Behavioural Surveillance Surveys - The Wisdom of Whores

Behavioural Surveillance Surveys - The Wisdom of Whores Behavioural Surveillance Surveys - The Wisdom of Whores

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Countries or regions where HIV is very uncommon are in a particularly interesting situation. Many countries is this situation have not felt the need to invest resources in collecting behavioral data, assuming that if the virus is largely absent, risk behavior must also be limited. However, it is exactly at this point of the epidemic that behavioral data can act most effectively as a warning system. Where behavioral data and other indicators such as STI or hepatitis B prevalence show that people are having unprotected sex with multiple partners or are sharing injecting equipment, it may simply be a matter of time before HIV follows. Almost inevitably in these situations, if HIV surfaces it will do so first in those groups whose behavior carries a high risk of exposure to the virus. Behavioral surveillance should therefore be restricted to those groups. Just as there are groups that are important to survey in different epidemic states, it is important to point out that certain groups are inappropriate for behavioral surveillance. For example, it makes little sense to include pregnant women or STI clients in behavioral surveillance, for reasons given in the section on linking behavioral and serological data on page 8. Since social circumstances change over time, countries need constantly to re-evaluate the existence and importance of different sub-populations. In Eastern Europe, for example, rapidly changing social circumstances had by the mid-1990s led to an epidemic of injecting drug use unimaginable just a few years earlier. Similarly, in parts of China, economic growth is giving rise to increased internal migration, a rapid resurgence of the sex industry and an increase in STIs. Other factors affecting the choice of respondent groups It is rare that respondent groups are chosen purely on epidemiological grounds, and rightly so. Other factors, led by prevention efforts, must come into play. As mentioned in the introductory chapter, there is no point setting up a behavioral surveillance system unless a change in behavior is expected. And while social circumstances may indeed affect behavior, the primary engine for behavior change should be HIV prevention efforts. Unless such efforts are in place or planned, behavioral surveillance is a waste of time and money. In certain countries where little behavioral information is available, or target populations are not clearly defined, BSS might include an initial pilot phase with more in-depth formative research e.g. attempting to better characterize sex worker clients. Alternatively, the pilot phase may be built into the first round of data collection, with multiple populations included, some of which may be dropped in later rounds, or included in alternative waves. B EHAV I OR A L S U R V EI L L A NC E SURV EY S CHAPTER 3 25

In some circumstances, public health officials may wish to use a first round of behavioral data as a springboard from which to launch a campaign to lobby for prevention activities in marginalised groups such as injecting drug users. But if the prevailing social or political climate dictates that such initiatives are bound to fail, it may be best to drop the group from BSS until circumstances change. One of the greatest dangers surrounding HIV surveillance systems including BSS is that the data generated will be used to victimize or discriminate against populations from whom data are collected. The consultative group planning BSS should take this possibility into very careful consideration when choosing respondent groups. Another danger is that the data will not be used at all. This is most commonly the case when influential sectors of society are in “hear no evil, see no evil, speak no evil” mode : in other words, in denial about the existence of certain behaviors in their societies. Examples come from several African countries that have refused to allow any data collection or indeed prevention programming for school children, arguing that this group is not sexually active. Some have persisted in this attitude even when 10 percent of blood donations from this “low risk” group have to be rejected because they are infected with HIV. In the case where inaction is so harmful, it is worth persisting in trying to build alliances that will make the collection and eventually the use of data from these groups possible. Political imperatives may affect the choice of respondent groups in other ways, too. There may be pressure from politicians to include (or to exclude) certain geographic areas or ethnic groups in data collection. Large donors may also hope to influence the selection of groups to include populations for whom they have funded interventions. Rapid assessment of the feasibility of including a sub-population group for BSS Other practical considerations are also important. A particular group may contribute to the spread of HIV in a country, but it may simply not be feasible to define and sample from the group in a way that would yield any meaningful information. Criteria necessary to guide selection of groups include the following: • It must be possible to define criteria for being considered a member of the respondent group • It must be possible to construct a sampling frame of locations where the population can be found • Interviewers must be able to access respondents • Respondents must consent to be interviewed and be willing to answer personal questions about their sexual/risk behavior • There must be adequate numbers of respondents present to meet sampling quotas. Rapid assessment techniques should establish whether these criteria can be met. Rapid assessment will include a review of any existing data or literature about the sub-population in question, including a press review. Interviews with group members or those who provide services to them can also help broadly to confirm assumptions about basic levels of risk behaviors in the sub-population. The ability of interviewers to approach potential respondents safely, and the willingness of potential respondents to discuss their sexual and drug-taking behavior should also be explored. 26 C H A PTER 3 B EHAV I OR A L S U R V EI L L A NC E S U R V EY S

Countries or regions where HIV is very<br />

uncommon are in a particularly interesting<br />

situation. Many countries is this situation<br />

have not felt the need to invest resources in<br />

collecting behavioral data, assuming that if the<br />

virus is largely absent, risk behavior must also<br />

be limited. However, it is exactly at this point<br />

<strong>of</strong> the epidemic that behavioral data can act<br />

most effectively as a warning system. Where<br />

behavioral data and other indicators such as<br />

STI or hepatitis B prevalence show that people<br />

are having unprotected sex with multiple<br />

partners or are sharing injecting equipment,<br />

it may simply be a matter <strong>of</strong> time before HIV<br />

follows. Almost inevitably in these situations,<br />

if HIV surfaces it will do so first in those<br />

groups whose behavior carries a high risk <strong>of</strong><br />

exposure to the virus. Behavioral surveillance<br />

should therefore be restricted to those groups.<br />

Just as there are groups that are important<br />

to survey in different epidemic states, it is<br />

important to point out that certain groups<br />

are inappropriate for behavioral surveillance.<br />

For example, it makes little sense to include<br />

pregnant women or STI clients in behavioral<br />

surveillance, for reasons given in the section<br />

on linking behavioral and serological data on<br />

page 8.<br />

Since social circumstances change over<br />

time, countries need constantly to re-evaluate<br />

the existence and importance <strong>of</strong> different<br />

sub-populations. In Eastern Europe, for<br />

example, rapidly changing social circumstances<br />

had by the mid-1990s led to an epidemic <strong>of</strong><br />

injecting drug use unimaginable just a few<br />

years earlier. Similarly, in parts <strong>of</strong> China,<br />

economic growth is giving rise to increased<br />

internal migration, a rapid resurgence <strong>of</strong> the<br />

sex industry and an increase in STIs.<br />

Other factors affecting the choice <strong>of</strong> respondent<br />

groups<br />

It is rare that respondent groups are chosen<br />

purely on epidemiological grounds, and<br />

rightly so. Other factors, led by prevention<br />

efforts, must come into play. As mentioned in<br />

the introductory chapter, there is no point<br />

setting up a behavioral surveillance system<br />

unless a change in behavior is expected.<br />

And while social circumstances may indeed<br />

affect behavior, the primary engine for<br />

behavior change should be HIV prevention<br />

efforts. Unless such efforts are in place or<br />

planned, behavioral surveillance is a waste<br />

<strong>of</strong> time and money.<br />

In certain countries where little behavioral<br />

information is available, or target populations<br />

are not clearly defined, BSS might include<br />

an initial pilot phase with more in-depth<br />

formative research e.g. attempting to better<br />

characterize sex worker clients. Alternatively,<br />

the pilot phase may be built into the first<br />

round <strong>of</strong> data collection, with multiple<br />

populations included, some <strong>of</strong> which may<br />

be dropped in later rounds, or included in<br />

alternative waves.<br />

B EHAV I OR A L S U R V EI L L A NC E SURV EY S CHAPTER 3<br />

25

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