Cogency v2 n2

COGENCY Vol. 2, N0. 2, Spring 2010
sos, principalmente obtenidos de Wittgenstein, que tomamos para ilustrar la resolución
de un desacuerdo profundo a través del uso de lo que llamamos “persuasión racional”.
Concluimos que, mientras el papel de la argumentación en desacuerdos “normales”
y “profundos” es característicamente diferente, juega un rol crucial en la resolución
de ambos.
Palabras clave: desacuerdo profundo, Robert Fogelin, forma de vida, razón, Weltbild,
Ludwig Wittgenstein.
The belief as formulated on the evidence can only
be the last result – in which a number of ways of
thinking and acting crystallize and come together.
(Ludwig Wittgenstein, LC, p. 56).
1. Introduction
In “The logic of deep disagreements” (Informal Logic, 1985), Robert Fogelin
described a kind of disagreement – deep disagreement – which, he claimed,
is by its very nature impervious to rational resolution (p. 7). He further
claimed that the conception of some disagreements as deep and the claim
that these are irresolvable by rational means is attributable to Wittgenstein.
“My thesis, or rather Wittgenstein’s thesis,” Fogelin wrote (p. 5), “is that
deep disagreements cannot be resolved through the use of argument, for
they undercut the conditions essential to arguing.”
This paper explores a Wittgenstenian perspective on deep disagreements.
We begin (in Sections 2 and 3) by considering Fogelin’s account and noting
some of its overtly Wittgenstenian components. Section 4 clarifies the nature
and scope of deep disagreements and their relation to understanding,
in order to specify the role that reason can be expected to play in their resolution.
Section 5 summarizes and critically evaluates the existing optimistic
claims concerning the prospects for a rational resolution of deep disagreements.
We argue that the optimists largely misconstrue the nature of deep
disagreement, or of reason itself, and thereby misrepresent the role reason
can play in their resolution. Finally (in Section 6) we analyse a variety of
cases, taken mainly from Wittgenstein, in an effort to gain some insight into
the actual operation of reason in disagreements having depth. We conclude
(Section 7) with some remarks about the relationship between agreement
and reason in the resolution of disagreements both deep and normal.
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