Cogency v2 n2

Wittgenstein and the Logic of Deep Disagreement / D. M. GODDEN & W. H. BRENNER
which might be called “deep.” Before doing this, though, we review and,
from a Wittgenstenian perspective, critically evaluate the existing accounts
of the role of reasons in resolving deep disagreements.
5. Prospects for the Rational Resolution of Deep Disagreements
Fogelin’s respondents can be divided into optimists and pessimists according
to whether they find there to be good prospects for the rational resolution
of deep disagreements.
5.1. Theoretical and Methodological Reasons for Optimism
Fogelin’s initial respondent, Lugg (1986) argued that even in cases of deep
disagreement, non-rational persuasion is not the only means available to
the disputants. Instead, he offers an account, ably described by Turner and
Wright (2005: 31), whereby “interlocutors can build to a common understanding
by retreating to neutral ground, untangling, coordinating and synthesizing
ideas, examining assumptions reviewing alternative proposals and
negotiating conflicting demands.” Further, Lugg reminds us that in many
cases the rational resolution to a disagreement may be suspension of judgment
(and perhaps an accompanying resumption of inquiry) rather than
the endorsement or rejection of the claim(s) at issue.
Ultimately, Lugg (p. 50) seeks to wrest us of Fogelin’s picture that “argumentative
exchanges must be always normal (and hence rational) or
nonrational (because abnormal).” To this end, Lugg recommends that we
take a new perspective on the role of agreement in argumentation. “What
we happen to agree upon is important because it provides a starting point
for discussion between us, not because it dictates what the outcome of our
discussion should be” (Lugg, p. 49). Agreement, for Lugg, is best conceived
of as a goal or accomplishment of argumentation, rather than a necessary
starting place or precondition of argumentation.
Taking a rationalist, epistemic approach Feldman (2005: 19) construes
deep disagreements as “disagreement[s] about a framework proposition.”
The kernel of Feldman’s argument is his denial of the claim that “framework
propositions are somehow beyond rational assessment” (p. 21) which
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