Cogency v2 n2

Wittgenstein and the Logic of Deep Disagreement / D. M. GODDEN & W. H. BRENNER
Agreement in Judgment: Complete & Incomplete
1
Concepts : judgments :: measures : measurements. But, just as a method
of measurement requires a certain uniformity in the results of measurement,
so too a way of judging requires a measure of “agreement in judgments.”
26 How much agreement is required depends on the type of concept
involved, as shown by the kind use a term has in the language.
Arithmetic is characterized by a virtually unanimous agreement in the
results of calculations performed by people acknowledged to have mastered
certain techniques (addition, subtraction, etc.) In contrast, psychological
(and ethical) concepts allow far more “indeterminancy in judgment.” Learning
to apply such concepts is a matter not of mastering a technique but of
learning “good judgment,” by way of paradigm examples and “rules of
thumb.” 27 2
Is fear of relativism at the back of the worry about the persistence of deep
disagreements? Relativists don’t seem to respect the law of excluded middle:
they appear to “want it both ways.” But Wittgensteinians aren’t enemies of
reason in the sense that they want to question the law of excluded middle.
They do, however, want to point out that it is not equally applicable to everything
we call a judgment. For our judgments do not all have a determinate
(p v ~p) sense in every context. In some cases, our judgments are “better
or worse” (plausible or implausible, insightful or “just weird”)–rather
than “true or false” or “calculated correctly or incorrectly.” To highlight one
important example, such indeterminacy is to be found in some of our judgments
about the feelings of others.
237-38: “The limit of the empirical is–concept-formation” and ibid. p. 379: “The limits of
empiricism [and pragmatism]–Do we live because it’s practical to live? ... think because
thinking is practical?”
26
Wittgenstein argues this point at PI §§ 142, 242 and in PI IIxi, pp. 226 ff.
27
See PI, pp. 227-28.
71