485th TACTICAL MISSILE WING

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE
COMPLIANCE
BASE-LINE 9 _
FLORENNES AIR
NUCLEAR FORCE TREATY
INSPECTION
10 AUGUST 1988
BASE, BELGII]M
Office of History
485th Tactical Missile Wing
Florennes Air Base, Belgium

INTRODUCTION
On 9 August 1988, months of hard work and preparation achieved fruition
with the arrival of a ten-man Soviet baseline inspection team at
Florennes Air Base. The team arrived as part of the verification process
spelled out in the historic Interrnediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missile
Elimination Treaty. Siurultaneous to the Florennes inspection, a second
ten-member Soviet team inspected the European Missi.le Repair Facility,
located dt Gosselies, Belgium, the site of advance repairs for NATOts
cruise and Pershing missile inventory. These two teams, composed of
Soviet military and technical experts, arrived with a predetermined agenda
which would verify to Soviet satisfaction strict adherance to the treaty.
Accompanying the Soviets was a contingent of the American On-Site Inspectj-on
Agency (OSIA), acting both as liaison between the Soviets and the
inspected parties and as representatives of the United States t interests
during the inspection.
How well the i-nspections went, and the efforts put forth by the men
and women of Florennes to smooth the course of this moment in history,
were the the topics of this brief recap. Wing leve1 hi-storians seldom
have the opportunity to eover what can truly be called rfreal hj.storyrr,
for the need to record the day-to-day routine of aircraft or missile
operations is all too often an exercise in important, but dull, contlnuity.
The inspection of onefs base by a Soviet team as part of an effort to
remove an enti.re class of nuclear weapons from the worldfs collective
arsenal, now that is REAL HISTORY, and as such merits coverage from al1
l-eveLs of the historical conrmunity. This sma1l effort, and other such
projeets from the wing historianrs corps, provides a view from the ground
level. As such it probably does not adequately frame the "big picturerr.
This will be the work of those l-ooking in from on-high, using the efforts
of 1ocal historians as sources of information and background coloring.
Much credit goes to the entire Florennes base community, for the inspec-'
tion of 9 - 10 August was an overwhelming success, both in terms of treaty.
adherance ains as well- as in the establishment of closer ties between two
diverse peoples. The treaty verification process, essential to any hopes
for a world eventually free of the threat of nuclear war, continued to
go well. According to Mr. Lyebedev, the Soviet Team Leader, rVe note that
the inspected party strictly adhered to the provisions of the treaty.tt
As to the growth of ties between Soviet and Arnerican people that these
inspections continue to nurture, Mr. Lyebedev culminated his closing
remarks to the base populace with the observation that, "...we are pleased
with the grow"Lh of mutual understanding and trust between the parties
concerned.tt This growth of understanding between the superpowers, and the
resulting effect.s on the security of Europe, these will form the lionrs
share of later coverage of the treaty now being enacted. For now, a
brief look at the role of one small, but important, group of people in
this process is in order.
It is to these people, the men and women of the 485th Tactical Missile
Wing, that this short work is dedicated.

IMERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCE TREATY
COMPLIANCE INSPECTION
BASE-I,INE 9 - 10 AUGUST 1988
FLORENNES AIR BASE, BELGIUM
Conscious that nuclear war would have devastating consequences for
all nankind,
Guided by the objective of strengthening strategic stability,
Convinced thaL the measures set forth in this Treaty will help to
reduce the risk of outbreak of war and strengthen international
peace and security, and
Mindful of their obligations under Article VI of the Treaty on the
Non-ProLiferation of Nuclear Weapons,
(The Parties) Have agreed as Follows:
Preamble to the Treaty Between the
United States of America and the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
on the Elirnination of Their
Intermediate-Range and Shorl-Range
Missilesl
With these words the United States and the Soviet Union began, what
was to many people around the world, the daruning of a new age. This was
perhaps overstating the value of a treaty that, 1-ike so nany other
international agreements, hinged on the mutual trust and cooperation of
rival superpowers. But the Treaty Between the United States of America
and the Union of Soviet Soeialist Republics on the Eliminatj-on of Their
Intermediate-Range and Short-Range Missiles (hereinafter referred to as
the INF Treaty) did mark a definite and positive shift in superpower
relations. For the first time ever, an entire class of nuclear weapons
would be removed from the inventories of adversarial nations. Perhaps
more importantly, from the standpoint of a Uni-ted States J-ed by the
conservative Republican President Reagan, were the carefully constructed
treaty verification apparatus. Without these verification procedures,
it would be difficult, if not impossible, for the Administration to gain
INF Treaty ratification from the United States Senate. For seven years
this President had reminded the American electorate of the untrustworthy
nature of the Soviet 'revil empire". Now this same bastion of conservative
principle, f.eat of the cormnunist menace, r^ras to be chipped away by a
treaty si-gned by the conservativers leading 1ight. This would be hard
for conservatives from both parties to swallow without ironclad assurance
of verification.2
It was the verification process of the INF Treaty which brought a
ten-member team of Soviet inspectors to Florennes Air Base, Belgium, on
9 - 10 August 1988. This was only fitting, and in fact it was inevitable,
for it was the presence of cruise missiles and Pershing II missiles in
tiny spots across western Europe that had brought about active Soviet
negotiations for the elimination of this class of weapons. Combined with

the enplacement of these new weapons systems as a spur to real negotiations
nas economic pragmatism on the part of Soviet policy-makers. If
Mr. Gorbachevrs avowed goal of revitalizing the stagnate Soviet economy
rilas to become reality, then a reduction in defense spending would have
to take place. A reduction in NATO/Warsaw Pact intermediate and shortrange
missiles was a first step that Gorbachev could not pass up, and
despite initial misgivings, the Reagan administration also saw domestic
and international gains from this mutual drawdown of forces.3*
A11 this said, it still remained a matter of developing a verification
system satisfactory to both sides before the INF treaty r.rouLd
work. Two key elements of this verification process, the GITTS and
rnandatory compliance inspections, both of which directly involved the
485th Tactical Missile lJing, will be the topic of the remainder of this
work. First, a brief look at GITTS, and Florennesr historic role in
its establishment.
GITTS
The Ground Launched Cruise Missile (GLCM) Intermediate Nuclear
Forces Treaty Tracking Systen (a large nouthful hereinafter more conveniently
known as GITTS) was an automated system jointly developed by
Headquart.ers, Air Force Logistics Cormand and the Air Logistics Center
at Oklahoroa City, Oklahoura. The GITTS \^tas a redundantly capabl-e system
which simultaneously updated a master data bank whenever those items
linited under the terms of the INF treaty were deployed to or from an
operational or training base. Being a redundant system, both an electronic
mail- and an AUTODIN phone-line made up the system' GITTS nade
sure that all required notifications took place without delay. Reportable
GITTS data first arrived at the Logistics Operations Center,
Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio, and from there was up-channeled to National-
Cornraand Authorities at the Pentagon and the White House. Only after a1l
data was carefully screened for accuracy, any inaccuracies could be
construed as a treaty violation, was GITTS reportable information.provided
to the Soviets, who then began there or^ln screeni-ng process.4
Under GITTS, rouLine messages were required upon Treaty status changes.
The first, an indication that Treaty ratification was complete and the
GITTS was in effectr w4s sent on 2 June, 1988. Only the previous day,
the United States Senate ratified the INF Treatyr and with earlier Soviet
rubber-stanping of the agreement, this Senate approval seL into motion the
elaborate mechanics of treaty verification. The first GITTS generated
notification departed Florennes at L5002, 2 June 88, as the 485th verified
its twenty nissile inventory, along with twenty launch canisters and two
training launch canisters. I^lith this initial report, Florennes became the
* According to C.W. Maynes, editor of Foreign Policy Magazine, "It is
clear from numerous statements that the Soviet civilian economy is doing
badly and that the USSR needs a respite internationally...NATO countries,
particularly the United States, must have the courage and the selfdiscipline
to develop a constructive policy that will test Soviet
intentions.rr The INF was the start of just such a'rtesting policy".

first unit to complete GITTS reporting.5
Two other reports, apart from the routine updates required when
missiles and other Treaty Linited Items (TLIs) changed status, were also
mandated by GITTS. Every six months after ratification put GITTS into
effect, a semi-annual status report listing the TLI inventory was due to
higher headquarters, with a forty-eight hour deadline to the Soviet Union.
Also required under GITTS was notification thrgugh channels in the event
of any accidental loss or destruction of TLIs.6
This, then, was GITTS, one of the key elements of the IIIF verification
process. We now l-eave the realm of international politics and
automated reporting, a place that required a brief stop in the interests
of background clarity. The remainder of this work will look at three
eventful days in August 1988. On 9 - 10 August, the verification process
entered its second phase at Florennes with the arrival of Soviet inspectors.
These inspectors, technicians and military men, would verify to
our treaty partner I s satisfaction whether Florennes was in fact complying
with the INF pactfs terms. A pair of messages, generated by the On-Site
Inspection Agency in Washington, D.C., and arriving at Florennes on Sunday,
7 August, were the catalysts that began the on-site inspectign process
in B61giun. What transpired next was, as they say, history.T*
Pre-Arrival- Preparations
The On-Site Inspection Agency (OSIA) messages satisfied the sixteen
hour notification requirement spelled out in the INF Treatyrs Protocol
dealing with the inspection process. In addition to the arrival date/time,
the inspection notification included the port of entry (Brussel-s in this
case), the site to be inspected, and the names of the inspection team members
and their designated aircrews. Two ten-man teams would make the trip
to Belgium, inspecting simultaneously Fl-orennes AB and the European
Missile Repair Facility, located at Gosselies. The composition of the two
Soviet teams is included below as Figures 1 and 2. 0n B August, at 1630L'
the Soviet contingent arrived at Brusselrs Zaventem National Airport.B
Figure 1
Soviet Inspection Team (Fl-orennes BB-RED-O19)
Vyacheslav S. LyebedevTc
Vladinir N. Andrianov
Vladinir N. Vostroknutov
Yuriy G. Kovtun
Anatoliy I. LukfYanchenko
Source: See Sup Doc 6 (NOTE:
Boris F. Zabavin
Mikhail Y. Sorokoumov
Vladimir A. Volosatov
Igorr A. ovsyannikov
Vladirnir N. Proshin
TC denotes Team Chief)
* Tncluded in the supporting documents are the text of the INF Treaty
(with Memorandum of Understanding establishing the treaty data base, and
protocols governing missile system disposal- and treaty inspections) as
well as the INF Basing Countries Agreement. These documents are included
in the interests of clarity and to form as concise as possible a record
of the events in question.

Figure 2
Soviet Inspection Team (Gosselies 88-RED-020)
Gennadj-y M. Komogortsev
Andrey K. RedrKin
Vlktor I. Davydov
Vasiliy M. Bondar
olyeg V. Shulrga
Source: See Sup Doc 7
Viktor P. Bozhenkov
Igorr Y. Goncharov
Vadin I. Solomenko
Olyeg G. Vinogradov
Yuriy N. TrettYakov
After introductory remarks by the senior Soviet team chief,
Mr. Lyebedev, and further comments by the OSIA team chief, Colonel Fer,
the Belgian Foreign Ministry Representative l,Iilifried Nartus made his
welcoming address on behalf of the host nation. Reminding his audience
that the INF agreement was only the beginning of the arms reduction process,
Mr. Nartus drew attention to the ultiurate aim of his governmenLts arms
policy, a global chemical weapons ban and conventional force stability on
the continent. Then, echoing the sentiments of the Maynes articl-e quoted
earlier, Mr. Nartus emphasized the role of his small nation as part of
NATOTs effort that brought the Soviets to the bargaining table:
Together with its partners and allies, Belgium remains prompted by
a spirit marked by both firmness in the defense of its security
interests and openness to all proposals aimed at laying the genuine
foundation of increased security at the lowest possible 1evel of
forces.9
Acconpanying the Soviet team as they began their inspection tours
woul-d be a team from the On-Site Inspection Agency, composed of both
military and civilians, experts in a broad range of disciplines. These
men and women would act in a dual role during the inspections, they would
act as liaison between the Soviets and the inspected parties, and at the
same time Ehey would represent the overall interests of the United States
during al1 phases of the inspection. The OSIA team that would accompany
Ehe Soviets to Florennes is listed below.
Tearn Chief
Deputy Team Chief
Support
Linguist
Linguist
Linguist
Linguist
Linguist
Security
Security
PA
Figure 3
0SIA Escort Team Composition
Colonel John I'er
Major Rene N. Chabannes
Captain Johnnie Seward
TSgt Martin J. Fol-an
TSgt John D. Steindel
Sgt Jeanine M. Gordon
Sgt Dennis D. Lewis
Sgt George D. Fields
Mr. Bernard C. Devaney
SSgt John R. Mendes
Major David N. Compton
Source: Briefing, Lt Col- E.T. Breazeal-e, 485 TMI^I DCS/OPS to
TSgt R.S. Devino, 485 TI'{W/HO, 17 Aug 88.

While the Soviet and U.S. teams settled in at a Brussels hotel, the
preparations at Florennes continued throughout the night of 8 August and
into the earl-y morning hours of 9 August. Because of the international
rami.fications of the entire INF process, media coverage of the Florennes
inspection vras expected to be widespread. In anticj.pation of a large
turn-out by the Belgian media, Anerican embassy and Fl-orennes public
affairs officials worked in a coordinated effort that would ensure smooth
flow of information to the assernbled reporters and photographers. Press
advisories issued jointly by the U.S. Enbassy and the Belgian Foreign
Ministry notified the media both of the pending arrival of the Soviets
at Brussels, and of the Soviet intentions to conduct baseline inspections
on Belgian soil. That the Belgian media took an i-ntense interest in the
events in question was clear from the degree of coverage provided, both
to the arrival of the Soviets at Zarentem and to the teamrs 9 August
initiaL appearance at Florettttes. 10*
At Florennes, a prirnary support cadre of nearly three hundred men
and women awaited the Soviet arrival. This support el-ement consisEed of
security police, transportation, civil engineering, services, public
affairs, logistics, Office of Special Investigations, administrative,
and numerous other specialities. And al-though special- recognition, in
the forur of one-of-a-kind connemorative eertificates, could only be given
to those most directly involved with the support of the team, it was fair
to say that the entire Florennes base community took part in the events
about to unfold. It was now 9 August, and the Soviets were enroute to
Florennes, it was all about to begin.ll
9 August 1988
In order to comply completely with the terms of the treaty, it was
necessary to establish a strictly enforced cordon around those areas of
Florennes determined to be inspectable by the Soviets. Those support
structures used to support GLCM operations at Florennes AB were preidentified
during the INF negotiation process, and the Soviet inspectors
had in their possession diagrams of the area to be inspected, which are
included as Sup Doc 4. The process of cordoning-off the Florennes Alert
and Maintenance Area, and the approaches to this area, was by 9 August
an easily accomplished routlne, based on monEhs of planning and several
mock inspections held over the previous months. To make sure that the
base community was aware of the boundaries to be maintaj.ned for the entire
twenty-four hours of the inspection, Colonel- Calvin Chasteen, 485 TMW
Commander, ordered the circulation of a letter spelling out the INF
inspection area. The letter also provided the base populace with sone
ldea when the cordon r/as to go into effect (&pproxirnately Ewo hours before
* An example of the coverage provided to the Brussel-s arrival is included
as Sup Doc 11, a transl-ation of a morning broadcast by RTBF (the French
language Belgian radio and television system). The RTBF broadcast stressed
the historical significance of the teamrs arrival , "an event nobody r^rould
have thought possibl-e a few years ago." An accurate and fair portrait of
the INF process, and NATOfs role in the achievement of the treaty, was
provided throughout the French language press. The Flemish language
coverage, as we will see, was somewhat different.

the Soviet arrival), how I-ong it would remain in place (initially the cordon
was scheduled to remai.n in place for the entire inspection period, this,
as hre wi1-l see, would eventually change), and with some alternatives for
the normal operati.on of essential- base facilities. As a further reminder
of the cordonrs importance, posters published by the base public affairs
office popped up on bulletin boards around Florennes. Included as Appendix
One is one of these posters, an item, whose Dresence caught the eye of
more than one interest.ed oarty.I2x
The first, in fact one of the only, problem to arise Curing the two
days of the inspection resulted from a faiLure on the part of OSIA to
verify its team listing in a timely manner. As of 1039L, only fifty-six
minutes before the scheduled arrival time, Florennes officials
which OSIA team would be staying with the Soviets here and which would
make the journey to Gosselies for the inspection there. This required,
according to Lieutenant Colonel Edwin T. BxeazeaLe, t'some real scraurbling
in validating the visitor list, setting-up for the ilL-briefing, and naking
room assignments" once the verification did arrive.13 To expedite the
logistics of in-processing both Soviet and OSIA teams, wing officials
recoumended that a listing of OSIA team compositions be provided to sites
about to be inspected before the verification message of Soviet intent to
inspect was transmitted.l4
were unalrare
At 1135L the Soviet team arrived. Iumediately upon their arrival at
Florennes, the Soviet contingent received formal greetings in front of the
base theater from Colonel Chasteen, Colonel Xavier Janssens (2nd Wing
Tactique Conrnander, the host wing conmander of Florennes AB), and from
Lieutenant Col-one1 Breazeale. Lieutenant Colonel Breazeale, Deputy
Commander for Operations, would act as the wing project officer for the
Soviet visit, a job that would require nore than a modicr.rn of patience'
flexibilLy, and tact. During rny brief tenure as 485th historian, I have
yet to see Lieutenant Colonel Breazeale when he was not sniling, and this
included the duration of the on-site inspection, a time when the man was
quite exhausted. He was a key element in the smooth running of the visit
and his confidence and competence were contagious, for rest of the Soviet
teamts time on Florennes hten! flawlessl-y.15
Before touching on the highpoints of the actual on-site inspection,
a brief look at the rnediats coverage of the visit at Florennes was inorder.
As mentioned previously, the coverage provided by the French
language media to a1l phases of the INF visit, including the actual
Soviet arrival at Florennes was factual and unbiased, placing particular
emphasis on the historical nature of the treaty process. !trithout touching
on the eultural and political differences between French speaking southern
Belgiuur and the Flenish speaking north, it was sufficient to say that the
nedia coverage provided by the Flemish press appeared to be less favorable
* Among the momentos of their visit to Florennes, the inspection team
brought a stack of the'rmousetrap" bulletins back to the Soviet Union.
The Soviets were not sure if the warning was intended to keep U.S. personnel
away from the Soviets, or if it was a dire threat against the wellbeing
of Americans found in the cordon area. The Soviets were assured
that the signs were intended only as a reminder not to interfere with the
inspection, and were not as fearsome as they may have appeared.

than that of the French press. This is based on transcripts taken from
both French and Flenish language newspaper articles dealing with the
INF inspection. The FLernish "De Morgen" complained that no press
conference, interviews, or extensive opportunity for photography were
provided. "De Morgen" also provided coverage of the two protestors who
stood at the main gate with a banner coulmemorating the Nagasaki bonbing
anniversary. Another Flemish publication, rrHet Laatste Nieuws", also
featured prominently the 43rd anniversary of Nagasaki protest by two
individuals, and also ran an article entitled "ouef a la russe et filet
americain" (egg a 1a Russian and American steak) which discussed the
plight of a restaraunt ol,ner whose place of business was located just
outside the base gate. The articl-e accused the United States Air Force
of atternpting to drive the man out of business, and hinted that the sale
of land along the perimeter of Florennes was bei-ng thwarted by U.S.
agents, "a witness explained to us that 'every time a FOR SALE sign is
piaced, sornebody take! it awayr".16
One French language newspaper, the Cormnunist "Le Peuple", did stress
the helplessness of the Belgian people against forces from outside their
sphere, "The Belgian representatives manage to conceal their embarrassment
and are stamping between the Arnericans and the press." And al-though
the main focus point of"Le Peupl-e" was praise of the local anti-nucl-ear
center "La Florennade", perhaps the most accurate portion of the articl"e
was an interview with the the mayor of Florennes, Monsieur Tinrmernans.
In that interview, the mayor voiced his concern over the economic impact
to his comnunity resulting from a U.S. pulJ--out. It al-most seemed that
he was sad to see us g9r a view sharply different from the one held by
ttl,e Peuple
I
stt heroes. r /o
A11 told, 37 French and Flemish language journalists covered the
Soviet arrival, filning and taking stil1 photographs of the we1-couring
ceremony from a flatbed truck parked in front of the base theater. The
media visit was basically a smooth process, although four reporters had
followed the team bus from Brusselg and therefore were unabl-e to process
onto the base in time to cover the photographic opportunity. Base public
affairs directed further press inquiries to the Brussels press center,
in place to track media coverage of all phases of the Sovietrs time in
Belgiuur.18
Inspection Highlights
Inrmediately after the brief photo opportunity, the Soviet and OSIA
teams went to the Operations, Maintenanee, & Training Facility (OMIF-
Building /lF-905) which served as the work center for the Soviets during
the inspection. At 1230L the incoming briefing concluded, narking the
official-ly agreed to inspection start tine. Mister Lyebedev then tol-d
base officials and the OSIA tearn that although previous inspected partles
* La Florennade, a center for non-violence and disarmament, is manned
on a continued basis by paid activists shipped in from Flanders and the
Netherlands. They have 1itt1e or no support from the French speaking
locals, who disagree with their polities and general- life sty1e.

provided the inspectors with a suggested itinerary, this team would like
to propose lts own schedule, which it did. The reader is reminded, at
this point, that the ten-man Soviet team on Fl-orennes was only one of
two ln-country, and that a second ten-member team was engaged in the
inspection of the European Missil-e Repair Facility, Gosselies, Belgium.
I^Iith the exception of providing a ten-person escort pool for the
Gosselies team, and providing billeting and other logistics support, no
other real- involvement in that i.nspection \das put forth by Florennes AB.
This work will concentrate exclusively, for that reasonr on the inspection
of base facilities. 19
After a short bus trip to the:ir quarters, the Soviets and their
OSIA and base escorts requested a bus tour of the inspection area. This
bus tour turned into a walking tour, as the entire party walked around
the OMTF, from the OMIF to the Vehicle Maintenance Facility (VMF), and
then around the VMf'. The team then proceeded to the GLCM Alert and
Maintenance Area (GAMA). Here, instead of entering the GA}IA, the team
once again walked around the area. This, according to Mister Lyebedev,
walkingaround the inspected areas prior to actually entering, \ras a
technique picked up from U.S. inspection teams on visits to Soviet sites.
The foot tour provided the team with a different perspective of the
area about to be inspected, and would be used throughout the visit.20
After this tour of the inspectable area, the Soviets ate what would
be the first of four meals at the "Bosman Inn" Dining Facility. Named
for a former Florennes Belgian Air Force conmander who provided strong
support to the incoming GLCM contingent in the early days, the Bosman
Inn was often the butt of good-humored (and not so good-humored) jokes
about the quality of its food. These were jokes made by the permanent
party U.S. personnel used to more Americanized chow from stateside
facilities. No such compl-aints rrere heard from our Russian visitors, who
seemed very pleased by the quality (and quantity) of the dining ha1-l
fare. ParLicular pleasing to the team was the salad bar whose plentiful
supply of fresh vegetables, fruits, and trirmrings was an €njoyable change
to these people, so used to shortages of produce of any kind in their
home country.^ Wal-dorf salad, a simple mix of apples, raisins, walnuts,
and carrots (all items of a hard-to-find nature in the Soviet homeland)
was a major hit, with one inspector filling a soup bowl to overflow
several times. I bring this penchant for U.S. not-so-home cooking up
sinply to illustrate a point, the Soviet team experienced more than
the strength of U.S. technical know-how. They experienced, for a short
time at least, a little of the life style Arnericans lrere used to, and
perhaps they got a taste of why Americans t/ere unvlilling to give up
their "bourgeolsfrexistence. /'nd perhaps, too, they found that the
"decadence" so often attributed to our way of 1ife, if being able to
get bacon-bits for your salad was considered decadent, was not so bad.zl
After lunch, which began at approximately 1430L and ended about
* Once again I
quoted earlier,
basie consumer
One would have
harken back to the overriding theme of the Maynes article
if the Soviets were to develop an economy able to provide
goods, cutbacks in military spending was a first step.
to call lettuce and apples basic consumer goods.

10
thirty minutes later, the inspectionfs pace guickened. Returning to
their work area, the inspection team split into two five-member groups.
One team went into the GAMA whil-e the second team inspected the OMTF
and VMF. After the independent teams completed their look at the OMTF,
WfF aad GAMA , the teams reconvened for an hour of comparing notes in the
work center. At the completion of their talks, the teams swapped areas,
a strategy Mister Lyebedevadopted in order to give each team member an
opportunity to see cach area. During this period, whil-e OSIA and local
escort teams remained in constant company of the Soviet inspectors, a
contingency team composed of senior base officials was on duty in the
wing connand post. From here the wing cormander and his staff were
kept constantly abreast of the movements of the team, and'were also in
a position to respond quickly to any unforeseen event.22
Worse case scenarios had been the norm during mock inspections held
during the previous months. What would the wingts response be to an
attempted defection by a team member; what would happen should a serious
demonstration break out on the base perimeter; could the inspectors come
up with a question base experts could not answer? Fortunately, the
actual inspection held none of these terribl,e surprises, which meant that
the command post q/as a basically quiet pJ-ace during the Soviet vj-sit.
One event does stand out in the nind of this observer, and this involved
a srrall- breakdovrn in communication, the kind that was quite humorous
considering the vast array of electronic and telephonic equipment
supporting this visit. Late in the afternoon, whil-e the two five-man
teams were accomplishing their separate tours, a request came from the
OSIA representative for some medication for a Soviet i.nspector. The
gentl-eman had a cold and it was thought that some cough syrup, aspirin,
and some throat lozenges would help him to fee1 better. Iurmediately
this request reached the cornmand post, whose medical representative made
a call to the hospital. He requested a "cold pack", which to him Beant
the above listed itenls to battle the sniffles. After some logistic
moves designed to deliver the. "cold packt' to the perimeter of the i.nspectj-on
area (recall the sealed cordon stil1 in place), from where security
police teams transported the bundle to the GAMA entry control point, and
finally into the area to the individual in need, it was diseovered that
a mistake had been urade .23
How could a mistake be made in such a simple area? By the basic
communieation flaw known as lack of eornmon core of experience, for the
very talented and reliable rnedical technician at the hospital misinterpreted
the equally talented and reliabl-e medical administrator at the
conmand post. To the man on the delivery-end of the phone, a rfcold
packtt was something you placed on an ankle sprain, basical-ly a pack of
ice. After a few embarrased moments, a suitable assembly of cold medicine
found its way to the GAMA and the man was much better in the morning.
Such were the problems of diplomacy and cornmunicatj-ons, would that all
our problems were so easily resol-ved.24
One potential area of misunderstanding of a mor.e s3rious nature
took place during an inspection of the Mark 24 txainLr.g launch canister.
Used to train maintenance technicians in the proper procedures for
mating warheads to the canister, the l{ark 24 incl-uded a dummy guidance

11
set. Those in training practiced wiring a simulated warhead to this
ersatz guidance unit. During their inspection of, the training launch
canister, a treaty l-inited item, the base-line team becane concerned
that the l(ark 24 differed from other canisters yet seen, either here
or at other inspection sites. The Mark 18 training launch canister
previously viewed at Florennes did not contain the t'guidance set" of
the Mark 24, for it was not used for the same purpose. And further
investigation by the OSIA team verified that at earl-ier bases, the
NIark 24 lrainers r^/ere not opened to display the guidance set. Although
messages from Headquarters USAFE prior to the inspection directed the
display of the Ylark 24 in this manner, at all installations, it appeared
that Florennes was the only unit to courply. "Extensive explanation "
to Mi.ster Lyebedev took place before the Soviet team chief r/as satisfied
with this answer to his concerns over the matter.25
At 2100L Mister Lyebedevnotified the OSIA team that his team was
done for the evening. He further informed wing personnel that all
facilities in the inspection area could be closed and that the cordon
could be removed. The inspection period itself, however, would remain
open for the planned twenty-four hours. fhe Soviets and their escort
contingent then proceeded to the dining facility for dinner, before
retiring to base billeting for the evening. Twenty-two rooms accomodated
the two Soviet teams and the OSIA urenbers, and no problems in housing
these people ocurred. As with the dining arrangements, the bilJ-etlng
facilities at Florennes were a p1-easant surprise to the inspectors.
Normally used to house transient airmen and farnilies just arriving or
departing Florennes, our Soviet guests assumed that these rooms were
the quarters of senior base official-s, people evicted temporaril-y for
the convenience of the INF process. When told that these were routinely
used by enlisted people and their families to make coming and going a
1itt1e more pleasant, the response was basic amazement.zo
l0 August 19BB
The final day began and ended as smoothly as the rest of the
inspection had gone. The Soviets and their escorts departed base
billeting at 0700L for breakfast, returned to their quarters, and at
0800L declared the inspection complete. I^Iith this crucial announcement
out of the way, Mister Lyebedev and his team finished their inspection
report at 1000L. After they completed the report, the Soviets requested
a chance to visit the base comnissary, base exchange, and Stars & Stripes
book store. Although time constraints prevented a stop at the book store,
the team did visit the commissary and exchange, with the commissaryts
generous supply of instant coffee and tea particularly attractive. Once
again, items that were not readily available at home, but were plentiful
at a "remote" U.S. Air Force facility in Belgium, made the inspection
process a pleasant one for the Communist visitors.'/
After their short shopping trip, the Soviets returned to billeting
in the Air Force bus they had used throughout the inspection. After
packing their luggage on a cotrutrercial bus for the trip back to Brussels,
and a short stop at the work site for retrieval of the technical data and
equipment used during the inspection, the team proceeded to the base
theater. At the theater, br,i.ef statements from Mister Lyebedev' 0SIA

l2
Team Chief, Colonel Fer, and Colonel Chasteen stressed the importance of
the work just conpleted. Mister .Lyebedevstated that the U.S. conpliance
with the tetrms of, the Treaty was faultless. Although this fact may have
been obvious to the average American, that we did not cheat or break our
word, clear adherance and the verification of that fact were critieal to
the success of the rNF process. But Mr.Lyebedev did not only stress
technical compliance with the ferms of our agreements, he also noted the
kindness and generosity given to hirn and his team. Al-so receiving praise
from the Soviet team chief was the government and people of Belgium, who
allowed t'the inspection to be conducted on their territory."2g
colonel Ferrs cofiments praised the work of the men and women of
Florennes,.pointing out that there was probably a strong perception by
these people that their efforts were not fully appreciaterl. But, as the
colonel observed, the long hours and hard work were 'rpart and parcel_ of
our business to practice and practice so that one day it all comes together
for a great success."29 Colonel Chasteents brief words thanked the
Soviet team for the professionalism and courtesy they put forth during
their inspection. Then turning his attention to his peopl-e (the theater
was fil-led with more than one hundred and fifty personnel who had taken
part in the inspection), he echoed the words of praise of the previous
speakers. But his comments were also tinged with no smal-l_ degree of
satisfaction and pride, for he had seen Florennes and the 4g5th grow
and come of age, almost from the earliest days of GLCI'{. The role this
base now played in the INF process was most gratifying to Colonel Chasteen,
and his sunmary of events a few days later could not, nor did they need
to be, expanded upon. "Nobody does it better than the 485th. Thanks to
all of You.t'30
The speeches compl-eted, the momentos exchanged, and the guest books
signed, the Soviets departed Florennes, after a brief stop for lunch, at
L245L. It was over, although the GLCM mission of the 485th remained a
viable and crucial one, and as such was susceptible to follow-up i,nspection.
Even after the end of Florennesf cruise missil-e operations, the
terms of the INF Treaty allowed Soviet inspection of facilities for the
next thirteen years. But this critical, junction in the treaty process
was reached, and the role of the 485th Tactical Missile Wing as a major
element in the disarmament process was permanently establ-ished.
Epilogue
The reader will note that few individual names figure promi.nently
in this work. The success story that was 9 - 10 August l98B took place
not because of any single person or single organization. rt was, like
so many of the past achievements of this wing, a team effort and a team
victory. Appendix Two contains a f-isting of two-hundred or so people,
a roster of men and women assembled to honor a few of the more visible
players. But every person assigned to Florennes, now or in the past,
can gather some measure of satisfaction, for the role of the 485th in
making the world a safer place was notable and worthy of pride.
Of course the final words on this topic have yet to be cornmitted to
paper. Perhaps some day, perhaps soon, future historians will- discuss
treaties mandating removal of Minuteman or Peacekeeper missiles from the

inventory of SAC. Perhaps they will docunent the scrapping of Sovlet
Backfire bonbers' and perhaps when they write about these historic events
the narne of the 485th Tactlcal Missile Wing wilL flgure prominentl-y in
these writlngs. It is almost certain that no indlvidualts name will
appear, but that will not matter. And perhaps, because the INF Treaty
was a document based on delicate negotations and mutual trust, little
will be accomplished as a result of 9 - 10 August 1988. That was also
for future history to determine. But the process did fl-ower early on
in southern Belgium, and that was indeed a start.
13

T4
END NOTES
1. Treaty Text (U), Treaty Between the United States of America and the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of, Their
Intermediate-Range and Short-Range Mi.ssilesr December 1987 (Department
of State Publication 9555), Sup Doc 1
2. Seweryn Brown, t'Gorbachevrs Move,tf Foreign Policy, Number 68 (Fall 87),
pp 59 - 87.
3. Charles William Maynes, "Americats Chancer" Foreign Policy, Number 68
(Fa11 B7), pp BB - 99.
4. Briefing (U), Mr. Richard Kleckner, Weapons Systems Logistics Officer
(AFLC), to TSgt R.S. Devino, 485 TMW/HO, 22 Aug 88.
5. Msg (U), 485 TMI^I/CC to AFLC LOC et a1-, "INF Treaty Data Base Update",
O2|5OOZ Jun 88; BriefinC (U), Mr. Ri;hard Kleckner, Weapons Sysrems
Logistics Officer (AFLC), to TSgt R.S. Devino,485 TMW/HO,22 Aug BB.
6. See note above.
7. Msg (U), 0SIA WASHINGTON D.C. to AIC 486, "lrlotification of Intention
to Conduct Baseline, Closeout, or Quota Inspection", 07I7O7Z Aug 88, Sup
Doc 6; Msg (U), OSIA WASHINGTON D.C. to AIC 486, "Notification of Intention
to Conduct Baseline, Closeout, or Quota Inspection", 0717082 Aug 88,
Sup Doc 7.
8. See note above.
9. MSg (U), AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS TO RUSNNOA/USINCEUR, 485 TMW, Et A1,
"Belgian Media Coverage, August 9, 198B: Soviet Inspectors in Be-l-gium",
091640Z Aug 88, Sup Doc 12; Msg (U), AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS to RUFLOJA/OSIA,
485 Tl'{W, et al , "Belgian Representativers Statement on the Arrival of the
Soviet Baseline Inspection Team", 2615442 Aug 88, Sup Doc 5.
10. Press Release (U) , United States Information Service Joint Release
from the (Belgian) Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Embassy of the
United States of America, "soviet Inspectors to Arrive in Belgium",
undated, Sup Doc 9; Press Release (U), United States Information Service
Joint Release from the (Belgian) Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the
Enbassy of the United States of America, "Press Advisory'r, undated, Sup
DOC 10; MSg (U), AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS tO RUSNNOA/USCINCEUR, 485 TWM, Ct A1,
ttBelgian Media Coverage, August 9, 19BB: Soviet INf'Inspectors in Belgium",
0916402 Aug 88, Sup Doc 12.
11. Briefing (U), Lt Col E.T.
Devino, 485 TMI^I/HO, 17 Aug 88.
Breazeale, 485 TMW DCS/OPS to TSgt R.S.
L2. Ibid; Ltr (U) , Col C.L. Chasteen, 485 TI,IW/CC, to all Florennes
PersoiE, t'INF Inspectiontt w/attached installation nap, 8 Aug 88, Sup
Doc 8.

15
13. Msg (u) ,
Sumnary Report
L4. rbid.
15. rbid.
16. Transcripts (U) ,
10 Aug 88, Sup Doc 15.
17. rbid.
485 TMI^I/CC to HQ USAFE, et al,
[88-RED-19]rr, LOLTI\Z Aug 88,
18. Mse (U), 485 TMI^I/PA to HQ
for SIT Arrival'r' 1216002 Aug
19. Briefing (U), Lt Col E.T.
Devino, 485 TMW/HO, 17 Aug 88.
t'INF Treaty Inspection
Sup Doc 13.
Flemish and French Language Newspaper Transcripts'
(Translated by 485 TMW translator)
USAFE/PAM, et al, "Media Photo OpportunitY
88, Sup Doc 14.
BreazeaLe, 485 TMItl DCS/OPS to TSgt R.S.
20. Msg (U), 485 TMI^I/CC ro HQ USAFE, et al, "INF Treaty Inspection
Sunmary Report [88-RED-19]", IOLTL1Z Aug 88, Sup Doc 13.
2L. Briefing (U), Col C.L. Chasteen, 485 TMW/CC to TSgt R.S. Devino,
485 TMW/HO, 11 Aug 88. NOTE: The author was on hand for the evening meal
on 9 August and can attest to the Soviet enjoyment of American food.
22. Msg (U), 485 T]'M/CC to HQ USAFE, et al, t'INF Treaty Inspection
Surrnary Report [88-RED-19]", LOL71'52 Aug 88, Sup Doc 13; Notes (U)'
TSgt R.S. Devino, 485 TI,IW/HO's notes taken during contingency operations
for the INF Baseline Inspection, 9 Aug 88.
23. See note above.
24. See note above.
25. Msg (U), 485 TMW/CC to HQ USAFE, et al, "INF Treaty Inspection
sunmary Reporr [88-RED-19]", IOITI5Z Aug 88, Sup Doc 13; BriefinC (U),
Capt R. tqitchell, 485 TMW Executive Officer to TSgt R.S. Devino, 485 TMW/
HO, 1 Sept 88.
26. Briefing (u) co1 c.L. chasteen, 485 TMW/CC to TSgt R.S. Devino,
485 TMW/HO, 11 Aug 88; Msg (U), 485 TMW/CC to HQ USAFE, et al, "INF
Treaty Inspection Surmnry Report 188-RED-191'', |0I7L5Z Aug 88, Sup Doc 13.
27. See note above.
28. Gryphon, 12 Aug 88, I'soviet inspection complet€t', P 4 and p 6' Sup
Doc 16. (Extracts used)
29. rbid.
30. rbid.

,\PP[)'JDIX O).;E
Designed by i85 T)11"'/PA to remind r"'ing personneL to remain clear
of the inspection area, thi-s post.er caughE the attention of the
Soviet. inspection Eeam. Unsure of its meaning, the i-nspect.ors
returned Eo their home with a stack of these Posters' perhaps a
tribute t,o wing.creativiEy and west,ern computer technology.
L'l
[nil't get caught
in lnspectahle
area, Inspection
fi90il I Aug. to
130il l0 Aug.

L7
APPENDIX TWO
The below listed 233 nen and women were clted
for their roles during the Sovlet vlsit. A
special-ly designed and mrmbered certifLcate of
appreciation was forthcoming. The llst could
easily have been doubled or tripled, for all
of Florennes took part in the events covered
hereln. Before all ls said and done, a longer
list will probably result from everyonets
recollections of who did what. Suffice to say
that the people on this list all participated
in a major role in the 9 - 10 August 1988 INF
Baseline Inspection at Florennes AB, BeJ-giun.
ADAMS, TRACY G., SGT
AOUIRRE, JOE C. SCJT
ARCHULETA, JAIIES T.. MAJ
AVENELL, GUY K., TSGT
BACKUS, MATTHEW E., AiC
BARTLOW, ROBERT L., LT COL
BEAVERS, SCOTT A. , SGT
BECKER, DAViD B., TSGT
EELL. EEIA}I d. . IL,I
BILL, PAUL D., SSGT
BtJAClt' VMAII H. ggGT
'
BLACKER, MICHAEL R., TSOT
BOEHM, MARJORIE S., S8A
BOONE, MABK T., TSGT
BOOTH. NOBERT L., AIC
BRACHT, ADOLPH O., SSST
BREAZEALE, EDWiN T., LT COL
BROCKETT, DONALD I. , SSGT
BROWil, SI{IRLEY A. , SSOT
BRUDEB, DAREELL W., TSOT
BBUIILEY, JAMES L. , MSGT
BUMP, RICKY J. , MSGT
BURHAM, DOIiINY A., TSGT
BURR, TIMOTHY D., SGT
BUSH, BRUCE A., CAPT
CADY, JAMES R., MAJ
CA}ITU, BRIAN A., SGT
CARBAUGH, STEVEN H., SRA
CARPENTER, CIIRIS A. , SSST
CARPENTER, SONNY L., AIC
CARTER, MARK L., CAPT
CABTER, ROLF TSGT
CHALIFOUB, KEil}TETH CAPT
CHANDLEY, W. JEFFREY, SSGT
CHABAMUT, CHARLES F., SSOT
CLARX, JALAN C., SSGT
CLEYRAT, DANIEL A., LT COL
COLE, HANN E., SSGT
CRiST, EARL E., ?SgT
CROCKETT, BIRCH D., MSGT
DAHL, CHBISTOPHER E., SSGI
DAUN, JEFFREY J., SRA
DEAVER. SODFREY L.. MSST
DESMET, DAVID W., SgT
DEVINO, ROBERT S., TSOT
DIEOO, DEANNIE L.. SOT
DOBROVOLC, JOSEPH E.. S6T
DOTY, DANIEL C., CAPT

D0ticLAS, SliArMON SSGT
DRABERT, gLEN}J H. , SRA
DRAPER, RONALD A., SRA
DRENNEN, JON L., AIC
DBIGGS, RANDY C. , SBA
DUHON , ALLA}I D. , }IAJ
DUN}I, PATRICK I{., S8A
EABUSHAW, MICITAEL R. , TAJ
EASoN, JolI X. , SOT
EATON, DANiEL T., SSOT
ELLIS, JAMES C., SRA
EIMICH, DOUSLAS P., TSGT
FAGAN, TODD A., SRA
FARMER, GARY D., TSGT
FELDMAN, LAURA J.. CAPT
FERGUSON, WILLIA"M J., AMN
FORSYTH, JOHN P., ILT
FORTE. TERRY D., AIC
FOURCABD, DAVID M. , SGT
FRAZiEN, LINDA L., CAPT
FBICKEY, MICHAEL A., SGT
FNIDLEY, KENNETH W., MSGT
FYATL, JACK P. , SSGT
GALLOIIIAY, DAVID L., SRA
GAIIIBRELL , LEO C. , TSCT
GARBETT, JOHIiI W., TSOT
GLADNEY, ANTHONY W., SGT
GONNELLA, JAIIES A. , SSOT
ORAETTIIGER, CHARLES SSGT
CRANDCHAMPS. ISABELLE
GRAY, IHOMAS M., ISGT
GREE}I, MURICE C., LT COL
GREIMAN, DO.ITALD R., CAPT
GULLETT, JON E., 2LT
HALSTEAD, JEFFREY K., SSGT
HALT, CHARLES I., COL
HAXCOCK, MELVIil J., MSGT
HANSOII, JEFFREY L., SSGT
HARES, SUSAN E., SSGT
HARO, OLiVIER
HARRIS, RUSSELL C., SGT
HATFiELD, MiCHAEL D., SGT
HAWLEY, FRANKLIN {,1l., SSGT
HAYNES, HAROLD D.
HEUER, STEVEN A., CAPT
HICKEY, STEVEN E., AiC
HICKS, THOMAS J. JR., SGT
HOBNER, MARSHALL L., SOT
HOWE, JACK S. . COL
HUGITES , IXALTEE B. , SSOT
HULBENT, CONSTAIICE, SSGT
HULETT, 8O}IITIE A., IISOT
HURLEY, LEWELLYN J., SMSOT
IMLAY, DUANE, T., SRA
JAIIES, HAROLD D., SSOT
JENKINS, RICHARD L., SST
JOHNSON, BETH
JOHIISON, BRADLEY K. , SSOT
JOHNSOil, CARROLL L., SSGT
JOHNSON, ERIC A., TS0T
JOH}TSON, MARC D. . SSST
JONES, CY}ITHIA M. , SRA
JONES, LESLiE E., SgT
JURAIIEX, LAI,TJRENCE E. , TSUT
KATHCART. DENNIS J., MSOT
KEESE, HENBY B. , COL
18

KELLY, SEAil 8.. SSGT
KETTERING, MICHAEL B., CAPT
KEY, JOHN M., MSGT
K}JOBB, PHILIP A., TSGT
KOFOID, UANKUS SRA
I(RES6E, DUAIIE D. , SOT
KUKLIIISI(I, CHEISTOPSEE, 2LT
KUKLIIISKI, JOHII A. , CA?T
KUtIiHIn0, STEVEX K., SSST
KURNIC, ROilALD O., LT COL
LAHTI, DAVID E., IISOT
LANGER, MATTHEW P., CAPT
LANHAM, LOUIS R., TSGT
LANHAM, LYITN
LAPOI!.IT, JAMES D., lt{SGT
LAURET{Zi, EBEN AlC
LITTLE, MARK MSGT
LOOIIEY, ROSER L. , SRA
LOVE, HENRY M. II, SGT
LUPOLT, RANDALL W., LT COL
LYLES, GEORGE TSOT
MACARI, ROBERT M. . SOT
MANDERFIELD, NiCHOLAS W.. COL
MANUEL, CHERYL J. , TSOT
MARTIN-Ti}ISLEY, EASTER MSGT
ilICBAIN, PATRICiA A., SRA
MCDAI{iEL, . MARVII{ Sli[SGT
MEITZEL, RALPH W., CAPT
MERKLE, ELLEII, CAPT
MIDDLESIIORTH, MICHELE CAPT
MILLEN, KEITH 8., SSCIT
MILLER, ROBERT 8., SOT
MITCHELL, RONATD S., CAPT
MIX, STEVEN J., SRA
MOLL, DANBYT J., MSOT
MONETTE, KEVIil M. , SSOT
MOORE, BRIAN M., SGT
MORRIS, SYLVESTER SGT
}IOUL, TEREY L. , TSGT
MU}{CE, MABSHALL I{I., TS0T
MUSMAililO, VICTOR H., zLT
NAZZARO, VINCENZO N. P.
NEY, EDWI}J D. II, SGT
NiCKELL, TERRY L., SSGT
NiLSSOX, CHERYL L., MAJ
NOSEDA, JOSEPH
ORMOND, BERIIALDO B., SRA
OUJEVOLK, A}IEBICA V., TAJ
PAOE, LOREX H., S8A
PALIIER, WILLIAT C. TSCIT
PAII, DAVID CAPT
PAREI{T, RICHARD
PARRISH, RICHARD T., SGT
PAVOIE, JOSEPH E., TSGT
PECK, CABY L. , CAPT
PEREZ, HAROLD P., TSOT
PERRi}IE, TERRY A., }I,SGT
PETEBSON, JAMES A., SRA
PHILLIPS, DAVID MSGT
POOCK. CHNISTOPHER J., CAPT
PSATCHEN, MICHAEL L., TSOT
RAIL. SCOTT C., AIC
REAMS . JAI'ES E. , TSST
REED, WARSEN T., SSST
RENEGAR, JAMES C. II, SSOT
t9
RHOADES, EOBERT C. , SSGT

BHoLlE, GEoRGE E. JR', AIC
RILEY. MICHAEL D., SSG?
ROBILLIA, LEOPOLD S., TSGT
ROBINSO}J, BON}IIE A. , SRA
BOBINSOI{, EBIC L. , SSGT
BODRIGUEZ, ZE}IO AilN
RUMBAUGH, ROBEBT D., HAJ
NUTLEDCE, DAIIIEL C. , CAPT
RYCHENER, FBEDERICK, I{SGT
SA}TAX, MONICA C., SGT
SAIDERS, IBVIII J., AIC
SANTONE, CAROL A., SSGT
SABGEANT, SIEPHEN T. , CAPT
SHAFEE, BETH L. P..
SHAFER, LARBY D., IIAJ
SIUOLEY, ROBERT D., SGT
SLOAN-ALESE, SHARON, 2LT
SMITH, CHRISTOPHER P., SGT
SMITH, PHILIP M.. SGT
SPENCER, PHILIP E., MSCT
STACKS, JIMMY D., AIC
STA}IDiFEN, WILLIAM E. , SST
STEFFES, TODD G., SRA
STIEFEL, TENRY D., SSGT
TAYLON, GENE A., AiC
TEIXEIRA, JOSEPH S.
THOMAS, SUSA}I C. , SSGT
THOMPSON. KEVIN SGT
THOMPSO}J, LESTER A., CAPT
THOUPSON, PAUL TSGI
THORNBURGH, ERIC W., SGT
TIITtsERLAKE, THOMAS SGT
TORRINGTOI{, ALLA}I R. , ilI.AJ
TUTTLE, THOMAS E., SGT
VA}I WATERMEULEI{, CHA}TTAL
WADE, MAYRON H., TSGT
WALKER, LORAINE
IilALLER, GEONGE R., SRA
WARRE}I, ALVA L., SGT
WEBBER, ROBERT V., SGT
WEISS, WALTER 8., MSGT
II]ELCH, DANiEL E. , SRA
WEST, JEN}JIFER L. , SGT
WESTOVER, DAVID L., SSGT
WHITE, BiLLY D., MSGT
WILKiilS, JOH}J A., MSOT
WILKS, RAY T., SSST
T{iLSOil, EDWAND J., SRA
WILSO}J, BICHABD R., CAPT
WOOLARD, JOHN T., SSST
YOUIIO, TEEESA L., zLI
YOII'. DAVID E., CAPT
ZARBO, DEBBIE
20

2I
LIST OF SUPPORTING DOCTIMENTS
1. Treaty Text (U), Treaty Between the United States of America and the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elinination of Their
Intermediate-Range and Short-Range Missiles, December L987 (Departnent
of State Publication 9555).
2. Appendix (U), Photographs and Site Diagrams Appended to the Memorandum
of Uederstanding for the Treaty Between the United States of America
and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their
Intermediate-Range and Short-Range Missiles, December L987 (Departnent
of State Publication). (Extract used)
3. Agreement (U), The INF Basing Countries Agreement, Decernber 1987
(United States Information Service, Brussels, Belgiurn).
4. Visual Aids (U), Florennes Air Base Alert and Maintenance Area
w/attaehed listing of INF Treary Linited Items (TLIs) Locations, as
provided to Soviet inspectors and OSIA Leam members, undated.
5. Mse (U), AI,IEMBASSY BRUSSELS to RUFLOJA/OSIA, 495 TMW, er a1,
"Belgian Representativers Statement on the Arrival of the Soviet Basel-ine
Inspection Team", 26L5442 Ju1 88.
6. Msg (U), OSIA WASHINGTON DC to AIG 486, "Notification of Intention
to Conduct Baseline, Closeout, or Quota Inspection", 07L7O7Z Aug BB.
7. Msg (U), OSIA WASHINGTON DC to AIG 486, "Notification of Intention
to Conduct Baseline, Closeout, or Quota Inspection'r, 0717082 Aug 88.
8. Ltr (U), Col C.L. Chasteen, 485 TMI{/CC, to all Florennes personnel,
"INF Inspection" w/attached installation map, 8 Aug 88.
9. Press Release (U) , United States Information Service Joint Release
from the (Belgian) Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Embassy of the
United States of Anerica, "Soviet Inspectors to Arrive in Belgium",
undated.
10. Press Release (U), United States Information Service Joint Release
from the (Belgian) Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Embassy of the
United States of America, "Press Advisory", undated.
f1. Transcript (U), RTBF Broadcast French Language Transcri-pt, 9 Aug 88
(0720L). (Translated by 485 TMW translator)
12. MSg (U), A}4EMBASSY BRUSSELS TO RUSNNOA/USCINCEUR,485 TMW, Et A1,
"Belgian Media Coverage, August 9, 1988: Soviet INF Inspectors in
Belgium", 09L6402 Aug 88.
13. Msg (U), 485 TMW/CC ro HQ USAFE, et al, "INF Treaty Inspecrion
Surmary Report [88-RED-19]", 0101e151 Aug S8.
14. Msg (U), 485 TMW/PA ro HQ USAFE/PAI"I, er a1, "Media Phoro opportunity
for SIT Arrivaln,1216002 Aug 88.

22
15. Transcripts (U), Flemish and French Language Newspaper Transcripts,
10 Aug 88. (Translated by 485 llMW translator)
16. Gryphon, 12 August 1988, "Soviet inspection compl-et€", p 4 and p 6.
(Extracts used)