Preface

55
this reason, it’s the decision of this panel that this appeal lacks merit on this ground
for being fundamentally defective in law for want of jurisdiction.
As to the second issue, whether the appellant is competent to maintain this
appeal bearing in mind the fact that she was not a party to the proceedings at the
lower court and no attempt was made by her to be joined as an interested party
either at the lower court or before this panel, it is pertinent to know at this juncture
who may appeal against the decisions of the District Tribunals in the Gambia.
Section 26 of the District Tribunals Act (supra) restricts the right to appeal against
its decisions to the parties. The section provides: "Any party who feels himself
aggrieved by any judgment, order or a decision of a District Tribunal whether
given in the exercise of its civil or criminal jurisdiction,···············may appeal
therefrom to the Supreme Court···".
The proviso to this section makes the issue of appeal from District Court to
the Supreme Court amenable to modification by the Chief Justice with a view to
eliminating undue formality, delay and expense. Section 137 A (6) of the 1997
Constitution of the Gambia has overtaken the rules that may be made by the Chief
Justice in this regard by providing that such appeals may lay to this panel where
Sharia law is involved.
Undoubtedly the appellant is an interested party but is she competent to
appeal against the decision of the District Tribunal Act within contemplation of
section 26 of the District Tribunals Act (supra)? Being a party to the proceedings
of the District Tribunals is a condition precedent to filing an appeal against its
decisions. The appellant has not satisfied that requirement since she was neither a
party to the proceedings before the lower court nor was she joined as an interested
party under the relevant rules of either court. The appellant should have applied