Cogency v2 n2

Wittgenstein and the Logic of Deep Disagreement / D. M. GODDEN & W. H. BRENNER
So, philosophical (metaphysical) sceptics will contradict commonsense
philosophers who claim to know that every human being has two parents,
on the grounds that they cannot justify their claim. And Catholics will contradict
them as well, though for quite different (doctrinal, religious) reasons.
Of course, both philosophical skeptics and Catholic believers would
have trouble making sense of anyone who, out of any special (philosophical
or religious) context spoke of doubting whether we all have a human mother
and father. Like the rest of us, they would then look for a cause rather than
a reason for such a “crazy” utterance.
The religious, biblical, reasons for believing that Jesus was born of a
virgin do not, of course, have any weight in a biological investigation into
the possibility of parthenogenesis. But should the biologist’s evidence against
the possibility of human parthenogenesis oblige reasonable Christians to
put aside the allegedly traditional belief that Jesus was, “literally,” born of a
virgin? While we’re not sure what to say here, we wonder if even the most
conservative believer in the supernatural nature of His paternity would entertain
even the possibility that the claim of “the pregnant girl next door” to
be a virgin might be true–on the grounds that, “Well, it happened once before.”
3
Where two principles really do meet which cannot
be reconciled with one another, then each man declares
the other a fool and heretic. (Ludwig
Wittgenstein, OC § 611)
We agree with Turner and Wright (2005: 34, fn. 3) that “a good illustration
of this point can be seen in the current debate over evolution and intelligent
design creationism (IDC). Proponents of both views tend to insult the other
side as much as engage with it.” But is the IDC proponent’s opposition to
modern evolutionary theory based on an arguably unreasonable disregard
We would not say ‘I know that’s a tree’ when looking at a familiar tree in our garden. For
if one said that, the question would arise of how one knew. There is nothing more to which
one could turn. But this is not because the proposition cannot be doubted but because it
cannot be doubted when it holds a certain place in our practice. What is ungrounded is not
a proposition but a practice.
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