Economic Models - Convex Optimization
Economic Models - Convex Optimization Economic Models - Convex Optimization
The Advantages of Fiscal Leadership in an Economy 71 Figure 1. Monetary-Fiscal Interactions and the Central Bank. absence of changes in information. Thus, the policies and their intended outcomes will be sustained by the government of the day. 4 2. The Fiscal Leadership Hypothesis The hypothesis is that the United Kingdom’s improved performance is due to the fact that the fiscal policy leads an independent monetary policy. This leadership derives from the fact that fiscal policies typically have long-run targets (sustainability and low debt), and is not easily reversible (public services and social equality), and does not stabilize well if efficiency is to be maintained. Nevertheless, there are also automatic stabilizers in any fiscal policy framework, implying that monetary policy must condition itself on the fiscal stance at each point. This automatically puts the latter in a follower’s role. This is helpful because it allows the economy to secure the benefits of an independent monetary policy but also enjoys a certain measure of co-ordination between the two sets of policy makers — discretionary/ automatic fiscal policies on one side, and active monetary policies on the 4 Stackelberg games, with fiscal policy leading, produce fiscal commitment: i.e., sub-game perfection with either strong or weak time consistency (Basar, 1989). In this sense, we have “rules rather than discretion”. Commitment to the stabilization policies is then assured by the independence of the monetary authority.
72 Andrew Hughes Hallet other. The extra co-ordination arises in this case because the constraints on, and responses to an agreed leadership role reduce the externalties of self-interested behavior, which independent agents would otherwise impose on one another. This allows a Pareto improvement over the conventional non-co-operative (full independence) solution, without reducing the central bank’s ability to act independently. It is important to realize that the co-ordination here is implicit and therefore rule-based, not discretionary. To show that the UK fiscal policy does lead monetary policy in this sense, and that this is the reason for the Pareto improved results in Table 1, I produce evidence in three parts: • Institutional evidence: taken from the UK Treasury’s own account of how its decision-making works, what goals it needs to achieve, and how the monetary stance may affect it or vice versa; Table 1. Generalized Taylor rules in the UK and EU-12. S.No. Const r t−1 π j,k e j, k gap pd debt Dependent variable: central bank lending rate, r t : For the UK, monthly data from June 1997–January 2004 (1) −1.72 0.711 1.394 +6, +18 0.540 (2.16) (5.88) (2.66) (2.06) (2) −2.57 (2.59) 0.598 (4.38) R 2 = 0.91, F 3,21 = 82.47, N = 29 1.289 (0.66) +9, +21 1.10 (1.53) — — −0.67 (0.83) 0.43 (0.50) R 2 = 0.90, F 5,19 = 44.1, N = 25 For the Eurozone (EU-12), monthly data from January 1999–January 2004 (1) −0.996 (0.76) (2) −13.67 (0.59) 0.274 (1.04) 0.274 (1.04) 1.714 (3.89) +9, +21 0.610 (1.77) R 2 = 0.82, F 3,11 = 22.2, N = 15 1.110 (1.19) −6, +6 0.341 (1.22) — — 0.463 (2.89) R 2 = 0.87, F 5,13 = 24.7, N = 19 0.191 (0.63) Notation: j, k give the bank’s inflation forecast interval; πj,k e represents the average inflation rate expected over the interval t + j to t + k: Eπ t+j,t+k ;gap= GDP–trend GDP; pd = primary deficit/surplus as a percentage of GDP (a surplus > 0) and debt = debt/GDP ratio. Estimation: instrumented 2SLS; t-ratios in parentheses; j, k determined by search; and the output gap is obtained from a conventional HP filter to determine trend output.
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72 Andrew Hughes Hallet<br />
other. The extra co-ordination arises in this case because the constraints<br />
on, and responses to an agreed leadership role reduce the externalties of<br />
self-interested behavior, which independent agents would otherwise impose<br />
on one another. This allows a Pareto improvement over the conventional<br />
non-co-operative (full independence) solution, without reducing the central<br />
bank’s ability to act independently. It is important to realize that the<br />
co-ordination here is implicit and therefore rule-based, not discretionary.<br />
To show that the UK fiscal policy does lead monetary policy in this<br />
sense, and that this is the reason for the Pareto improved results in Table 1,<br />
I produce evidence in three parts:<br />
• Institutional evidence: taken from the UK Treasury’s own account of<br />
how its decision-making works, what goals it needs to achieve, and how<br />
the monetary stance may affect it or vice versa;<br />
Table 1.<br />
Generalized Taylor rules in the UK and EU-12.<br />
S.No. Const r t−1<br />
π j,k<br />
e<br />
j, k gap pd debt<br />
Dependent variable: central bank lending rate, r t :<br />
For the UK, monthly data from June 1997–January 2004<br />
(1) −1.72 0.711 1.394 +6, +18 0.540<br />
(2.16) (5.88) (2.66)<br />
(2.06)<br />
(2) −2.57<br />
(2.59)<br />
0.598<br />
(4.38)<br />
R 2 = 0.91, F 3,21 = 82.47, N = 29<br />
1.289<br />
(0.66)<br />
+9, +21 1.10<br />
(1.53)<br />
— —<br />
−0.67<br />
(0.83)<br />
0.43<br />
(0.50)<br />
R 2 = 0.90, F 5,19 = 44.1, N = 25<br />
For the Eurozone (EU-12), monthly data from January 1999–January 2004<br />
(1) −0.996<br />
(0.76)<br />
(2) −13.67<br />
(0.59)<br />
0.274<br />
(1.04)<br />
0.274<br />
(1.04)<br />
1.714<br />
(3.89)<br />
+9, +21 0.610<br />
(1.77)<br />
R 2 = 0.82, F 3,11 = 22.2, N = 15<br />
1.110<br />
(1.19)<br />
−6, +6 0.341<br />
(1.22)<br />
— —<br />
0.463<br />
(2.89)<br />
R 2 = 0.87, F 5,13 = 24.7, N = 19<br />
0.191<br />
(0.63)<br />
Notation: j, k give the bank’s inflation forecast interval; πj,k e represents the average inflation<br />
rate expected over the interval t + j to t + k: Eπ t+j,t+k ;gap= GDP–trend GDP; pd =<br />
primary deficit/surplus as a percentage of GDP (a surplus > 0) and debt = debt/GDP ratio.<br />
Estimation: instrumented 2SLS; t-ratios in parentheses; j, k determined by search; and the<br />
output gap is obtained from a conventional HP filter to determine trend output.