
implies that no safe haven should be available f<strong>or</strong> those who commit<br />
them. Although these justifications may not always appear realistic, they<br />
clearly explain why the international community <strong>or</strong> individual states intervene<br />
by bringing proceedings and prosecuting the perpetrat<strong>or</strong>s of such<br />
crimes. 54<br />
Here, it is imp<strong>or</strong>tant to recall two points. First, that “to the extent<br />
that a title to prescriptive universal criminal jurisdiction exists under customary<br />
international law, a state that has exercised this title must be presumed<br />
to have the jurisdiction title to adjudicate the matter by way of<br />
52 Roger O‟Keefe, “Universal Jurisdiction: Clarifying the Basic Concept”, see supra<br />
note 3, pp. 745-746 and references cited therein.<br />
53 Xavier Philippe, “The principles of universal jurisdiction and complementarity how<br />
do the two principles intermesh?”, see supra note 49, p. 377.<br />
54 International Court of Justice, Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000, see supra note 17,<br />
Dissenting opinion of Judge ad hoc Van den Wyngaert, para. 46; Ge<strong>or</strong>ges Abi-Saab,<br />
“The Proper Role of Universal Jurisdiction”, in Journal of International Criminal<br />
Justice, 2003, vol. 1, no. 3, p. 597; Philip Grant, “Les poursuites nationales et la compétence<br />
universelle”, in Robert Kolb, Droit international pénal, Bruylant/Helbing and<br />
Lichtenhahn, Bruxelles/Bâle, 2008, p. 454; Fl<strong>or</strong>ian Jessberger, “Universal Jurisdiction”,<br />
see supra note 49, p. 556.<br />
<strong>FICHL</strong> Publication Series No. 7 (2010) – page 263