Erbil: The host city of sports t ournaments - Kurdish Globe

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The Kurdish Globe No. 276, Saturday, October 09, 2010 12 Iran, the U.S invasion and expected possibilities By Bahman Abdulrahman Hassan The invasion of Iraq was schadenfreude for many. Unremittingly, it has been stated that the foray was a necessary messiah, and also it was the only way to abolish human rights abuses, WMD programs, and civil mass carnages. Saddam Hussein’s regime was constantly accused of not cooperating with the International Atomic Energy Agency, and the IAEA many times halted its operations in Iraq. In addition, the U.S administe tration showed Hussein’s regime as an undeniable threat not only to the rege gion, but to the security of the entire globe. On April 5, 2003, coalition forces entered Baghdad, and on April 9, Saddam’s statue in Al-Mansur square, which was standing for more than 30 years, was torn down by Iraqis with the help of U.S marines. Hitherto, searches for Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction started and all turned to be unrewarding. Over the course of the ince cursion, reasons changed, and the Baath Regime was brutally fought back by its atrocious history. Anfal operations, Halabja town chemical bombings, and the 1991’s uprising oppe pressions in the northern and southern provinces lay among major reasons or justifications. Moreover, although, reasons couldn’t cover the economic and political motivations, the war prolonged. Sparking the light of freede dom operations, later invase sion operations, was the easy part, but restructuring the tattered land remains daunting. The invasion of Iraq has detonated the region’s stability bomb. The imposed despotic harme monious atmosphere was ruined, and the silenced and suppressed voices of minorities rose. American warships turned toward the East along cargos of U.S. doctrines shipped to the area. Middle East deme mocratization started with war and triggered with the war on Iraq. The occupate tion of Iraq brought a grave danger to the authoritarie ian powers of the region. Post-Saddam events have signaled a new era for the Middle East, and tyranne nical regimes are on the edge of radical changes. While most of the Western nations intensively fueled and participated in reshapie ing the new Middle Easte ern order and installing their values, Iraq neighbe bors criticized the invase sion. Syria, for instance, was on one hand against the occupation, fearing to be the next, and on the other hand to some scope was involved in the escale lating violence in Iraq by offering training and safe haven for Arab insurgents. Perchance, Syria is on the list of regimes to be reme moved by the West (West throughout this article ince clude Israel) and replaced with a pro-Western regime with very little intention of democracy. Momentarily, though most of the blame goes to Iran, Iran continues playie ing a critical role in the rege gion, especially in the post- Saddam Iraq epoch. The subjugating of Iraq, on one side, was in the favor of Iran, as one of its old rival regimes utterly ceased to exist, and the new installed system is fragile and can be influenced effortlessly. On the other, the war on Iraq brought its ends even closer. Iran, now, is the only strong opposition or barrier to the American Democratizing Package (ADP), and clandestine economic, cultural, or pole litical purposes. Therefore, perhaps the possibility of another war in the nonappe pearance of negotiating is present. Consequently, if this conception proves its actuality, similarities would overcome the long history of rivalry between Iraq and Iran. Although, experts believe waging a complete war on the Isle lamic Republic of Iran is not widely expected, a strike on its nuclear face cilities is to some extent indispensable. Conceivae ably, this argument is not realistic--seeing that in case its nuclear positions are attacked Iran won’t sit idle, its reactions may go beyond expectations, thus wider scale war would be necessary to secure the outcomes. Also, a “shock and awe” strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities might delay or cripple its quest for a few years, but in the long run it will not stop Iran’s dese sire for nuclear warheads. Hence, just war can upre root the Iranian threat and generate a fundamental change, which is heard from U.S and Israel offe ficials, if not only White House neoconservatives. Thus, what should be done about Iran? Should the U.S. as delegate or shield of Western countries attack Iran? And will the U.S. inve vade Iran? Can a nuclear Iran be tolerated? Millions of dollars and lives are at stake, and perhaps an errone neous decision would lead us to unprecedented bitter results. Will the U.S. attack Iran? While Iran is discussed in the media more than Holle lywood star divorces, it would make definite sense to anticipate this question. Yet it’s hard to answer; later mentioned reasons might un-cloud envisionie ing the future Iran-U.S. scene. People are suspice cious, and experts try to elucidate and decode signs. The choice of attacking Iran has never been off the table, neither in the U.S. nor in Israel. All are of the view that military assaults will be catastrophic, more personnel and advanced military arsenals are neede ed, and this war would be the most detrimental ever. And if this war sparked, it will be the biggest military and weapon display of the century. If diplomatic inqe quiries failed and if the Iranian regime Mullahs continues disobeying the international community standards or interests, the chance of assaults grow greater. Iran seems challe lenging to the West, plus Israel. In the words of Johanna Macgery, quoted from the Bush Administe tration’s National Secure rity Strategy: “Iran is the most challenging ‘single country’ to U.S. interests.” It might be worth the U.S air force flying over Iran delivering Christmas misse siles. Pre-emptive air strikes on the regime’s nuclear plants by Israel are expected. Bese sides, many times, Israeli officials gave watchfulne ness to the international community. If serious acte tions are not taken, unilate eral action will be pursued, namely military assaults on the Iranian nuclear face cilities, and its military and intelligence positions. Experts also say the U.S. and Israel--as two attached politically and militarily bodies--will do this war together. Afterward, other countries may join in. Therefore, Israel’s threats of attacking Iran cannot be approved without a “go” from the U.S administrate tion, which can be granted Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and officials from Iran's atomic organization applaud during a ceremony to mark the National Nuclear Day in Tehran on April 9, 2010. easily. In 1981, the Israeli army obliterated the Iraqi nuclear plant in Osirak. Perhaps similar actions might be taken against Iran as Israeli officials prone nounce that Israel will not take the “Osirak option” off the table. The Iraqi nuclear plant may prove that attacking specific targe gets is not unthinkable, but it won’t stop future adventures. In 1988, the Iraqi military used chemice cal weapons against its citizens and Iranian forces BEHROUZ MEHRI/AFP/Getty Images >>
The Kurdish Globe No. 276, Saturday, October 09, 2010 13 >> in the eight-year Iran-Iraq War, as well as its huge military exhibition in the Kuwait invasion. Regardie ing the Iranian desire and position, it would be widele ly expected to reconstruct its weaponry treasure with new visions and targe gets. And this action may empower the permanent regime, and the regime’s counterattacks might cost more of the U.S and Israel. Then, prior to the attack it would be imperative to ponder who will be more at risk. Will the threat of Iran stop with limited aerie ial strikes not followed by ground invasion? And what will happen to the U.S.’s unfinished projects in the region? Hence, again, limie ited airborne strikes won’t utterly stop the permanent Iranian regime, which is more of the purpose, from being a threat to Israel or U.S. interests. Many believe the U.S. military buildup in the rege gion is either preparation for a war on Iran or a way used by the U.S. to remind Iran of the superiority of the West. And the U.S. for many years refused to involve direct diplomacy with Iran. This may give the assumption that the U.S. doesn’t want compe promise, whereas the U.S. officials accuse Iran of not giving much. Although a considerable majority, especially pro- Iranian countries, insists on peaceful resolutions, the international commune nity is divided into two groups. One is calling for a clean sweep strike--not only strikes on the Irane nian nuclear facilities, but a complete ground invase sion. And others persist on giving Tehran more time, assurances, or severe sanctions. Now, Iran is in an embarrassing situation. The media and Western countries have shed light on Iran more than ever. Iran is surrounded from all sides. Thousands of U.S. combat troops are in Iraq, and there is a huge chance of instituting a permanent U.S. military base in Iraq, which will back up if not all then definitely some U.S. armed interferences and intelligence operate tions. Kuwait, Qatar, Bahre rain, and U.S. bases in Central Asia (Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan) would assist any move from the West. From an American perspective, these make attacking Iran easier than ever, and lessons taught from the modern warfare in Iraq and Afghanistan can be implemented in the war on Iran. Even though President Obama’s adminie istration might to some extent look different from the Bush administration, the new administration, like Bush’s, maintains that the Iran crisis must be addressed utterly. And this mission cannot be acce complished through negote tiations, as Iran uses talks either to buy time so that more feats are gained in its nuclear research centers or to impose its wishes, which seemingly won’t be in the favor of Western powers. Will sanctions affect Iran? Sanctions imposed on Iran would not debilitate the country, and now Iran is stepping forward faster. Past decades prove that political and economical restrictions were inappe propriate, and Iran could survive and send its oppone nents shocking gestures. Therefore, controlling Iran through sanctions is less realistic. America has not much in the way of direct links with Iran. The U.S. argues with Iran through public media; it pressures Iran by threatening capital sources, which were mostle ly European investors and bankers. The European Commission in 2006 repe ported that “the EU makes up 27.8% of Iran’s trade.” Meanwhile, the new sancte tions are expected to be put into place soon, “disruptie ing exports of gasoline and other refined petroleum products,” (Hosted News) might not stop Iran from moving on. Moreover, the EU is the regime’s biggest trading associate. It is a huge leap and risk for the EU to withhold its comme mercial relationships with Iran. Will EU countries submit to the U.S. and give up their profits? If so, the EU free and sovere eign states would be queste tioned, and they automatice cally would be counted on the U.S. side and dragged to become part of the next war. Why attack Iran? Iran may probably be occe cupied with similar justifice cation as used once against Saddam’s Iraq. Restriction of individual boundaries including religious freede dom, nuclear weapon proge grams, and minority rights possibly would be a worthwe while reason to invade Iran. Meanwhile, perhaps many could add two more serious reasons: interferie ing with Iraqi affairs and supporting or funding viole lent groups. One hardly can find any more debated topic other than the Iranian nuclear program. “From the afterme math of the U.S. failure in Iraq, Islamic Republic of Iran has emerged as a rege gional superpower.” Thus, its attempts are calculated and become apprehensive. Though on more than one occasion, Iran—assurie ing of its peaceful purpe poses--has been portrayed as a growing threat. The regime’s nuclear inquiry has covered most of the regimes faults, and it is misrepresented and mystife fied by the West. In 2010, Iran built two nuclear bombs. Iran does not have enough expertise to build nuclear warheads. Iran seeks nuclear weapons and is a violent country. If it gained nuclear weapons, the Iranian regime will pose wider threats, or they may put it into practice. Momentarily, its heard from all that a nuclear Iran is entirely repudiated by Western superpowers. Perhe haps these are a bunch of perplexities that manipule lated the Western political arena. Barely a newspaper passes a day without news, mostly misleading and not based on solid details, about the Iranian nuclear programs, and they succe cessfully contribute in misinforming the public. Western nations’s threats and sanctions resulted in negative outcomes to this day. The menace is viewed bigger than it is in authente ticity. Then, will the West debilitate extreme relige gious zealots and the hardle liner President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and bring an end to the Iranian nuclear program? Furthermore, human rights organizations conte tinuously accused Iran of arbitrary imprisonments, high execution ratio, and restriction of religious freedoms. Still, no reason could evoke the call for an action against Iran as deafe eningly as its uranium enre richment procession. The human rights activists perse sist on reporting massive abuses inside the country. However, Amnesty Interne national is not allowed to conduct research in Iran, China, Myanmar, North Korea, or Turkmenistan. The organization’s UK director, Kate Allen, clarife fied 30 years after the Isle lamic Revolution of Iran that wide use of torture and arbitrary detentions still exist, and Iran in 2008 executed at least 346 peope ple. In addition, whereas security forces tightened their measures and methoe ods, Allen insisted that they continue recording changes. After the 2009 presidente tial election, Tehran brutalle ly suppressed opponents, human rights organizate tions, civil society activie ists, and journalists. Acce cording to Human Rights Watch reports, hundreds of Iranian activists fled to neighboring Turkey or rece ceived lengthy imprisonme ment, were sent to death, or are on death row. Any dissent could be followed by severe punishment, and the regime launched a huge operation against all means of communicate tion. Internet servers were kept under surveillance so as to minimize the flow of information. Emails and phone calls were under scrutiny to crackdown on dissent. As stated by Joe Stork, deputy Middle East director at Human Rights Watch, “Journalists, lawye yers, civil society activie ists who used to speak to foreign media and human rights groups increasingly fear phone and Internet surveillance.” Moreover, Amnesty Inte ternational reported, “Slande der, defamation of state offe ficials, insults to Islam and other aspects of freedom of expression, association, and belief are used to prose ecute those who dissent, including those seeking to promote and protect hume man rights.” And maltreatme ments reported by former detainees include sexual abuse, insult, torture, sleep deprivation, and “suspense sion from height.” Meanwe while, still-minority nate tions, Kurds, and religious minorities like believers in the Baha’i faith face huge discrimination and represse sion. Whereas hundreds of Kurds were executed or incarcerated due to holdie ing anti-regime slogans, a huge portion of Baha’i believers were forced to convert to Islam or they are not allowed to practice their faith unreservedly. Possible portrayals and outcomes of the war The occupation of Iraq would guide the possible war on Iran. Perhaps all modern wars share simile lar tactics to the Iraq War in one way or another. The invasion of Iran, like Iraq, will begin with intensive air strikes on military base es, intelligence positions, and suspected zones, but how accurate they can be is dubious. The effort would be partially to sece cure the pass for ground, but the post-invasion situae ation would be more dise sastrous than Iraq due to population, geopolitical, and militarily differences. An internal revolution or coup is not expected, but Iranians might have a dese sire to replace the existing regime. Iran is a multinate tional and religious counte try, and if the occupation is triggered, components might ask for privileges. The 2003 Iraq subjugation would depict this point, evidently. Iraq for more than four years was on the edge of a civil war and sectarian division. Kurds, Sunnis, Christians, Assyrie ians, and Shiites claimed they had superiority, but there was not a true call for fraternity. Iraq was about to alienate into three regions, northern province es for the Kurds, southern provinces for the Shiites, and middle provinces for the Sunni population, and even the feeble federal Iraq was expected to disie integrate. Therefore, Iran might divide into as many independent districts as nations, and religious groups exist in the counte try. Every group will take the stage and endeavor to obtain the occupiers’ suppe port to put its plans into effect. Therefore, chances of waging a civil war reme main muscular. Kurds, with more than 7 percent population, might declare their free state; meanwe while, Sunnis, after more than 30 years of represse sion, will take the chance to build a Sunni region supported by Sunni neighbe boring countries, possibly most of the Arab World. In addition, many yet believe Iranians are well cultured; they may want the regime change, but the likelihood of an internal war or dishe harmony is weak. Iranians, unlike Iraqis, will not surre render and be lured into a civil war. Therefore, most likely, a group of leading reformists who definitely could fulfill the invaders’ expectations will lead the country. Furthermore, hundreds of thousands of sacrifices are needed to engage this huge alteration. The inve vasion of Iran will not destabilize just Iran or change the regime, but the entire region will face unpe precedented change. The strongest anti-West power would die off and the prese ence of U.S. and Western superpowers would double in the region. Meanwhile, Israel would protract its expansions fearlessly, as there would be no country to wipe it out on the world map. It is all positive up to this point, but we must compose Iranians’ capabe bilities. For more than 30 years now, Iranians have worked on their intellige gence and military mace chine; therefore, a bloody and unparalleled counterae attack is expected. Bombings and destabile lizing the dwellers’ bases would be the Iranian prioe ority, as was the case in Iraq. Those thousands of revolutionary guards and regime affiliates would finally find something worthy to do and resist. Temporarily, on one hand, U.S. forces in Iraq would be an attackable and realie istic target of the Iranians, perchance through re-dese stabilizing Iraq. No matte ter if Iran loses its laser guided missile arsenals, Jihe had would remain a lethal weapon. Iranian religious figures might announce a wide range Jihad against the West, and this will defie initely have lingering effe fects. In the Iraq-Iran War, Iran rerecorded tangible successes through using religion. Iranian soldiers were ready to cross mined fields and give their lives, imagining a safe place in heaven. On the other hand, other U.S. bases, embasse sies, and citizens in the East will be embattled. And while Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, and Central Asia U.S. bases would offer a huge backup for troops on the ground, they will be on the Iranian hit list. Thus, the Iranian counter-offense sives might exceed expecte tations. Israel, expectedly, would be the Iranian determined target. Many times the Irane nian disciplinarian Preside dent Ahmadinejad promie ised to “wipe Israel off the map.” Undoubtedly, if Israel doesn’t initiate, definitely it will partake in the war; thus, its secure rity would be disturbed. If Tehran, by itself, could not compose attacks against Israel, its extreme organize zations are ready to carry out the mission. On one side, Hezbollah, from the south of Lebanon, will compile raids on Israel and involve Israel in a war not of its interests. On the other side--the Palestinie ian side--Hamas suicide bombers and local manufe factured missiles could create chaos in the heart of Israel. Politically, when the war comes to the region, the political procession will take a vacation. For countle less years the war might wage, and the peace proce cess and IDP would stop. Not just Iranians, Iraqis, or Palestinians, but all would have to pay the price. The new Middle Eastern orde der would depend on the newly established Iran, as Iranians will keep their rege gional influential role. Economically, the inve vasion will affect those Western countries that depend on oil. Iran is the fourth-largest oil produce er, and any attack on the country will undoubtedly affect its oil production. Iran--through its huge natue ural gas and oil reserves and exports--can affect markets. And if the counte try faced invasion, oil and gas prices will surely rece cord first-time, shockingly high prices. As the “USA Today” editorial board stated, oil prices might shoot to “$100 a barrel.” Meanwhile, “Iran grips the 20 percent of global oil supplies that are shipped through the Straits of Horme muz.” (Seumas Milne) Therefore, Iran might try to seize the Straits and creae ate a global energy crisis. But the Iranian navy might be crippled by the invade ers. This quest would be backbreaking for the inve vaders, and Iranians may succeed for a short time.
Page 1 and 2: From the Heart of Kurdistan Region
Page 3 and 4: KRP PHOTO The Kurdish Globe No. 276
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Erbil: The host city of sports t ournaments - Kurdish Globe

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