Cogency v2 n2

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COGENCY Vol. 2, N0. 2, Spring 2010 sos, principalmente obtenidos de Wittgenstein, que tomamos para ilustrar la resolución de un desacuerdo profundo a través del uso de lo que llamamos “persuasión racional”. Concluimos que, mientras el papel de la argumentación en desacuerdos “normales” y “profundos” es característicamente diferente, juega un rol crucial en la resolución de ambos. Palabras clave: desacuerdo profundo, Robert Fogelin, forma de vida, razón, Weltbild, Ludwig Wittgenstein. The belief as formulated on the evidence can only be the last result – in which a number of ways of thinking and acting crystallize and come together. (Ludwig Wittgenstein, LC, p. 56). 1. Introduction In “The logic of deep disagreements” (Informal Logic, 1985), Robert Fogelin described a kind of disagreement – deep disagreement – which, he claimed, is by its very nature impervious to rational resolution (p. 7). He further claimed that the conception of some disagreements as deep and the claim that these are irresolvable by rational means is attributable to Wittgenstein. “My thesis, or rather Wittgenstein’s thesis,” Fogelin wrote (p. 5), “is that deep disagreements cannot be resolved through the use of argument, for they undercut the conditions essential to arguing.” This paper explores a Wittgenstenian perspective on deep disagreements. We begin (in Sections 2 and 3) by considering Fogelin’s account and noting some of its overtly Wittgenstenian components. Section 4 clarifies the nature and scope of deep disagreements and their relation to understanding, in order to specify the role that reason can be expected to play in their resolution. Section 5 summarizes and critically evaluates the existing optimistic claims concerning the prospects for a rational resolution of deep disagreements. We argue that the optimists largely misconstrue the nature of deep disagreement, or of reason itself, and thereby misrepresent the role reason can play in their resolution. Finally (in Section 6) we analyse a variety of cases, taken mainly from Wittgenstein, in an effort to gain some insight into the actual operation of reason in disagreements having depth. We conclude (Section 7) with some remarks about the relationship between agreement and reason in the resolution of disagreements both deep and normal. 42
Wittgenstein and the Logic of Deep Disagreement / D. M. GODDEN & W. H. BRENNER 2. The Nature of Deep Disagreement Highly elliptical conversation, planning and highly enthymematic reasoning and argument, Fogelin (1985: 3) observed, is made possible only by the great many beliefs and preferences shared by the participants. Fogelin (p. 3) described their role in argument as follows: They guide the discussion, but they are not themselves the subject of it. … They provide the framework or the structure within which reasons can be marshaled, where marshaling reasons is typically a matter of citing facts in a way that their significance becomes clear. Recognizing the role of this “rich background of agreement” (p. 4), Fogelin distinguished between normal (or near-normal) argumentative exchanges and deep disagreements. Normal arguments (p. 3) share two characteristic features: (i) they occur within this background context of broadly shared beliefs and preferences and (ii) there exist shared procedures for resolving them. While Fogelin does not explicitly state this, it seems reasonable to suppose that these resolution-procedures are at least grounded in, if not articulated among, these shared background commitments (cf. Adams 2005: 69). Deep disagreements, by contrast, are not indicated by their rhetorical or emotional intensity or by their resolvability. Normal disagreements can be irresolvable due, for example, to the ignorance or intransigence of their participants. That said, disagreements which are deep are characteristically and abnormally resolution-resistant in that they “are immune to appeals to facts” and tend to “persist even when normal criticisms have been answered” (Fogelin, 1985: 5). According to Fogelin, deep disagreements are instead distinguished by an absence of any relevant shared background commitments. Fogelin (p. 5) described this as a clash of “underlying principles” or “framework propositions.” Rather than involving differences of opinion on isolated issues, Fogelin (pp. 5-6) described them as follows: when we inquire into the root of a deep disagreement, we do not simply find isolated propositions … but instead a whole system of mutually supporting propositions (and paradigms, models, styles of acting and thinking) that constitute, if I may use the phrase, a form of life. 43
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