Cogency v2 n2

COGENCY Vol. 2, N0. 2, Spring 2010
In this case, we would only lack a given assignment of truth-values, not
standards to appraise the argument. (p. 82)
In the first quote, the field (and the audience) seems to play an important
role in the appraisal, but in the second quote its importance is denied.
Normally, however, the lack of truth values is a real problem for appraising
the epistemic value of arguments. On the one hand, the impression that the
field provides the truth-values is given, but on the other hand, it is also
suggested that we are able to determine them without the field. Alas, how
do we determine the truth values if we do lack them?
Another problematic aspect is that on p. 80 she asks
[w]hy do we need justification for our inferences? The obvious answer is
that we need it in case they are challenged, and this answer is perfectly
sound. By contrast, the idea that good arguments need justified inferences
is a holdover from deductivism.
And later on that same page she states:
Yet, the truth is that, in order to justify our claims, we do not need our
inference claims to be necessary, or justified. We just need them to be
true, or highly plausible. The inference claim enables us to pass from
reason to claim; if it is true, or highly plausible, the claim will be justified
because of the reason. Second-level justification may be desirable in certain
cases, but it does not prevent us from falsity. (Ibid.)
In the first quote, it appears that deductivism and epistemological
internalism 2 (called ‘second-level justification’) are somehow taken to go
together (although they do not) and then rejected. Moreover, it appears that
epistemological externalism – the remaining choice, given the rejection of
internalism – is clearly not acceptable, since it is required that we need to
2
Epistemological internalism is the doctrine that whether an epistemic agent is justified
in believing, for example, the result of an inference, supervenes on factors one is in a
position to know by reflection alone. A stronger form on internalism, called access
internalism, holds that one has some special access to the justifying features. See e.g. James
Pryor (2001) for discussion
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