Cogency v2 n2

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COGENCY Vol. 2, N0. 2, Spring 2010 5. Conclusion Despite the revolutionary changes that distinguish Wittgenstein’s early philosophy from his later philosophy, and for all the evolutionary changes from the Tractatus through the transitional works to the Investigations in his style of argument (and also despite his own reputation for being personally argumentative), there is one constant in Wittgenstein’s metaphilosophy: argumentation is not an essential part of philosophy. Depending on the context, argumentation may even be antithetical to the goals of philosophy. Even so, argumentation can be a valuable tool for philosophers because its real value is sometimes found in its point rather than its content, its consequences rather than its conclusions. This is especially true of philosophical argumentation precisely because philosophy is not a body of knowledge. It is not a discipline. Arguments can be conceptualized in many ways, but most of the prominent models for argumentation do not fit into the Wittgensteinian understanding of philosophy. Arguments can be understood as proofs, demonstrations of knowledge, but there is no philosophical knowledge, so that kind of argumentation has no place in philosophy. Alternatively, arguments can be seen as attempts as rational persuasion, but even if there were something in philosophy to persuade others of, there would be no reason for doing so, so once again argumentation seems out of place in philosophy. And if we prefer to think of argumentation as a procedure for dispute resolution, the situation is the same: philosophical differences are not genuine differences, so consensus and agreement are beside the point. What we need to eliminate is confusion, not difference of opinions or beliefs – and for that philosophical goal, argumentation is still an inappropriate tool. In sum, there is nothing in the standard logical, rhetorical, and dialectical conceptions of argumentation to recommend it to a Wittgensteinian philosopher. What emerges is an altogether different appreciation for what arguments can do. In his Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics, Wittgenstein connects the sense of a proposition in mathematics with its proof. Proofs establish the connections which serve to define the concepts involved. Otherwise, there would be no point in offering different proofs for established theorems. As a corollary, any formula that we end up proving always has a 38
You can’t step into the same Argument twice: Wittgenstein... / D. H. COHEN different sense than the typographically identically formula that we set out to prove! Regardless of how well this characterization fits proofs and propositions in mathematics, it certainly captures an important feature of arguments and their conclusions very well. For example, we learn a lot about a person’s social and political positions when we hear her say that she is against the death penalty, but we learn all that and a good deal more when we hear what her arguments are for that stance. And that is exactly what has happened here: the author of the Tractatus and the author of the Investigations offer the same conclusion – argumentation per se is not the right tool for philosophers – but they reach that conclusion by different arguments, which mean that it is not exactly the same conclusion after all. Works Cited Cohen, D. “The Word as Will and Idea.” Philosophical Studies Vol. XXXII (1990): 126-140. Hacker, P.M.S. Wittgenstein: Meaning and Mind. Oxford: Blackwell, 1990. Kenny, A. “Philosophy States Only What everyone Admits.” In A. Kenny, Wittgenstein at Work: Method in the Philosophical Investigations (pp. 173- 182). London: Routledge, (2004). Wittgenstein, L. Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. Translated by D.F. Pears and B.F. McGuiness, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1961. Wittgenstein, L. Philosophical Investigations. Translate by G.E.M. Anscombe. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1953. Wittgenstein, L. Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics. Translated by G.E.M. Anscombe; G. H. von Wright, R. Rhees, and G.E.M. Ancombe (Eds.). Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1956. Wittgenstein, L. The Blue and Brown Books. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1958. 39
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