Economic Models - Convex Optimization
Economic Models - Convex Optimization Economic Models - Convex Optimization
The Advantages of Fiscal Leadership in an Economy 99 Table 4. Data for the deficit rule calculations. α β γ s θ φ λ g 2 France 0.294 0.500 0.570 1 0 1.147 0.25 Germany 0.176 0.533 0.430 1 0 1.094 0.25 Italy 0.625 0.433 0.600 1 0 1.271 0.25 Netherlands 0.625 0.489 0.533 1 0 1.306 0.25 Sweden 0.333 0.489 0.533 1 0 1.163 1 New Zealand 0.244 0.400 0.850 1 0 1.098 1 UK 0.385 0.133 0.580 1 0 1.038 1 United States 0.278 0.467 1.150 1 0 1.130 0.5 Canada 0.200 0.400 0.850 1 0 1.080 0.5 Switzerland 0.323 0.489 0.533 1 0 1.158 0.5 security sectors in the Netherlands and Sweden. Similarly, θ is set to give a debt target somewhat below each country’s 1998 debt ratio and the SGP’s 60% limit. Likewise, λ g 2 was set to imply a low, high, or medium commitment to debt/deficit limits, as reflected in actual behavior in 2004. Finally, I have set λ g 1 = 1 in each country to suggest that governments, if left to themselves, are equally concerned about inflation and output stabilization. For Table 4, I suppose that the deficit that remains after growth effects and new discretionary taxes are accounted for will be spent (s = 1), and that the medium-term deficit target is zero (θ = 0). Appendix B: Derivation of the Change in Fiscal Stance Between Regimes The expected value of s(by t − τ t ) under fiscal leadership and simultaneous moves can be obtained by inserting values first from Eq. (29), and then from Eqs. (31) and (32), respectively. Taking the expected values, this yields zero and φλ cb∗ /(α 2 γ) > 0 in each case. Applying this result to Eq. (4), it shows that the expected change in output between regimes, which we know to be zero, is (β − γ)m − βλ cb∗ /(αλ g 1 ) + γ[s(by − τ)] = 0. Hence, m ={γ[s(by − τ)] + βλ cb∗ /(αλ g 1 )}/(β − γ) which, given the change in s(by t − τ t ), is positive, if β>γ. In this case, the simultaneous move regime is unambiguously more expansionary, and will run larger deficits, than a regime with fiscal leadership. But, since
100 Andrew Hughes Hallet γ/(β − γ) > 1, this result may not follow if β
- Page 71 and 72: 48 Dipak R. Basu and Alexis Lazarid
- Page 73 and 74: 50 Dipak R. Basu and Alexis Lazarid
- Page 75 and 76: 52 Dipak R. Basu and Alexis Lazarid
- Page 77 and 78: 54 Dipak R. Basu and Alexis Lazarid
- Page 79 and 80: 56 Dipak R. Basu and Alexis Lazarid
- Page 81 and 82: 58 Dipak R. Basu and Alexis Lazarid
- Page 83 and 84: 60 Dipak R. Basu and Alexis Lazarid
- Page 85 and 86: 62 Dipak R. Basu and Alexis Lazarid
- Page 87 and 88: 64 Dipak R. Basu and Alexis Lazarid
- Page 89 and 90: 66 Dipak R. Basu and Alexis Lazarid
- Page 91 and 92: This page intentionally left blank
- Page 93 and 94: 70 Andrew Hughes Hallet have, there
- Page 95 and 96: 72 Andrew Hughes Hallet other. The
- Page 97 and 98: 74 Andrew Hughes Hallet success in
- Page 99 and 100: 76 Andrew Hughes Hallet with a hori
- Page 101 and 102: 78 Andrew Hughes Hallet control inf
- Page 103 and 104: 80 Andrew Hughes Hallet Table 2. Fi
- Page 105 and 106: 82 Andrew Hughes Hallet country 13
- Page 107 and 108: 84 Andrew Hughes Hallet Given this
- Page 109 and 110: 86 Andrew Hughes Hallet 5.4. Instit
- Page 111 and 112: 88 Andrew Hughes Hallet Substitutin
- Page 113 and 114: 90 Andrew Hughes Hallet This is alw
- Page 115 and 116: 92 Andrew Hughes Hallet (d) Since E
- Page 117 and 118: 94 Andrew Hughes Hallet Table 3. Ex
- Page 119 and 120: 96 Andrew Hughes Hallet restraint m
- Page 121: 98 Andrew Hughes Hallet HM Treasury
- Page 125 and 126: 102 Chirstophe Deissenberg and Pave
- Page 127 and 128: 104 Chirstophe Deissenberg and Pave
- Page 129 and 130: 106 Chirstophe Deissenberg and Pave
- Page 131 and 132: 108 Chirstophe Deissenberg and Pave
- Page 133 and 134: 110 Chirstophe Deissenberg and Pave
- Page 135 and 136: 112 Chirstophe Deissenberg and Pave
- Page 137 and 138: 114 Chirstophe Deissenberg and Pave
- Page 139 and 140: 116 Chirstophe Deissenberg and Pave
- Page 141 and 142: 118 Chirstophe Deissenberg and Pave
- Page 143 and 144: This page intentionally left blank
- Page 145 and 146: 122 Nikitas Spiros Koutsoukis 2. Mo
- Page 147 and 148: 124 Nikitas Spiros Koutsoukis GRAI
- Page 149 and 150: 126 Nikitas Spiros Koutsoukis (3) U
- Page 151 and 152: 128 Nikitas Spiros Koutsoukis The m
- Page 153 and 154: 130 Nikitas Spiros Koutsoukis lower
- Page 155 and 156: 132 Nikitas Spiros Koutsoukis Some
- Page 157 and 158: 134 Nikitas Spiros Koutsoukis We be
- Page 159 and 160: This page intentionally left blank
- Page 161 and 162: 138 Victoria Miroshnik 2. Corporate
- Page 163 and 164: 140 Victoria Miroshnik Japanese NC
- Page 165 and 166: 142 Victoria Miroshnik process shou
- Page 167 and 168: 144 Victoria Miroshnik National cul
- Page 169 and 170: 146 Victoria Miroshnik A1 A2 A3 D1
- Page 171 and 172: 148 Victoria Miroshnik Fujino, T (1
100 Andrew Hughes Hallet<br />
γ/(β − γ) > 1, this result may not follow if β