Economic Models - Convex Optimization
Economic Models - Convex Optimization Economic Models - Convex Optimization
Topic 1 The Advantages of Fiscal Leadership in an Economy with Independent Monetary Policies Andrew Hughes Hallet James Mason University, USA 1. Introduction In January 2006, Gordon Brown (as Britain’s finance minister) was widely criticized by the European Commission and other policy makers for running fiscal policies, which they considered to be too loose and irresponsible. The UK fiscal deficit had breached the 3% of GDP that is considered to be safe. To make its point, the European Commission initiated an “excessive deficit” procedure against the UK government, claiming that its fiscal policies constituted a danger for the good performance of the UK economy and its neighbors, if these deficits were not contained and reversed. Yet the United Kingdom, alone among its European partners, allows fiscal policy to lead in order to achieve certain social expenditure and medium-term output objectives and a degree of co-ordination with the monetary policies designed to reach a certain inflation target. And the economic performance has been no worse, and may have been better than elsewhere in the Eurozone. Was Gordon Brown’s strategy so mistaken after all? The British fiscal policy has changed radically since the days when it tried to micro-manage all of the aggregate demand with an accommodating monetary policy in the 1960s and 1970s; and again during the 1980s, it was designed to strengthen the economy’s supply-side responses, while the monetary policies were intended to secure lower inflation. The 1990s saw a return to more activist fiscal policies — but policies designed strictly in combination with an equally active monetary policy based on inflation targeting and an independent Bank of England. They are set, in the main, to gain a series of medium- to long-term objectives — low debt, the provision of public services and investment, social equality, and economic efficiency. The income stabilizing aspects of the fiscal policy 69
70 Andrew Hughes Hallet have, therefore, been left to act passively through the automatic stabilizers, which are part of any fiscal system, while the discretionary part (the bulk of the policy measures) is set to achieve these long-term objectives. Monetary policy, meanwhile, is left to take care of any short-run stabilization around the cycle; that is, beyond what, predictably, would be done by the automatic stabilizers. 1 To draw a sharp distinction between actively managed long-run policies, and non-discretionary short-run stabilization efforts restricted to the automatic stabilizers, is of course the strategic policy prescription of Taylor (2000). Marrying this with an activist, monetary policy directed at cyclical stabilization, but based on an independent Bank of England and a monetary policy committee with the instrument (but not target) independence, appears to have been the innovation in the UK policies. It implies a leadership role for the fiscal policy, which allows both fiscal and monetary policies to be better co-ordinated — but without either losing their ability to act independently. 2 Thus, Britain appears to have adopted a Stackelberg solution, which lies somewhere between the discretionary (but Pareto superior) co-operative solution, and the inferior but independent (non-co-operative) solution, as shown in Fig. 1. 3 Nonetheless, by forcing the focus onto long-run objectives, to the exclusion of the short term, this set-up has imposed a degree of pre-commitment (and potential for electoral punishment) on fiscal policy because governments naturally wish to lead. But, the regime remains nonco-operative so that there is no incentive to renege on earlier plans in the 1 The Treasury estimates that the automatic stabilizers will, in normal circumstances, stabilize some 30% of the cycle; the remaining 70% being left to monetary policy (HM Treasury, 2003). The option to undertake discretionary stabilizing interventions is retained “for exceptional circumstances” however. Nevertheless, the need for any such additional interventions is unlikely: first, because of the effectiveness of the forward looking, symmetric and an activist inflation targeting mechanism adopted by the Bank of England; and, second, because the long-term expenditure (and tax) plans are deliberately constructed in nominal terms so that they add to the stabilizing power of the automatic stabilizers in more serious booms or slumps. 2 For details on how this leadership vs. stabilization assignment is intended to work, see HM Treasury (2003) and Section 3 below. Australia and Sweden operate rather similar regimes. 3 Figure 1 is the standard representation of the outcomes of the different game theory equilibria when the reaction functions form an acute angle. The latter is assured for our context when both sets of policy makers have some interest in inflation control and output stabilization, and the policy multipliers have the conventional signs (Hughes Hallett and Viegi, 2002). Stackelberg solutions, therefore, imply a degree of co-ordination in the outcomes, relative to the non-co-operative (unco-ordinated) Nash solution.
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Topic 1<br />
The Advantages of Fiscal Leadership in an<br />
Economy with Independent Monetary Policies<br />
Andrew Hughes Hallet<br />
James Mason University, USA<br />
1. Introduction<br />
In January 2006, Gordon Brown (as Britain’s finance minister) was widely<br />
criticized by the European Commission and other policy makers for running<br />
fiscal policies, which they considered to be too loose and irresponsible. The<br />
UK fiscal deficit had breached the 3% of GDP that is considered to be safe.<br />
To make its point, the European Commission initiated an “excessive deficit”<br />
procedure against the UK government, claiming that its fiscal policies constituted<br />
a danger for the good performance of the UK economy and its<br />
neighbors, if these deficits were not contained and reversed. Yet the United<br />
Kingdom, alone among its European partners, allows fiscal policy to lead in<br />
order to achieve certain social expenditure and medium-term output objectives<br />
and a degree of co-ordination with the monetary policies designed to<br />
reach a certain inflation target. And the economic performance has been<br />
no worse, and may have been better than elsewhere in the Eurozone. Was<br />
Gordon Brown’s strategy so mistaken after all?<br />
The British fiscal policy has changed radically since the days when it<br />
tried to micro-manage all of the aggregate demand with an accommodating<br />
monetary policy in the 1960s and 1970s; and again during the 1980s, it<br />
was designed to strengthen the economy’s supply-side responses, while the<br />
monetary policies were intended to secure lower inflation.<br />
The 1990s saw a return to more activist fiscal policies — but policies<br />
designed strictly in combination with an equally active monetary policy<br />
based on inflation targeting and an independent Bank of England. They are<br />
set, in the main, to gain a series of medium- to long-term objectives — low<br />
debt, the provision of public services and investment, social equality, and<br />
economic efficiency. The income stabilizing aspects of the fiscal policy<br />
69