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notice construction activity as far as the eye can see.<br />

In downtown Hong Kong, real estate is selling for<br />

EUR 5000 per square foot, driving house prices<br />

relative to income to unrealistic levels. However,<br />

lending restrictions have been introduced that limit<br />

the leverage relative to the cost of the real estate<br />

project to 75%; this will provide the housing market<br />

with a good cushion. Hence we do not envisage the<br />

Hong Kong real estate market undergoing a Dubaistyle<br />

crash.<br />

However, we wish to highlight the impact of a<br />

booming real estate market on consumer price<br />

inflation. Unlike Dubai, Hong Kong’s real estate<br />

boom is only moderately leveraged and is funded by<br />

Chinese real money. Nonetheless, real estate prices<br />

rising out of all proportion to income will squeeze<br />

low-income groups out of the cities. As low-income<br />

groups tend to be service providers, it should not be<br />

a surprise to see Hong Kong’s real estate boom<br />

leading to a period where inflation is an issue.<br />

Rising bills<br />

Each time I go to Asia, my bills are higher than on<br />

previous visits. There is a lot of anecdotal evidence<br />

suggesting Asia is inflating its relative<br />

competitiveness away. Official data may understate<br />

real inflation by a substantial margin and the Chinese<br />

administration’s endorsement of 20% wage<br />

increases may be viewed as a move to calm the<br />

population’s anger as real incomes are eroded by<br />

rising prices.<br />

The motivation behind the PBoC’s current policy<br />

mix<br />

Last Friday, the PBoC again increased its minimum<br />

reserve requirements with the aim of reducing the<br />

velocity of money and credit in the Chinese<br />

economy. This policy has become known as<br />

quantitative tightening. There has been a lively<br />

discussion on why China has largely been refraining<br />

from using the traditional interest rate tool to fight<br />

inflation. An argument often deployed is that higher<br />

RMB money market rates could trigger an inflow of<br />

unwanted hot money, pushing currency reserves up<br />

even up rapidly. Indeed, absorbing incoming<br />

reserves by selling sterilization bonds has become<br />

an increasingly costly business for the PBoC given<br />

the negative spread between the yield from foreign<br />

currency reserves and the yield offered by the<br />

sterilisation bonds.<br />

Nonetheless, the main reason why China is using the<br />

interest rate tool only reluctantly is the highly<br />

leveraged “state-owned” corporate sector. Here,<br />

higher interest rates could burst the leverage bubble.<br />

China’s households have on average saved 35% of<br />

their income on average over the past decade. As<br />

authorities run a closed capital account and<br />

50.0<br />

49.0<br />

48.0<br />

47.0<br />

46.0<br />

45.0<br />

44.0<br />

43.0<br />

Chart 3: US Wages Relative Output have<br />

Declined<br />

42.0<br />

Sep-75Jun-79 Mar-83 Dec-86Sep-90Jun-94 Mar-98Dec-01Sep-05Jun-09<br />

Source: Bloomberg, <strong>BNP</strong> Paribas<br />

Percent<br />

6<br />

5<br />

4<br />

3<br />

2<br />

1<br />

-1<br />

US Wages are a proportion of GDI<br />

US CPI (y/y, RHS)<br />

Chart 4: USD Vs CNY 3m Bill <strong>Rate</strong>s<br />

USD 3m bill yield<br />

households have saved for pension and rainy-day<br />

purposes, savings were accumulated into bank<br />

deposits. Domestic banks have only been allowed to<br />

lend domestically, which in a booming economy is<br />

relatively unproblematic. However, Chinese bankers<br />

(as everywhere else in the world) are paid to ride the<br />

yield curve and convert deposits into vast amounts of<br />

credit. China’s household savings relative to GDP<br />

have reached 100% but state-owned corporate<br />

liabilities are now a multiple of that.<br />

China’s national accounts data are not yet as<br />

comprehensive enough as those provided by<br />

Western statistics offices. However, given the closed<br />

capital account and huge private household savings,<br />

either the corporate or sovereign sector must be<br />

deeply in the red. In China, it is the state-owned<br />

corporate sector which is highly leveraged and thus<br />

sensitive to changing funding costs. The Chinese<br />

authorities know that, explaining why they have been<br />

reluctant to use the interest rate tool.<br />

12.0<br />

10.0<br />

Nov May Aug Nov Feb May Aug Nov Feb May Aug Nov Feb May Aug Nov Feb<br />

06 07<br />

08<br />

09<br />

10 11<br />

Source: Reuters Ecowin Pro, <strong>BNP</strong> Paribas<br />

CNY 3m bill yield<br />

8.0<br />

6.0<br />

4.0<br />

2.0<br />

0.0<br />

-2.0<br />

-4.0<br />

-6.0<br />

-8.0<br />

Hans Redeker 20 January 2011<br />

<strong>Market</strong> Mover, Non-Objective Research Section<br />

60<br />

www.Global<strong>Market</strong>s.bnpparibas.com

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