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Cogency v2 n2

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Wittgenstein and the Logic of Deep Disagreement / D. M. GODDEN & W. H. BRENNER<br />

Isn’t “defect” a family resemblance term? And aren’t “neurophilosophers”<br />

such as Paul Churchland trying to persuade us to make one member of the<br />

family lord it over the others? But could we “find our feet” with people who<br />

actually used a language that was “reformed” in a way they recommend, i.e.,<br />

with all the indeterminacy eliminated from our “psychological” concepts?–<br />

“Concepts with fixed limits would demand a uniformity of behavior” (RPP-<br />

II § 683). And do we really want that? 30<br />

“Deep Disquietudes”<br />

When we do philosophy we are like savages, primitive<br />

people, who hear the expressions of civilized<br />

men, put a false interpretation on them, and then<br />

draw the queerest conclusions from it. (Ludwig<br />

Wittgenstein, PI § 194)<br />

[As reported by Moore, Wittgenstein] said that what<br />

he was doing was a “new subject” … [and] that<br />

though what he was doing was certainly different<br />

from what, e.g., Plato or Berkeley had done, yet<br />

people might feel that it “takes the place of” what they<br />

had done – might be inclined to say “This is what I<br />

really wanted.” (Ludwig Wittgenstein, PO, p. 113)<br />

The traditional “problems of philosophy” are often thought to generate the<br />

deepest of deep disagreements. Yet Wittgenstein would persuade philosophers<br />

to adopt a fresh conception of the ‘depth’ of these problems. On<br />

Wittgenstein’s view, philosophical problems “have the character of depth.<br />

They are deep disquietudes; their roots are as deep in us as the forms of our<br />

language and their significance is as great as the importance of our language”<br />

(PI § 111).<br />

Wittgenstein suggested that philosophical problems call for a “grammatical<br />

investigation” – one that sheds light on the problems by clearing away<br />

misunderstandings concerning the use of words, misunderstandings<br />

“caused, among other things, by certain analogies between the forms of expression<br />

in different regions of language” (PI § 90). An example of an analogy<br />

that appears to have captivated and mislead more than one philosopher<br />

is the comparison of certain knowledge with a building or tower resting on<br />

30<br />

For more on this, consult RPP-II, LWPP-II, and PI, pp. 223-29.<br />

73

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