Living in a More Volatile Investment World - Pioneer Investments
Living in a More Volatile Investment World - Pioneer Investments
Living in a More Volatile Investment World - Pioneer Investments
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Blue<br />
pAPER<br />
<strong>Liv<strong>in</strong>g</strong> <strong>in</strong> a <strong>More</strong><br />
<strong>Volatile</strong> <strong>Investment</strong><br />
<strong>World</strong><br />
IN BRIEF<br />
November 2012<br />
Higher Market Volatility a Paradigm Shift<br />
We believe that <strong>in</strong>vestors face a more volatile<br />
<strong>in</strong>vestment environment that will demand<br />
different ways of manag<strong>in</strong>g risk.<br />
<strong>Pioneer</strong> Offers an Approach to Manag<strong>in</strong>g<br />
Volatility <strong>in</strong> Client Portfolios<br />
Income-oriented, multi-asset/multi-sector,<br />
managed volatility strategies.
BLUE PAPER | <strong>Liv<strong>in</strong>g</strong> <strong>in</strong> a <strong>More</strong> <strong>Volatile</strong> <strong>Investment</strong> <strong>World</strong> November 2012<br />
Key Po<strong>in</strong>ts<br />
F<strong>in</strong>ancial markets have undergone a dramatic paradigm shift characterized by extreme<br />
volatility. We believe this new paradigm will persist while the developed world de-levers,<br />
a process that will take time.<br />
Michael Temple<br />
Senior Vice President,<br />
Director of Credit Research<br />
Volatility and Central Bank distortions have dramatically <strong>in</strong>creased correlations between<br />
f<strong>in</strong>ancial markets. Increased volatility and correlations are self-re<strong>in</strong>forc<strong>in</strong>g. This<br />
phenomenon makes it difficult to achieve mean<strong>in</strong>gful diversification through traditional<br />
asset allocation.<br />
We believe this more volatile <strong>in</strong>vestment environment demands different ways of<br />
manag<strong>in</strong>g risk.<br />
Our focus at <strong>Pioneer</strong> has been on creat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>come-oriented, multi-asset/sector strategies<br />
that seek to achieve high and consistent returns by tak<strong>in</strong>g a balanced approach between<br />
sophisticated asset allocation and thoughtful hedg<strong>in</strong>g.<br />
Contributor<br />
Michael Temple is Senior Vice President and Director of Credit Research, U.S., based <strong>in</strong><br />
Boston. He is responsible for oversight of <strong>Pioneer</strong>’s U.S. credit research department. His<br />
duties <strong>in</strong>clude <strong>in</strong>dependent research of credits, sector analysis, and coord<strong>in</strong>ation of research<br />
efforts <strong>in</strong> high yield, bank loan, <strong>in</strong>vestment grade, emerg<strong>in</strong>g markets and municipal credit. He<br />
has been the Portfolio Manager of an <strong>in</strong>stitutional “Credit Opportunity” strategy s<strong>in</strong>ce 2008,<br />
and is also a Portfolio Manager of <strong>Pioneer</strong> Absolute Return Credit Fund. He received a BA and<br />
MBA from the University of Colorado <strong>in</strong> 1982 and 1984, respectively.<br />
2
BLUE PAPER | <strong>Liv<strong>in</strong>g</strong> <strong>in</strong> a <strong>More</strong> <strong>Volatile</strong> <strong>Investment</strong> <strong>World</strong> November 2012<br />
<strong>Liv<strong>in</strong>g</strong> <strong>in</strong> a <strong>More</strong> <strong>Volatile</strong> <strong>Investment</strong> <strong>World</strong><br />
A paradigm shift <strong>in</strong> f<strong>in</strong>ancial<br />
markets has taken place s<strong>in</strong>ce<br />
2008 <strong>in</strong>to a more volatile<br />
<strong>in</strong>vestment environment that<br />
will demand different ways<br />
of manag<strong>in</strong>g risk.<br />
A paradigm shift <strong>in</strong> f<strong>in</strong>ancial markets has taken place s<strong>in</strong>ce 2008 <strong>in</strong>to a more volatile<br />
<strong>in</strong>vestment environment that will demand different ways of manag<strong>in</strong>g risk. In this<br />
paper we will exam<strong>in</strong>e the forces beh<strong>in</strong>d the evolution to this new paradigm and<br />
describe how <strong>in</strong>vestors might navigate this more volatile <strong>in</strong>vestment climate.<br />
The follow<strong>in</strong>g graph goes back to the 1930s, highlight<strong>in</strong>g the deleverag<strong>in</strong>g period after<br />
the great Depression and WWII and then the “great moderation” after 1982. Notice the<br />
greater frequency of recessions <strong>in</strong> the last deleverag<strong>in</strong>g phase, when <strong>in</strong>dividuals,<br />
companies and the government were actively reduc<strong>in</strong>g their debt loads, vs. the relative<br />
calm and length of expansions <strong>in</strong> the re-leverag<strong>in</strong>g phase from 1982 to 2008. Also<br />
<strong>in</strong>terest<strong>in</strong>g to note are the prevalent spikes <strong>in</strong> volatility dur<strong>in</strong>g those times.<br />
120<br />
Recessions Shorter/Expansions Longer <strong>in</strong> the Era of Re-Leverag<strong>in</strong>g<br />
S&P 500 1-month Annualized<br />
Historical Volatility %<br />
100<br />
80<br />
60<br />
40<br />
20<br />
Recession Frequency Greater<br />
Economic Expansion Periods Shorter<br />
Grey area = Recession<br />
Recession Frequency Less<br />
Economic Expansion Periods Longer<br />
0<br />
Jan-28 Jan-33 Jan-38 Jan-43 Jan-48 Jan-53 Jan-58 Jan-63 Jan-68 Jan-73 Jan-78 Jan-83 Jan-88 Jan-93 Jan-98 Jan-03 Jan-08<br />
The Last Deleverag<strong>in</strong>g Phase<br />
The Re-leverag<strong>in</strong>g Era "The Great Moderation"<br />
Source: Bloomberg. Last data po<strong>in</strong>t 7/31/2012.<br />
Notice the greater frequency<br />
of recessions <strong>in</strong> the last<br />
deleverag<strong>in</strong>g phase, when<br />
<strong>in</strong>dividuals, companies and<br />
the government were actively<br />
reduc<strong>in</strong>g their debt loads<br />
vs. the relative calm and<br />
length of expansions <strong>in</strong> the<br />
re-leverag<strong>in</strong>g phase from<br />
1982 to 2008.<br />
Today, the question for many economists is, Will the next decade resemble the 1930s-40s<br />
or the 1980s-2000s? Conditions today are different than <strong>in</strong> either period. In the 30s and<br />
40s, a comb<strong>in</strong>ation of high corporate leverage and high government leverage was a<br />
poisonous backdrop that caused more frequent recessions and periods of market<br />
<strong>in</strong>stability. At least today, we have more susta<strong>in</strong>able corporate balance sheets. The<br />
problem is, we still have higher-than-desired consumer debt loads. Developed-world<br />
government debt balances are also unsusta<strong>in</strong>ably high. Thus, as we are now <strong>in</strong> a<br />
deleverag<strong>in</strong>g phase, it is not too much of a stretch to imag<strong>in</strong>e that the next decade will<br />
look more like the early part of the last century, rather than the latter part.<br />
3
BLUE PAPER | <strong>Liv<strong>in</strong>g</strong> <strong>in</strong> a <strong>More</strong> <strong>Volatile</strong> <strong>Investment</strong> <strong>World</strong> November 2012<br />
It is ironic, but we believe<br />
that today’s higher<br />
<strong>in</strong>vestment volatility is the<br />
consequence of attempts by<br />
central banks to eng<strong>in</strong>eer<br />
a less volatile economic<br />
environment.<br />
Lower Volatility Sows the Seeds of Higher Volatility<br />
It is ironic, but we believe that today’s higher <strong>in</strong>vestment volatility is the consequence of<br />
attempts by central banks to eng<strong>in</strong>eer a less volatile economic environment. This<br />
environment, one <strong>in</strong> which recessions are shorter/shallower and expansions stronger/<br />
longer, has its roots <strong>in</strong> the early 1980s and has spanned over two decades. Dubbed “the<br />
Great Moderation,” the period commenced with the resett<strong>in</strong>g of <strong>in</strong>flation expectations<br />
by Fed Chairman Volker. This psychological watershed was backstopped by the<br />
globalization trend which helped defuse <strong>in</strong>flationary <strong>in</strong>fluences (as overseas capacity<br />
robbed firms of pric<strong>in</strong>g power, act<strong>in</strong>g as a “relief valve” for domestic price pressures).<br />
The decl<strong>in</strong>e <strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong>flation and <strong>in</strong>flation volatility helped support a prolonged decl<strong>in</strong>e <strong>in</strong><br />
<strong>in</strong>terest rates.<br />
Lower Perceived Risk<strong>in</strong>ess and the “Paradox<br />
of Credibility”<br />
Improved corporate balance sheets, more transparent monetary policy, and new “riskdiversify<strong>in</strong>g”<br />
f<strong>in</strong>ancial <strong>in</strong>struments also lowered the perceived risk<strong>in</strong>ess of <strong>in</strong>vest<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong><br />
securities tied to economic growth. Unfortunately, the stable macroeconomic<br />
environment and strong central bank credibility created a false sense of security.<br />
Hyman M<strong>in</strong>sky dubbed this the “paradox of credibility.” The Great Moderation era led<br />
to excessive credit expansion and an underpric<strong>in</strong>g of risk. Valuation bubbles and excess<br />
debt were the consequence, manifest<strong>in</strong>g three times s<strong>in</strong>ce the early 1990s <strong>in</strong> both the<br />
U.S. equity and two real-estate busts.<br />
To combat the economic<br />
aftereffects of burst bubbles,<br />
the Federal Reserve (“Fed”)<br />
aggressively reduced<br />
<strong>in</strong>terest rates. But because<br />
of <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>g systematic<br />
leverage, rates had to be<br />
lowered further <strong>in</strong> each cycle,<br />
kept lower for longer, and<br />
raised less each time before<br />
the economy tipped back<br />
<strong>in</strong>to recession.<br />
Percent<br />
To combat the economic aftereffects of burst bubbles, the Federal Reserve (“Fed”)<br />
aggressively reduced <strong>in</strong>terest rates. But because of <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>g systematic leverage, rates<br />
had to be lowered further <strong>in</strong> each cycle, kept lower for longer, and raised less each time<br />
before the economy tipped back <strong>in</strong>to recession. In the graph below, you can see the<br />
<strong>in</strong>crease <strong>in</strong> leverage and the path of lower highs and lower lows <strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong>terest rates. The<br />
story <strong>in</strong> Europe and Japan is similar.<br />
20<br />
18<br />
16<br />
14<br />
12<br />
10<br />
8<br />
6<br />
4<br />
2<br />
0<br />
Systematic Lower<strong>in</strong>g of Interest Rates / Systematic Increas<strong>in</strong>g of Leverage<br />
Fed Funds Rate vs. Government Debt % of GDP<br />
Systematic lower<strong>in</strong>g of <strong>in</strong>terest rates<br />
Systematic <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>g leverage<br />
Zero Interest<br />
rate boundary<br />
Sep-80 Sep-83 Sep-86 Sep-89 Sep-92 Sep-95 Sep-98 Sep-01 Sep-04 Sep-07 Sep-11<br />
Fed Funds Rate (left scale) U.S. Govt Debt % of GDP (right scale)<br />
0.25<br />
100<br />
90<br />
80<br />
70<br />
60<br />
50<br />
40<br />
Percent<br />
Fed Funds Rate last data po<strong>in</strong>t 8/31/2012. Government Debt as a % of GDP last data po<strong>in</strong>t 8/31/2012.<br />
Source: Bloomberg<br />
4
BLUE PAPER | <strong>Liv<strong>in</strong>g</strong> <strong>in</strong> a <strong>More</strong> <strong>Volatile</strong> <strong>Investment</strong> <strong>World</strong> November 2012<br />
Today, we are effectively<br />
at the zero <strong>in</strong>terest rate<br />
boundary, where we have<br />
rema<strong>in</strong>ed for almost<br />
four years.<br />
Today, we are effectively at the zero <strong>in</strong>terest rate boundary, where we have rema<strong>in</strong>ed for<br />
almost four years. At this po<strong>in</strong>t, the only policies left to the Fed, the European Central<br />
Bank (ECB) and the Bank of Japan (BOJ) are unconventional, and it is unclear whether<br />
they will have much of an effect on their respective economies. Indeed, HSBC recently<br />
<strong>in</strong>vestigated the effectiveness of each of the quantitative eas<strong>in</strong>g programs <strong>in</strong>itiated by<br />
the Fed and concluded that the programs were exhibit<strong>in</strong>g signs of dim<strong>in</strong>ish<strong>in</strong>g returns.<br />
If central banks <strong>in</strong> the developed world are becom<strong>in</strong>g less effective stewards of the<br />
bus<strong>in</strong>ess, <strong>in</strong>terest rate and credit cycles, it is likely we are go<strong>in</strong>g to experience more<br />
frequent economic volatility; more “soft patches,” shorter and less robust expansions<br />
and prolonged recessions.<br />
Volatility by Asset Class<br />
While volatility has broadly impacted the overall <strong>in</strong>vestment environment, each asset<br />
class has exhibited its own unique responses:<br />
• Fixed Income – Volatility <strong>in</strong> fixed <strong>in</strong>come markets has become magnified s<strong>in</strong>ce the<br />
GFC. In the follow<strong>in</strong>g chart we calculate the implied volatility of Treasuries, which<br />
have been less anchored by the Fed Funds rate. The dotted red l<strong>in</strong>e marks the advent of<br />
the GFC.<br />
If central banks <strong>in</strong> the<br />
developed world are<br />
becom<strong>in</strong>g less effective<br />
stewards of the bus<strong>in</strong>ess,<br />
<strong>in</strong>terest rate and credit<br />
cycles, it is likely that we are<br />
go<strong>in</strong>g to experience more<br />
frequent economic volatility;<br />
more “soft patches,” shorter<br />
and less robust expansions<br />
and prolonged recessions.<br />
Percent<br />
Percent<br />
300<br />
250<br />
200<br />
150<br />
100<br />
50<br />
0<br />
Treasuries Less Anchored by Fed Funds Rate Activity<br />
Volatility of Treasuries<br />
Sep-95 Sep-97 Sep-99 Sep-01 Sep-03 Sep-05 Sep-07 Sep-09<br />
ML BofA Option Volatility MOVE Index, a yield curve weighted <strong>in</strong>dex of implied volatility on 1-month Treasury options and<br />
the weighted average of volatilities on 2-, 5-, 10-, and 30-year Treasuries. Source Bloomberg. Last data po<strong>in</strong>t 7/31/12.<br />
Volatility <strong>in</strong> the high yield market has also risen over the last 4 years, creat<strong>in</strong>g difficult<br />
conditions for managers that are focused on provid<strong>in</strong>g steady <strong>in</strong>come and returns.<br />
Jan-95<br />
Jan-96<br />
Jan-97<br />
Jan-98<br />
Jan-99<br />
Jan-00<br />
Jan-01<br />
Jan-02<br />
Jan-03<br />
Jan-04<br />
Jan-05<br />
Jan-06<br />
Jan-07<br />
Jan-08<br />
Jan-09<br />
Jan-10<br />
Jan-11<br />
Sep-11<br />
Jan-12<br />
5
BLUE PAPER | <strong>Liv<strong>in</strong>g</strong> <strong>in</strong> a <strong>More</strong> <strong>Volatile</strong> <strong>Investment</strong> <strong>World</strong> November 2012<br />
Volatility <strong>in</strong> the high yield<br />
market has also risen over<br />
the last 4 years, creat<strong>in</strong>g<br />
difficult conditions for<br />
managers that are focused<br />
on provid<strong>in</strong>g steady <strong>in</strong>come<br />
and returns.<br />
Percent<br />
HY Realized Vol<br />
High Yield Bonds Have Been <strong>More</strong> <strong>Volatile</strong><br />
30<br />
Volatility of High Yield Bonds<br />
25<br />
20<br />
15<br />
10<br />
5<br />
0<br />
Sep-90 Sep-93 Sep-96 Sep-99 Sep-02 Sep-05 Sep-08 Sep-11<br />
Source: BofA High Yield Master II Index which measures the performance of below <strong>in</strong>vestment grade U.S. bonds, source<br />
Bloomberg. Last data po<strong>in</strong>t 7/31/2012.<br />
• Currencies – Foreign Exchange (“FX”) volatilities (Vols) rema<strong>in</strong> elevated post 2008.<br />
Follow<strong>in</strong>g the GFC, the volatility of the world‘s 10 major (G10) currencies spiked<br />
from a long-term average of around 9.5% to 20% <strong>in</strong> 2009, and s<strong>in</strong>ce then has been<br />
widely fluctuat<strong>in</strong>g between 12-16%.<br />
The FX Vol curve rema<strong>in</strong>s<br />
near historic steepness.<br />
S<strong>in</strong>ce the GFC, the FX Vol<br />
curve is also near record<br />
steepness - likely a reflection<br />
of demand for tail-risk<br />
protection as hedgers buy<br />
longer-dated options,<br />
support<strong>in</strong>g a risk premium<br />
<strong>in</strong> the term structure.<br />
S<strong>in</strong>ce the GFC, the FX Vol curve is also near record steepness - likely a reflection of<br />
demand for tail-risk protection as hedgers buy longer-dated options, support<strong>in</strong>g a risk<br />
premium <strong>in</strong> the term structure. The FX Vol curve also <strong>in</strong>dicates a pickup <strong>in</strong> volatility<br />
<strong>in</strong> the com<strong>in</strong>g weeks to months. This could be <strong>in</strong>terpreted that FX markets are<br />
expect<strong>in</strong>g low volatility <strong>in</strong> the short term but a significant <strong>in</strong>crease <strong>in</strong> volatility <strong>in</strong> the<br />
second half of 2012.<br />
25<br />
Currency Volatility Spiked <strong>in</strong> 2008 and Rema<strong>in</strong>s Elevated - Likely Reflect<strong>in</strong>g<br />
Hedg<strong>in</strong>g Activity<br />
20<br />
Average 1-year Implied Volatility of G10 Currencies<br />
Percent<br />
15<br />
10<br />
5<br />
0<br />
Sep-02 Sep-03 Sep-04 Sep-05 Sep-06 Sep-07 Sep-08 Sep-09 Sep-10 Sep-11<br />
Source: Bloomberg and <strong>Pioneer</strong> <strong>Investment</strong>s. Last data po<strong>in</strong>t 7/13/2012.<br />
• Equities – For many <strong>in</strong>vestors the term “risk assets” is synonymous with common<br />
stocks. Dur<strong>in</strong>g periods of economic distress, equities exhibit sharply elevated levels of<br />
volatility as <strong>in</strong>vestors seek refuge <strong>in</strong> senior claims (bonds), cash or government debt.<br />
The chart below illustrates this trend.<br />
6
BLUE PAPER | <strong>Liv<strong>in</strong>g</strong> <strong>in</strong> a <strong>More</strong> <strong>Volatile</strong> <strong>Investment</strong> <strong>World</strong> November 2012<br />
Dur<strong>in</strong>g periods of economic<br />
distress, equities exhibit<br />
sharply elevated levels of<br />
volatility as <strong>in</strong>vestors seek<br />
refuge <strong>in</strong> senior claims<br />
(bonds), cash or<br />
government debt. The<br />
chart below illustrates<br />
this trend.<br />
Percent<br />
Percent<br />
80<br />
70<br />
60<br />
50<br />
40<br />
30<br />
20<br />
10<br />
0<br />
Equity Volatility Dur<strong>in</strong>g Economic Distress<br />
S&P Implied Volatility (90 Day)<br />
S&P Historical Volatility (90 Day)<br />
Sep-02<br />
Sep-03<br />
Sep-04<br />
Sep-05<br />
Sep-06<br />
Sep-07<br />
Sep-08<br />
Sep-09<br />
Sep-10<br />
Sep-11<br />
Source: Bloomberg. Last data po<strong>in</strong>t 9/28/2012.<br />
Virtually all commodityl<strong>in</strong>ked<br />
fund products and<br />
derivatives have launched<br />
<strong>in</strong> the last five years, and<br />
their effect is palpable.<br />
Correlations with equity<br />
markets are now ~ 60%,<br />
compared to ~0% prior to<br />
this era.<br />
The consequence of this behavior has been skepticism over whether the stock market<br />
appropriately compensates <strong>in</strong>vestors for the <strong>in</strong>crease <strong>in</strong> volatility and its impact on<br />
portfolios.<br />
• Commodities – Over the last decade, commodities have undergone a dramatic<br />
structural change. The proliferation of commodity-l<strong>in</strong>ked exchange-traded funds<br />
and more robust futures markets has transformed this asset class. They are no longer<br />
simply used to mitigate price risk for crops and raw materials, but have “morphed”<br />
<strong>in</strong>to complex f<strong>in</strong>ancial <strong>in</strong>struments that are open to speculative trad<strong>in</strong>g. A consequence<br />
of this transition has been the substantial <strong>in</strong>crease <strong>in</strong> volatility, as well as a rise <strong>in</strong><br />
correlation with other risk asset classes — which has reduced their effectiveness as<br />
portfolio diversifiers. The chart below illustrates this.<br />
Commodities Have “Morphed” <strong>in</strong>to Instruments Open to Speculative Trad<strong>in</strong>g<br />
Correlation<br />
1<br />
0.8<br />
0.6<br />
0.4<br />
0.2<br />
0<br />
-0.2<br />
-0.4<br />
-0.6<br />
30-Week Correlation 60-Week Correlation 90-Week Correlation<br />
Sep-99 Sep-01 Sep-03 Sep-05 Sep-07 Sep-09 Sep-11<br />
Sources: Bloomberg and Thom/Reuters Jeffries Commodities Index, which averages commodity futures prices with<br />
monthly rebalanc<strong>in</strong>g. Last data po<strong>in</strong>t 9/28/2012.<br />
Virtually all commodity-l<strong>in</strong>ked fund products and derivatives have launched <strong>in</strong> the last<br />
five years, and their effect is palpable. Correlations with equity markets are now ~ 60%,<br />
compared to ~0% prior to this era.<br />
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BLUE PAPER | <strong>Liv<strong>in</strong>g</strong> <strong>in</strong> a <strong>More</strong> <strong>Volatile</strong> <strong>Investment</strong> <strong>World</strong> November 2012<br />
A Nasty Side Effect of Volatility –<br />
Higher Correlation<br />
The result<strong>in</strong>g feedback loop<br />
is a key characteristic of the<br />
current paradigm of “Riskon/Risk-off<br />
” (“RORO”).<br />
It is not just commodities that have been experienc<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>creased correlation with<br />
equities. Almost all f<strong>in</strong>ancial markets are now more highly correlated to each other.<br />
HSBC has studied this phenomenon and has concluded that higher volatility and<br />
higher correlations go hand <strong>in</strong> hand and are, <strong>in</strong> fact, self-re<strong>in</strong>forc<strong>in</strong>g. The result<strong>in</strong>g<br />
feedback loop is a key characteristic of the current paradigm of “Risk-on/Risk-off”<br />
(“RORO”). To track the RORO phenomenon, HSBC created an <strong>in</strong>dex. Follow<strong>in</strong>g is<br />
a graphical depiction that highlights how, s<strong>in</strong>ce Lehman, correlations and volatility<br />
have been ris<strong>in</strong>g.<br />
Higher Correlations and Higher Volatility Go Hand-<strong>in</strong>-Hand<br />
0.50<br />
0.45<br />
HSBC RORO (“Risk On/Risk Off”) Index<br />
ROROR<br />
RORO Index<br />
Index<br />
Value<br />
Value<br />
0.40<br />
0.35<br />
0.30<br />
0.25<br />
0.20<br />
0.15<br />
0.10<br />
RORO develops<br />
Sep-90 Jan-95<br />
Source: HSBC.Last data po<strong>in</strong>t 8/10/2012.<br />
Jan-00<br />
Jan-05<br />
Jan-10<br />
Aug-12<br />
As we have discussed, there are a number of macro contributors to the volatility and<br />
correlation phenomenon. However, re<strong>in</strong>forc<strong>in</strong>g the macro backdrop is the cont<strong>in</strong>u<strong>in</strong>g<br />
evolution of the market structure – namely, the rise of the ETF phenomenon. As market<br />
participants <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>gly utilize ETFs and the number of ETFs proliferate, the pulses of<br />
RORO are channeled through vehicles that are required to sell hold<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>in</strong>discrim<strong>in</strong>ately,<br />
likely re<strong>in</strong>forc<strong>in</strong>g positive and negative feedback loops.<br />
Cont<strong>in</strong>ued “Fertilizer” for Higher Volatility<br />
The landscape rema<strong>in</strong>s rife with potential volatility. Below, we enumerate several of the<br />
more obvious factors. One could argue that a lot of these are embedded <strong>in</strong> the markets.<br />
However, it is clear that the fragility of the economic backdrops and the distortions<br />
created by central banks at the extremes of their monetary toolbox magnifies the effects<br />
of exogenous shocks.<br />
8
BLUE PAPER | <strong>Liv<strong>in</strong>g</strong> <strong>in</strong> a <strong>More</strong> <strong>Volatile</strong> <strong>Investment</strong> <strong>World</strong> November 2012<br />
• Fiscal cliff – Political <strong>in</strong>fight<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> the U.S. Congress raises the risk of fiscal policy<br />
paralysis and the so-called fiscal cliff where tax hikes, debt limits and spend<strong>in</strong>g cuts<br />
will presumably converge. The IMF estimates the expiration of U.S. tax provisions and<br />
automatic spend<strong>in</strong>g cuts mandated by sequestration could result <strong>in</strong> a 4% hit to GDP.<br />
• Europe – ECB President Mario Draghi has verbally promised to “save the Euro” and<br />
has h<strong>in</strong>ted that he will keep fund<strong>in</strong>g European sovereigns via the short end of the<br />
curve but <strong>in</strong>vestors have yet to see a clear <strong>in</strong>dication of how he will accomplish this.<br />
And <strong>in</strong> the meantime, the European economic environment cont<strong>in</strong>ues to deteriorate.<br />
• Mideast Tensions – The “Arab Spr<strong>in</strong>g” cont<strong>in</strong>ues to roil the Mideast political<br />
landscape. And <strong>in</strong> the background, grow<strong>in</strong>g concerns about Iran’s nuclear capability<br />
and the possibility of an armed response by Israel will keep tensions high and will<br />
affect the price of oil – which has the potential for significant negative consequences to<br />
global GDP.<br />
• Uncerta<strong>in</strong> Ch<strong>in</strong>ese Growth – The rebound from Ch<strong>in</strong>a after the GFC was stunn<strong>in</strong>g,<br />
but was predicated on an unsusta<strong>in</strong>able level of stimulus. The Ch<strong>in</strong>ese then suffered<br />
the aftereffects, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g a higher-than-comfortable level of <strong>in</strong>flation and burgeon<strong>in</strong>g<br />
bad debts from mal-<strong>in</strong>vestment. Today, their economy is suffer<strong>in</strong>g a lack of demand<br />
from Europe, pressur<strong>in</strong>g their export eng<strong>in</strong>e. But a response like 2008-2009 is not<br />
likely. So Ch<strong>in</strong>a, rather than a source of economic growth may, on the marg<strong>in</strong>, be a<br />
source of economic drag.<br />
To Those Whose <strong>Investment</strong> Time Horizons are<br />
Shr<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g Quickly, Volatility is Dangerous<br />
Why should we worry about volatility – why not just ride it out? Or wait it out?<br />
The “wait it out” option is straightforward and it is one many people have chosen to<br />
adopt out of fear. But it means that <strong>in</strong>vestors need to resign themselves to hid<strong>in</strong>g out <strong>in</strong><br />
cash and other low-return <strong>in</strong>vestment options. On top of mediocre returns, <strong>in</strong>vestors<br />
might be sett<strong>in</strong>g themselves up for a truly awful experience if the seem<strong>in</strong>gly low-risk<br />
<strong>in</strong>vestment turns out to be anyth<strong>in</strong>g but.<br />
The “ride it out” option is the “buy it and put it away <strong>in</strong> the drawer” approach. At<br />
<strong>Pioneer</strong>, we cont<strong>in</strong>ue to advocate that a long-term approach is the best way to <strong>in</strong>vest<br />
because among other th<strong>in</strong>gs it tends to dim<strong>in</strong>ish “entry po<strong>in</strong>t risk” (basically buy<strong>in</strong>g<br />
before a correction, then sell<strong>in</strong>g before it has had time to recover). With a long time<br />
horizon, the risk that a volatile market hurts you either on the entry po<strong>in</strong>t or the exit<br />
po<strong>in</strong>t dim<strong>in</strong>ishes.<br />
Unfortunately, volatility is pernicious for those whose time horizons are shr<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g.<br />
And this is the central issue for a grow<strong>in</strong>g segment of the population currently <strong>in</strong> or<br />
approach<strong>in</strong>g retirement. This “baby-boom bulge” is forc<strong>in</strong>g a shr<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g of time<br />
horizons. Ironically, as we have discussed, this is occurr<strong>in</strong>g at the same time that the<br />
markets are becom<strong>in</strong>g more antithetical to <strong>in</strong>vestors with shorter time horizons. And<br />
these <strong>in</strong>vestors are demand<strong>in</strong>g that <strong>in</strong>come become a much larger, more central part of<br />
their total return.<br />
9
BLUE PAPER | <strong>Liv<strong>in</strong>g</strong> <strong>in</strong> a <strong>More</strong> <strong>Volatile</strong> <strong>Investment</strong> <strong>World</strong> November 2012<br />
<strong>Pioneer</strong>’s Approach to Manag<strong>in</strong>g Volatility:<br />
The Middle Way – Income-oriented, Multi-Asset/<br />
Multi-Sector, Managed Volatility Strategies<br />
Aga<strong>in</strong>st today’s highly volatile <strong>in</strong>vestment backdrop, lower volatility strategies that still<br />
offer reasonable returns are difficult to eng<strong>in</strong>eer. Many <strong>in</strong>vestment organizations have<br />
tried to develop absolute return strategies that work <strong>in</strong> all market environments. Often,<br />
they approach this challenge by attempt<strong>in</strong>g to either hedge away all beta and/or<br />
focus<strong>in</strong>g on the highest quality sections of the market. Inevitably, many of these<br />
strategies produce meager returns as <strong>in</strong>vestment outcomes barely fluctuate around<br />
returns on cash. Others have attempted to create lower volatility strategies that overly<br />
rely upon correlations between asset classes as the key determ<strong>in</strong>ant of the strategy’s<br />
construction. But as po<strong>in</strong>ted out above, these correlations can break down at the most<br />
<strong>in</strong>opportune time (usually when you need them to hold steady…) As a result, their<br />
underly<strong>in</strong>g results demonstrate anyth<strong>in</strong>g but low volatility.<br />
Our focus at <strong>Pioneer</strong> has been on creat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>come-oriented, multi-asset/sector<br />
strategies that don’t overly rely upon hedges or correlations, but take a balanced<br />
approach between the two.<br />
• Income helps dampen the effects of volatility - the more consistent the better. We<br />
th<strong>in</strong>k there is a secular demand component that will susta<strong>in</strong> demand for <strong>in</strong>comeproduc<strong>in</strong>g<br />
<strong>in</strong>vestment for some time to come as <strong>in</strong>vestors seek out yield <strong>in</strong> this low<br />
growth, low yield environment. With<strong>in</strong> a strategy, <strong>in</strong>come also tends to ameliorate<br />
<strong>in</strong>vestment mistakes (such as gett<strong>in</strong>g duration wrong <strong>in</strong> fixed <strong>in</strong>come, or growth wrong<br />
<strong>in</strong> equity). Over time, <strong>in</strong>come has historically been one of the better dampeners of<br />
volatility. The graph below compares the return and volatility characteristics of the<br />
S&P 500 Index and the S&P Aristocrats (a subset of the stocks <strong>in</strong> S&P that exhibit<br />
consistent dividend growth*).<br />
* Dividends are not guaranteed.<br />
One of the Better Dampeners of Volatility – Consistent Income<br />
Percent Return<br />
1,400<br />
1,200<br />
1,000<br />
800<br />
600<br />
400<br />
S&P 500<br />
S&P 500 S&P 500 Aristocrats<br />
Annualized Return 4.18% 8.00%<br />
Volatility 15.67% 13.84%<br />
Sharp Ratio 0.23 0.50<br />
S&P 500 Dividend Aristocrats<br />
200<br />
0<br />
Sep-90 Sep-93 Sep-96 Sep-99 Sep-02 Sep-05 Sep-08 Sep-11<br />
Source: <strong>Pioneer</strong>, Bloomberg. Last data po<strong>in</strong>t 9/28/2012.<br />
10
BLUE PAPER | <strong>Liv<strong>in</strong>g</strong> <strong>in</strong> a <strong>More</strong> <strong>Volatile</strong> <strong>Investment</strong> <strong>World</strong> November 2012<br />
• As you can see, the volatility of those companies produc<strong>in</strong>g consistent and grow<strong>in</strong>g<br />
dividends is lower than the average volatility of the S&P.<br />
• Multi-asset/multi-sector approach broadens diversification. Diversification † is more<br />
difficult to achieve <strong>in</strong> an <strong>in</strong>vestment environment plagued by high correlation. This<br />
suggests that <strong>in</strong>vestors need to go farther afield. A multi-asset approach also holds the<br />
potential for dramatically broaden<strong>in</strong>g the opportunity set.<br />
• Hedges: While we like diversification with<strong>in</strong> sectors and between asset classes, given<br />
the correlation issues, we believe the approach of hedg<strong>in</strong>g through structurally<br />
negatively correlated <strong>in</strong>struments (such as short<strong>in</strong>g the S&P as a way to reduce the<br />
beta of an underly<strong>in</strong>g portfolio) adds a dimension of volatility and risk control not<br />
often found <strong>in</strong> traditional mutual funds.<br />
<strong>Pioneer</strong>’s Heritage Shows Us The Way<br />
At <strong>Pioneer</strong>, we have been build<strong>in</strong>g multi-asset/multi-sector approaches to <strong>in</strong>vest<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong><br />
fixed <strong>in</strong>come s<strong>in</strong>ce the late ‘90s. Our multi-sector bond fund was launched at a time that<br />
its competitors generally did not stray too far from their Lehman U.S. Aggregate Bond<br />
benchmark (now Barclays). Our approach was to build a strategy that had wide latitude<br />
to allocate to a number of fixed <strong>in</strong>come sectors vs. be<strong>in</strong>g restricted to small exposures<br />
(or no exposure at all) <strong>in</strong> sectors such as high yield, foreign bonds and currency,<br />
converts, emerg<strong>in</strong>g market debt, etc. We took this successful concept <strong>in</strong> the mid 2000s<br />
and launched an <strong>in</strong>stitutional credit opportunity strategy (multi-sector high yield).<br />
Shortly thereafter we launched our <strong>Pioneer</strong> Multi-Asset Real Return Fund and most<br />
recently <strong>Pioneer</strong> Absolute Return Credit Fund, <strong>Pioneer</strong> Multi-Asset Income Fund and<br />
<strong>Pioneer</strong> Multi-Asset Ultrashort Income Fund. All of these funds are built around the<br />
concept of broad diversification, and a wide opportunity set.<br />
<strong>Pioneer</strong>’s Strategies for Tackl<strong>in</strong>g Volatility (without<br />
sacrific<strong>in</strong>g the potential for strong returns)<br />
Focus on Hedg<strong>in</strong>g: The role of hedg<strong>in</strong>g, the <strong>in</strong>struments used and the framework are<br />
guided by the focus and purpose of the strategy.<br />
• <strong>Pioneer</strong> Absolute Return Credit Fund (ARC): Hedg<strong>in</strong>g plays a prom<strong>in</strong>ent role <strong>in</strong><br />
manag<strong>in</strong>g NAV volatility, with the critical focus of seek<strong>in</strong>g high stable <strong>in</strong>come. Because<br />
we seek higher <strong>in</strong>come, we focus on hedges that either have very low carry<strong>in</strong>g costs or<br />
that have a positive carry.* The hedg<strong>in</strong>g strategy we employ is designed to encapsulate<br />
a high yield-centric strategy with “guardrails.” We can mitigate volatility by short<strong>in</strong>g<br />
S&P futures, buy<strong>in</strong>g volatility protection via the “VIX” curve (which has been called<br />
the “fear <strong>in</strong>dex” and tends to be negatively correlated with equity markets) and by<br />
buy<strong>in</strong>g long-dated Treasury futures. This helps to improve the stability of the NAV<br />
without detract<strong>in</strong>g from the <strong>in</strong>come-produc<strong>in</strong>g potential of the portfolio. 1<br />
* Positive carry is us<strong>in</strong>g one <strong>in</strong>strument to hedge aga<strong>in</strong>st another and gett<strong>in</strong>g paid <strong>in</strong>terest on that <strong>in</strong>strument.<br />
† Diversification does not ensure a profit or protect aga<strong>in</strong>st loss <strong>in</strong> a decl<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g market.<br />
11
BLUE PAPER | <strong>Liv<strong>in</strong>g</strong> <strong>in</strong> a <strong>More</strong> <strong>Volatile</strong> <strong>Investment</strong> <strong>World</strong> November 2012<br />
• <strong>Pioneer</strong> Multi-Asset Income Fund (MAIF): Income is generated through a different<br />
take on a traditional balanced approach – target<strong>in</strong>g potentially higher <strong>in</strong>comegenerat<strong>in</strong>g<br />
fixed <strong>in</strong>come securities comb<strong>in</strong>ed with high dividend*-pay<strong>in</strong>g stocks. The<br />
Fund uses multiple hedg<strong>in</strong>g strategies and <strong>in</strong>struments <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g currency, equity,<br />
duration and credit. Hedg<strong>in</strong>g is driven by a comb<strong>in</strong>ation of fundamental analysis and<br />
market signals. The strategy based on market signals is similar to ARC’s methodology.<br />
However, unlike ARC, whose hedg<strong>in</strong>g strategy is always “on” – a structural component<br />
– hedg<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> MAIF is tactical and shorter-term <strong>in</strong> nature. 2<br />
• <strong>Pioneer</strong> Multi-Asset Real Return (MARR): The Fund’s objective is to outperform<br />
Consumer Price Index over a full market cycle (generally last<strong>in</strong>g 6-8 years) with lower<br />
volatility than the average of the Morn<strong>in</strong>gstar <strong>World</strong> Allocation Funds’ peer group.<br />
The strategy employs a top-down approach to identify<strong>in</strong>g value globally across all<br />
asset classes. Diversification is a key component, supported by tactical hedges. The<br />
strategy employs a wide variety of hedg<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>struments — VIX futures (futures are<br />
contracts bought or sold accord<strong>in</strong>g to an expected price <strong>in</strong> the future. VIX futures<br />
estimate the expected movement <strong>in</strong> the S&P 500 over the next 30 days.), ultra-short<br />
ETFs (baskets of securities that trade on an exchange composed of securities that<br />
mature <strong>in</strong> a year or less), options, etc. — that are selected based upon their cost<br />
and effectiveness. 3<br />
Broad diversification and low relative correlation:<br />
• <strong>Pioneer</strong> Multi-Asset Ultrashort Income Fund (MAUI): Focuses on reduc<strong>in</strong>g – as<br />
much as possible – credit, volatility, and duration risk. The Fund’s goal is to pursue<br />
greater NAV stability over time than a typical short- or <strong>in</strong>termediate-term bond<br />
fund** and seek higher <strong>in</strong>come than a money market or a cash-equivalent <strong>in</strong>strument.<br />
We seek to achieve this through broad diversification, a focus on float<strong>in</strong>g rate<br />
securities to reduce duration, low idiosyncratic credit risk through small (as<br />
percentage) position sizes and a high proportion of very high quality, liquid securities<br />
to cushion the fund when “risk” is be<strong>in</strong>g sold by market participants. 4<br />
* Dividends are not guaranteed.<br />
** Refers to Morn<strong>in</strong>gstar categories. The Morn<strong>in</strong>gstar Short-Term Bond funds average measures the performance of Short<br />
Term Bond funds. The Morn<strong>in</strong>gstar Intermediate-Term Bond funds average measures the performance of <strong>in</strong>termediate- term<br />
bond funds.<br />
12
BLUE PAPER | <strong>Liv<strong>in</strong>g</strong> <strong>in</strong> a <strong>More</strong> <strong>Volatile</strong> <strong>Investment</strong> <strong>World</strong> November 2012<br />
Hav<strong>in</strong>g Your Cake and Eat<strong>in</strong>g It Too…<br />
The Utopia of <strong>in</strong>vestment management is to produce high returns with no volatility<br />
or downside risk. Unfortunately this Utopian ideal is just that – an ideal. But it does<br />
<strong>in</strong>form our th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g – it is our “stretch goal.” We believe that we can cont<strong>in</strong>ue to be<br />
<strong>in</strong>vestors with long-term time horizons. Our average turnover for our funds attest to<br />
this be<strong>in</strong>g part of our DNA. But we also recognize that <strong>in</strong>vestors are <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>gly uneasy<br />
with the volatility that sometimes comes with this approach. Thus, we have created<br />
flexible, multi-asset strategies that can, at their core, be as long-term as possible while<br />
manag<strong>in</strong>g the often treacherous volatility of the current and likely protracted<br />
<strong>in</strong>vestment environment.<br />
The views expressed <strong>in</strong> this memorandum regard<strong>in</strong>g market and economic trends are those of <strong>Pioneer</strong> <strong>Investment</strong>s,<br />
and are subject to change at any time. These views should not be relied upon as <strong>in</strong>vestment advice, as securities<br />
recommendations, or as an <strong>in</strong>dication of trad<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>tent on behalf of any <strong>Pioneer</strong> <strong>in</strong>vestment product. There is no<br />
guarantee that market forecasts discussed will be realized. There is no guarantee that these trends will cont<strong>in</strong>ue. No<br />
forecast is a guarantee.<br />
The performance data quoted represents past performance, which is no guarantee of future results.<br />
Investors should consider risk tolerance and time horizons prior to mak<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>vestment decisions. This material is not<br />
<strong>in</strong>tended to replace the advice of a qualified attorney, tax adviser, <strong>in</strong>vestment professional or <strong>in</strong>surance agent. Before<br />
mak<strong>in</strong>g any f<strong>in</strong>ancial commitment regard<strong>in</strong>g any issue discussed here, consult with the appropriate professional advisor.<br />
To learn more about any <strong>Pioneer</strong> fund, visit our web site at us.pioneer<strong>in</strong>vestments.com<br />
Before <strong>in</strong>vest<strong>in</strong>g, consider the product’s <strong>in</strong>vestment objectives, risks, charges and expenses. Contact<br />
your advisor or <strong>Pioneer</strong> <strong>Investment</strong>s for a prospectus or a summary prospectus conta<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g this <strong>in</strong>formation.<br />
Read it carefully.<br />
Neither <strong>Pioneer</strong>, nor its representatives are legal or tax advisors. In addition, <strong>Pioneer</strong> does not provide advice or recommendations.<br />
The <strong>in</strong>vestments you choose should correspond to your f<strong>in</strong>ancial needs, goals, and risk tolerance. For assistance <strong>in</strong><br />
determ<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g your f<strong>in</strong>ancial situation, please consult an <strong>in</strong>vestment professional.<br />
13
BLUE PAPER | <strong>Liv<strong>in</strong>g</strong> <strong>in</strong> a <strong>More</strong> <strong>Volatile</strong> <strong>Investment</strong> <strong>World</strong> November 2012<br />
A Word about Risk<br />
1<br />
<strong>Pioneer</strong> Absolute Return Credit Fund<br />
All <strong>in</strong>vestments are subject to risk, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g the possible loss of pr<strong>in</strong>cipal. <strong>Pioneer</strong> Absolute Return Credit (“ARC”) Fund has<br />
the ability to <strong>in</strong>vest <strong>in</strong> a wide variety of debt securities.<br />
The Fund may <strong>in</strong>vest <strong>in</strong> underly<strong>in</strong>g funds (ETFs and unit <strong>in</strong>vestment trusts). In addition to the Fund’s operat<strong>in</strong>g expenses,<br />
you will <strong>in</strong>directly bear the operat<strong>in</strong>g expenses of <strong>in</strong>vestments <strong>in</strong> any underly<strong>in</strong>g funds.<br />
The Fund and some of the underly<strong>in</strong>g funds employ leverage, which <strong>in</strong>creases the volatility of <strong>in</strong>vestment returns and<br />
subjects the Fund to magnified losses if an underly<strong>in</strong>g fund’s <strong>in</strong>vestments decl<strong>in</strong>e <strong>in</strong> value.<br />
The Fund and some of the underly<strong>in</strong>g funds may use derivatives, such as options and futures, which can be illiquid, may<br />
disproportionately <strong>in</strong>crease losses, and have a potentially large impact on Fund performance.<br />
The Fund may <strong>in</strong>vest <strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong>flation-l<strong>in</strong>ked securities. As <strong>in</strong>flationary expectations <strong>in</strong>crease, <strong>in</strong>flation-l<strong>in</strong>ked securities<br />
may become more attractive, because they protect future <strong>in</strong>terest payments aga<strong>in</strong>st <strong>in</strong>flation. Conversely, as <strong>in</strong>flationary<br />
concerns decrease, <strong>in</strong>flation-l<strong>in</strong>ked securities will become less attractive and less valuable.<br />
The Fund may <strong>in</strong>vest <strong>in</strong> credit default swaps, which may <strong>in</strong> some cases be illiquid, and they <strong>in</strong>crease credit risk s<strong>in</strong>ce the<br />
fund has exposure to both the issuer of the referenced obligation and the counterparty to the credit default swap.<br />
The Fund may <strong>in</strong>vest <strong>in</strong> float<strong>in</strong>g rate loans. The value of collateral, if any, secur<strong>in</strong>g a float<strong>in</strong>g rate loan can decl<strong>in</strong>e or may<br />
be <strong>in</strong>sufficient to meet the issuer’s obligations or may be difficult to liquidate.<br />
The Fund may <strong>in</strong>vest <strong>in</strong> event-l<strong>in</strong>ked bonds. The return of pr<strong>in</strong>cipal and the payment of <strong>in</strong>terest on event-l<strong>in</strong>ked bonds are<br />
cont<strong>in</strong>gent on the non-occurrence of a pre-def<strong>in</strong>ed “trigger” event, such as a hurricane or an earthquake of a specific<br />
magnitude.<br />
The Fund may <strong>in</strong>vest <strong>in</strong> commodities. The value of commodity-l<strong>in</strong>ked derivatives may be affected by changes <strong>in</strong><br />
overall market movements, commodity <strong>in</strong>dex volatility, changes <strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong>terest rates, factors affect<strong>in</strong>g a particular <strong>in</strong>dustry or<br />
commodity, <strong>in</strong>ternational economic, political and regulatory developments, supply and demand, and governmental<br />
regulatory policies.<br />
The Fund may <strong>in</strong>vest <strong>in</strong> zero coupon bonds and payment <strong>in</strong> k<strong>in</strong>d securities, which may be more speculative and fluctuate<br />
more <strong>in</strong> value than other fixed <strong>in</strong>come securities. The accrual of <strong>in</strong>come from these securities are payable as taxable annual<br />
dividends to shareholders.<br />
<strong>Investment</strong>s <strong>in</strong> equity securities are subject to price fluctuation.<br />
<strong>Investment</strong>s <strong>in</strong> fixed <strong>in</strong>come securities <strong>in</strong>volve <strong>in</strong>terest rate, credit, <strong>in</strong>flation, and re<strong>in</strong>vestment risks. As <strong>in</strong>terest rates<br />
rise, the value of fixed <strong>in</strong>come securities falls.<br />
The Fund may <strong>in</strong>vest <strong>in</strong> mortgage-backed securities, which dur<strong>in</strong>g times of fluctuat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>terest rates may <strong>in</strong>crease or<br />
decrease more than other fixed-<strong>in</strong>come securities. Mortgage-Backed securities are also subject to pre-payments.<br />
Prepayment risk is the chance that mortgage-backed bonds will be paid off early if fall<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>terest rates prompt homeowners<br />
to ref<strong>in</strong>ance their mortgages.<br />
High yield bonds possess greater price volatility, illiquidity, and possibility of default.<br />
There is no assurance that these and other strategies used by the Fund or underly<strong>in</strong>g funds will be successful.<br />
Absolute return funds are not <strong>in</strong>tended to outperform stocks and bonds dur<strong>in</strong>g strong market rallies.<br />
These risks may <strong>in</strong>crease share price volatility.<br />
Please see the prospectus for a more complete discussion of the Fund’s risks.<br />
2<br />
<strong>Pioneer</strong> Multi-Asset Income Fund<br />
All <strong>in</strong>vestments are subject to risk, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g the possible loss of pr<strong>in</strong>cipal. <strong>Pioneer</strong> Multi-Asset Income (“MAI”) Fund has the<br />
ability to <strong>in</strong>vest <strong>in</strong> a wide variety of securities and asset classes.<br />
High yield bonds possess greater price volatility, illiquidity, and possibility of default.<br />
<strong>Investment</strong>s <strong>in</strong> fixed <strong>in</strong>come securities <strong>in</strong>volve <strong>in</strong>terest rate, credit, <strong>in</strong>flation, and re<strong>in</strong>vestment risks. As <strong>in</strong>terest rates<br />
rise, the value of fixed <strong>in</strong>come securities falls.<br />
Prepayment risk is the chance that mortgage-backed bonds will be paid off early if fall<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>terest rates prompt homeowners<br />
to ref<strong>in</strong>ance their mortgages.<br />
The Fund may <strong>in</strong>vest <strong>in</strong> mortgage-backed securities, which dur<strong>in</strong>g times of fluctuat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>terest rates may <strong>in</strong>crease or<br />
decrease more than other fixed-<strong>in</strong>come securities. Mortgage-Backed securities are also subject to pre-payments.<br />
The Fund may <strong>in</strong>vest <strong>in</strong> subord<strong>in</strong>ated securities which may be disproportionately adversely affected by a default or even a<br />
perceived decl<strong>in</strong>e <strong>in</strong> creditworth<strong>in</strong>ess of the issuer.<br />
International <strong>in</strong>vestments are subject to special risks <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g currency fluctuations, social, economic and political<br />
uncerta<strong>in</strong>ties, which could <strong>in</strong>crease volatility. These risks are magnified <strong>in</strong> emerg<strong>in</strong>g markets.<br />
The Fund may <strong>in</strong>vest <strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong>flation-l<strong>in</strong>ked securities. As <strong>in</strong>flationary expectations <strong>in</strong>crease, <strong>in</strong>flation-l<strong>in</strong>ked securities may<br />
become more attractive, because they protect future <strong>in</strong>terest payments aga<strong>in</strong>st <strong>in</strong>flation. Conversely, as <strong>in</strong>flationary<br />
concerns decrease, <strong>in</strong>flation-l<strong>in</strong>ked securities will become less attractive and less valuable.<br />
The Fund may <strong>in</strong>vest <strong>in</strong> event-l<strong>in</strong>ked bonds. The return of pr<strong>in</strong>cipal and the payment of <strong>in</strong>terest on event-l<strong>in</strong>ked bonds are<br />
cont<strong>in</strong>gent on the non-occurrence of a pre-def<strong>in</strong>ed “trigger” event, such as a hurricane or an earthquake of a specific<br />
magnitude.<br />
The Fund may <strong>in</strong>vest <strong>in</strong> float<strong>in</strong>g rate loans. The value of collateral, if any, secur<strong>in</strong>g a float<strong>in</strong>g rate loan can decl<strong>in</strong>e or may<br />
be <strong>in</strong>sufficient to meet the issuer’s obligations or may be difficult to liquidate.<br />
14
BLUE PAPER | <strong>Liv<strong>in</strong>g</strong> <strong>in</strong> a <strong>More</strong> <strong>Volatile</strong> <strong>Investment</strong> <strong>World</strong> November 2012<br />
The Fund may <strong>in</strong>vest <strong>in</strong> underly<strong>in</strong>g funds (ETFs and unit <strong>in</strong>vestment trusts). In addition to the Fund’s operat<strong>in</strong>g expenses,<br />
you will <strong>in</strong>directly bear the operat<strong>in</strong>g expenses of <strong>in</strong>vestments <strong>in</strong> any underly<strong>in</strong>g funds.<br />
<strong>Investment</strong>s <strong>in</strong> equity securities are subject to price fluctuation.<br />
Small-and mid-cap stocks <strong>in</strong>volve greater risks and volatility than large-cap stocks.<br />
The Fund may <strong>in</strong>vest <strong>in</strong> Master Limited Partnerships, which are subject to <strong>in</strong>creased risks of liquidity, price valuation,<br />
control, vot<strong>in</strong>g rights and taxation. In addition, the structure affords fewer protections to <strong>in</strong>vestors <strong>in</strong> the Partnership than<br />
direct <strong>in</strong>vestors <strong>in</strong> a corporation.<br />
The Fund may <strong>in</strong>vest <strong>in</strong> zero coupon bonds and payment <strong>in</strong> k<strong>in</strong>d securities, which may be more speculative and fluctuate<br />
more <strong>in</strong> value than other fixed <strong>in</strong>come securities. The accrual of <strong>in</strong>come from these securities are payable as taxable annual<br />
dividends to shareholders.<br />
The Fund and some of the underly<strong>in</strong>g funds may use derivatives, such as options and futures, which can be illiquid,<br />
may disproportionately <strong>in</strong>crease losses, and have a potentially large impact on Fund performance.<br />
The Fund may <strong>in</strong>vest <strong>in</strong> credit default swaps, which may <strong>in</strong> some cases be illiquid, and they <strong>in</strong>crease credit risk s<strong>in</strong>ce the<br />
fund has exposure to both the issuer of the referenced obligation and the counterparty to the credit default swap.<br />
The Fund and some of the underly<strong>in</strong>g funds employ leverage, which <strong>in</strong>creases the volatility of <strong>in</strong>vestment returns and<br />
subjects the Fund to magnified losses if an underly<strong>in</strong>g fund’s <strong>in</strong>vestments decl<strong>in</strong>e <strong>in</strong> value.<br />
These risks may <strong>in</strong>crease share price volatility.<br />
There is no assurance that these and other strategies used by the Fund or underly<strong>in</strong>g funds will be successful.<br />
Please see the prospectus for a more complete discussion of the Fund’s risks.<br />
3<br />
<strong>Pioneer</strong> Multi-Asset Real Return Fund<br />
All <strong>in</strong>vestments are subject to risk, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g the possible loss of pr<strong>in</strong>cipal. <strong>Pioneer</strong> Multi-Asset Real Return (“MARR”) Fund<br />
has the ability to <strong>in</strong>vest <strong>in</strong> a wide variety of securities and asset classes.<br />
In addition, the Fund is non-diversified which means it can <strong>in</strong>vest a higher percentage of its assets <strong>in</strong> the securities of any<br />
one or more issuers. This will <strong>in</strong>crease the Fund’s potential risk exposure.<br />
The Fund may <strong>in</strong>vest <strong>in</strong> underly<strong>in</strong>g funds (ETFs and unit <strong>in</strong>vestment trusts). In addition to the Fund’s operat<strong>in</strong>g expenses,<br />
you will <strong>in</strong>directly bear the operat<strong>in</strong>g expenses of <strong>in</strong>vestments <strong>in</strong> any underly<strong>in</strong>g funds.<br />
The Fund and some of the underly<strong>in</strong>g funds employ leverage, which <strong>in</strong>creases the volatility of <strong>in</strong>vestment returns and<br />
subjects the Fund to magnified losses if an underly<strong>in</strong>g fund’s <strong>in</strong>vestments decl<strong>in</strong>e <strong>in</strong> value.<br />
The Fund and some of the underly<strong>in</strong>g funds may use derivatives, such as options and futures, which can be illiquid,<br />
may disproportionately <strong>in</strong>crease losses, and have a potentially large impact on Fund performance.<br />
The Fund and some of the underly<strong>in</strong>g funds may employ short sell<strong>in</strong>g, a speculative strategy. Unlike the possible loss on<br />
a security that is purchased, there is no limit on the amount of loss on an appreciat<strong>in</strong>g security that is sold short.<br />
The Fund may <strong>in</strong>vest <strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong>flation-l<strong>in</strong>ked securities. As <strong>in</strong>flationary expectations <strong>in</strong>crease, <strong>in</strong>flation-l<strong>in</strong>ked securities may<br />
become more attractive, because they protect future <strong>in</strong>terest payments aga<strong>in</strong>st <strong>in</strong>flation. Conversely, as <strong>in</strong>flationary<br />
concerns decrease, <strong>in</strong>flation-l<strong>in</strong>ked securities will become less attractive and less valuable.<br />
The Fund may <strong>in</strong>vest <strong>in</strong> credit default swaps, which may <strong>in</strong> some cases be illiquid, and they <strong>in</strong>crease credit risk s<strong>in</strong>ce the<br />
fund has exposure to both the issuer of the referenced obligation and the counterparty to the credit default swap.<br />
The Fund may <strong>in</strong>vest <strong>in</strong> subord<strong>in</strong>ated securities which may be disproportionately adversely affected by a default or even a<br />
perceived decl<strong>in</strong>e <strong>in</strong> creditworth<strong>in</strong>ess of the issuer.<br />
The Fund may <strong>in</strong>vest <strong>in</strong> float<strong>in</strong>g rate loans. The value of collateral, if any, secur<strong>in</strong>g a float<strong>in</strong>g rate loan can decl<strong>in</strong>e or may<br />
be <strong>in</strong>sufficient to meet the issuer’s obligations or may be difficult to liquidate.<br />
The Fund may <strong>in</strong>vest <strong>in</strong> event-l<strong>in</strong>ked bonds. The return of pr<strong>in</strong>cipal and the payment of <strong>in</strong>terest on event-l<strong>in</strong>ked bonds are<br />
cont<strong>in</strong>gent on the non-occurrence of a pre-def<strong>in</strong>ed “trigger” event, such as a hurricane or an earthquake of a specific<br />
magnitude.<br />
The Fund may <strong>in</strong>vest <strong>in</strong> commodities. The value of commodity-l<strong>in</strong>ked derivatives may be affected by changes <strong>in</strong> overall market<br />
movements, commodity <strong>in</strong>dex volatility, changes <strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong>terest rates, factors affect<strong>in</strong>g a particular <strong>in</strong>dustry or commodity, <strong>in</strong>ternational<br />
economic, political and regulatory developments, supply and demand, and governmental regulatory policies.<br />
<strong>Investment</strong>s <strong>in</strong> equity securities are subject to price fluctuation.<br />
Small-and mid-cap stocks <strong>in</strong>volve greater risks and volatility than large-cap stocks. International <strong>in</strong>vestments are<br />
subject to special risks <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g currency fluctuations, social, economic and political uncerta<strong>in</strong>ties, which could <strong>in</strong>crease<br />
volatility. These risks are magnified <strong>in</strong> emerg<strong>in</strong>g markets.<br />
<strong>Investment</strong>s <strong>in</strong> fixed <strong>in</strong>come securities <strong>in</strong>volve <strong>in</strong>terest rate, credit, <strong>in</strong>flation, and re<strong>in</strong>vestment risks. As <strong>in</strong>terest rates<br />
rise, the value of fixed <strong>in</strong>come securities falls.<br />
The Fund may <strong>in</strong>vest <strong>in</strong> mortgage-backed securities, which dur<strong>in</strong>g times of fluctuat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>terest rates may <strong>in</strong>crease or<br />
decrease more than other fixed-<strong>in</strong>come securities. Mortgage-Backed securities are also subject to pre-payments.<br />
Prepayment risk is the chance that mortgage-backed bonds will be paid off early if fall<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>terest rates prompt homeowners<br />
to ref<strong>in</strong>ance their mortgages.<br />
High yield bonds possess greater price volatility, illiquidity, and possibility of default.<br />
These risks may <strong>in</strong>crease share price volatility.<br />
There is no assurance that these and other strategies used by the Fund or underly<strong>in</strong>g funds will be successful.<br />
Please see the prospectus for a more complete discussion of the Fund’s risks.<br />
15
BLUE PAPER | <strong>Liv<strong>in</strong>g</strong> <strong>in</strong> a <strong>More</strong> <strong>Volatile</strong> <strong>Investment</strong> <strong>World</strong> November 2012<br />
4<br />
<strong>Pioneer</strong> Multi-Asset Ultra Short Income Fund<br />
All <strong>in</strong>vestments are subject to risk, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g the possible loss of pr<strong>in</strong>cipal. <strong>Pioneer</strong> Multi-Asset Ultrashort Income (“MAUI”)<br />
Fund has the ability to <strong>in</strong>vest <strong>in</strong> a wide variety of debt securities.<br />
The Fund may <strong>in</strong>vest <strong>in</strong> underly<strong>in</strong>g funds (ETFs and unit <strong>in</strong>vestment trusts). In addition to the Fund’s operat<strong>in</strong>g expenses,<br />
you will <strong>in</strong>directly bear the operat<strong>in</strong>g expenses of <strong>in</strong>vestments <strong>in</strong> any underly<strong>in</strong>g funds.<br />
The Fund and some of the underly<strong>in</strong>g funds employ leverage, which <strong>in</strong>creases the volatility of <strong>in</strong>vestment returns and<br />
subjects the Fund to magnified losses if an underly<strong>in</strong>g fund’s <strong>in</strong>vestments decl<strong>in</strong>e <strong>in</strong> value.<br />
The Fund and some of the underly<strong>in</strong>g funds may use derivatives, such as options and futures, which can be illiquid,<br />
may disproportionately <strong>in</strong>crease losses, and have a potentially large impact on Fund performance.<br />
The Fund may <strong>in</strong>vest <strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong>flation-l<strong>in</strong>ked securities. As <strong>in</strong>flationary expectations <strong>in</strong>crease, <strong>in</strong>flation-l<strong>in</strong>ked securities<br />
may become more attractive, because they protect future <strong>in</strong>terest payments aga<strong>in</strong>st <strong>in</strong>flation. Conversely, as <strong>in</strong>flationary<br />
concerns decrease, <strong>in</strong>flation-l<strong>in</strong>ked securities will become less attractive and less valuable.<br />
The Fund may <strong>in</strong>vest <strong>in</strong> credit default swaps, which may <strong>in</strong> some cases be illiquid, and they <strong>in</strong>crease credit risk s<strong>in</strong>ce the<br />
fund has exposure to both the issuer of the referenced obligation and the counterparty to the credit default swap.<br />
The Fund may <strong>in</strong>vest <strong>in</strong> subord<strong>in</strong>ated securities which may be disproportionately adversely affected by a default or even a<br />
perceived decl<strong>in</strong>e <strong>in</strong> creditworth<strong>in</strong>ess of the issuer.<br />
The Fund may <strong>in</strong>vest <strong>in</strong> float<strong>in</strong>g rate loans. The value of collateral, if any, secur<strong>in</strong>g a float<strong>in</strong>g rate loan can decl<strong>in</strong>e or may<br />
be <strong>in</strong>sufficient to meet the issuer’s obligations or may be difficult to liquidate.<br />
The Fund may <strong>in</strong>vest <strong>in</strong> event-l<strong>in</strong>ked bonds. The return of pr<strong>in</strong>cipal and the payment of <strong>in</strong>terest on event-l<strong>in</strong>ked bonds are<br />
cont<strong>in</strong>gent on the non-occurrence of a pre-def<strong>in</strong>ed “trigger” event, such as a hurricane or an earthquake of a specific<br />
magnitude.<br />
The Fund may <strong>in</strong>vest <strong>in</strong> commodities. The value of commodity-l<strong>in</strong>ked derivatives may be affected by changes <strong>in</strong> overall market<br />
movements, commodity <strong>in</strong>dex volatility, changes <strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong>terest rates, factors affect<strong>in</strong>g a particular <strong>in</strong>dustry or commodity, <strong>in</strong>ternational<br />
economic, political and regulatory developments, supply and demand, and governmental regulatory policies.<br />
The Fund may <strong>in</strong>vest <strong>in</strong> zero coupon bonds and payment <strong>in</strong> k<strong>in</strong>d securities, which may be more speculative and fluctuate<br />
more <strong>in</strong> value than other fixed <strong>in</strong>come securities. The accrual of <strong>in</strong>come from these securities are payable as taxable annual<br />
dividends to shareholders.<br />
<strong>Investment</strong>s <strong>in</strong> equity securities are subject to price fluctuation.<br />
International <strong>in</strong>vestments are subject to special risks <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g currency fluctuations, social, economic and political<br />
uncerta<strong>in</strong>ties, which could <strong>in</strong>crease volatility. These risks are magnified <strong>in</strong> emerg<strong>in</strong>g markets.<br />
<strong>Investment</strong>s <strong>in</strong> fixed <strong>in</strong>come securities <strong>in</strong>volve <strong>in</strong>terest rate, credit, <strong>in</strong>flation, and re<strong>in</strong>vestment risks. As <strong>in</strong>terest rates<br />
rise, the value of fixed <strong>in</strong>come securities falls.<br />
The Fund may <strong>in</strong>vest <strong>in</strong> mortgage-backed securities, which dur<strong>in</strong>g times of fluctuat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>terest rates may <strong>in</strong>crease or<br />
decrease more than other fixed-<strong>in</strong>come securities. Mortgage-Backed securities are also subject to pre-payments.<br />
Prepayment risk is the chance that mortgage-backed bonds will be paid off early if fall<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>terest rates prompt<br />
homeowners to ref<strong>in</strong>ance their mortgages.<br />
High yield bonds possess greater price volatility, illiquidity, and possibility of default.<br />
There may be <strong>in</strong>sufficient or illiquid collateral secur<strong>in</strong>g the float<strong>in</strong>g rate loans held with<strong>in</strong> the Fund. This may reduce the<br />
future redemption or recovery value of such loans.<br />
The Fund may have disadvantaged access to confidential <strong>in</strong>formation that could be used to assess a loan issuer, as<br />
<strong>Pioneer</strong> normally seeks to avoid receiv<strong>in</strong>g material, non-public <strong>in</strong>formation.<br />
These risks may <strong>in</strong>crease share price volatility.<br />
There is no assurance that these and other strategies used by the Fund or underly<strong>in</strong>g funds will be successful.<br />
Please see the prospectus for a more complete discussion of the Fund’s risks.<br />
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Securities offered through <strong>Pioneer</strong> Funds Distributor, Inc.<br />
Underwriter of <strong>Pioneer</strong> mutual funds, Member SIPC<br />
60 State Street, Boston, Massachusetts<br />
©2012 <strong>Pioneer</strong> <strong>Investment</strong>s • us.pioneer<strong>in</strong>vestments.com 26009-00-0912