Economic Models - Convex Optimization

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The Advantages of Fiscal Leadership in an Economy 97 why the ECB prefers hard restraints (and why the fiscal policy makers do not), and suggests that the ECB may actually prefer fiscal leadership because of the greater degree of pre-commitment implied. References Barro, RJ (1981). Output effects of government purchases. Journal of Political Economy 89, 1086–1121. Barro, RJ and DB Gordon (1983). Rules, discretion, and reputation in a model of monetary policy. Journal of Monetary Economics 12, 101–121. Basar, T (1989). Time consistency and robustness of equilibria in non-cooperative dynamic games. In Dynamic Policy Games in Economics, F van der Ploeg and A de Zeeuw (eds.), pp. 9–54. Amsterdam: North Holland. Basar, T and G Olsder (1989). Dynamic noncooperative game theory. In Classics in Applied Mathematics, SIAM series, Philadelphia: SIAM. Brandsma, A and A Hughes Hallett (1984). Economic conflict and the solution of dynamic games. European Economic Review 26, 13–32. Buti, M, S Eijffinger and D Franco (2003). Revisiting the stability and growth pact: grand design or internal adjustment? Discussion Paper 3692. London: Centre for Economic Policy Research. Canzoneri, M (2004). A New View on The Transatlantic Transmission of Fiscal Policy and Macroeconomic Policy Coordination. In The Transatlantic Transmission of Fiscal Policy and Macroeconomic Policy Coordination, M Buti (ed.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Currie, DA, G Holtham andA Hughes Hallett (1989). The theory and practice of international economic policy coordination: does coordination pay? In Macroeconomic Policies in an Interdependent World, R Bryant, D Currie, J Frenkel, P Masson and R Portes (eds.), Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund, 125–148. Demertzis, M, A Hughes Hallett and N Yiegi (2004). An Independent Central Bank Faced with Elected Governments: A Political Economy Conflict. In European Journal of Political Economy 20(4), 907–922. Dieppe, A, K Kuster and P McAdam (2004). Optimal monetary policy rules for the Euro Area: an analysis using the area wide model. Working Paper 360. Frankfurt: European Central Bank. Dixit,A (2001). Games of monetary and fiscal interactions in the EMU. European Economic Review 45, 589–613. Dixit, AK and L Lambertini (2003). Interactions of commitment and discretion in monetary and fiscal issues. American Economic Review 93, 1522–1542. Dow, JCR (1964). The Management of the British Economy 1945–1960. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. European Commission (2002). Public finances in EMU:2002. European Economy: Studies and Reports 4, Brussels: European Commission. Fatas, A, J von Hagen, A Hughes Hallett, R Strauch and A Sibert (2003). Stability and Growth in Europe. London: Centre for Economic Policy Research (MEI-13). Gali, J and R Perotti (2003). Fiscal policy and monetary integration in Europe. Economic Policy 37, 533–571.
98 Andrew Hughes Hallet HM Treasury (HMT) (2003). Fiscal Stabilization and EMU. HM Stationary Office, Cmnd 799373. Norwich: also available from www.hm-treasury.gov.uk. Hughes Hallett, A (1984). Noncooperative strategies for dynamic policy games and the problem of time inconsistency. Oxford Economic Papers 36, 381–399. Hughes Hallett,A (2005). In praise of fiscal restraint and debt rules: what the Euro zone might do now. Discussion Paper 5043. London: Centre for Economic Research, 251–279. Hughes Hallett, A and D Weymark (2002). Government leadership and central bank design. Discussion Paper 3395, London: Centre for Economic Research. Hughes Hallett, A and N Viegi (2002). Inflation targeting as a coordination device. Open Economies Review 13, 341–362. Hughes Hallett, A and D Weymark (2004a). Policy games and the optimal design of central banks. In Money Matters, P Minford (ed.). London: Edward Elgar. Hughes Hallett,A and DWeymark (2004b). Independent monetary policies and social equity. Economics Letters 85, 103–110. Hughes Hallett,A and D Weymark (2005). Independence before conservatism: transparency, politics and central bank design. German Economic Review 6, 1–25. Lucas, RE (1972). Expectations and the neutrality of money. Journal of Economic Theory 4, 103–124. Lucas, RE (1973). Some international evidence on output-inflation trade-offs. American Economic Review 63, 326–334. McCallum, BT (1989). Monetary Economics: Theory and Policy. New York: Macmillan. Svensson, L (2003). What is wrong with Taylor rules? Using judgement in monetary rules through targeting rules. Journal of Economic Literature 41, 426–477. Taylor, JB (1993a). Macroeconomic Policy in a World Economy: From Econometric Design to Practical Operation. New York: W.W. Norton and Company. Taylor, JB (1993b). Discretion vs. policy rules in practice. Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy 39, 195–214. Taylor, JB (2000). Discretionary fiscal policies. Journal of Economic Perspectives 14, 1–23. Turrini, A and J in ‘t Veld (2004). The Impact of the EU Fiscal Framework on Economic Activity. DGII, Brussels: European Commission. Appendix A: Data Sources for Table 3 The data used in Table 3 are set out in the table below. They come from different sources and represent “stylized facts” for the corresponding parameters. The Phillips curve parameter, α, is the inverse of the annualized sacrifice ratios on quarterly data from 1971–1998. The values for β and γ, the impact multipliers for fiscal and monetary policy, respectively, are the one-year simulated multipliers for these policies in Taylor’s multicountry model (Taylor, 1993a). I have calibrated the remaining parameters using stylized facts from 1998: the year that EMU started, and the year that new fiscal and monetary regimes took effect in the United Kingdom and Sweden. Thus, s is the automatic stablizer effect on output according to the European Commission (2002) and HMT (2003) estimates, allowing for larger social
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ECONOMIC MODELS Methods, Theory and
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ECONOMIC MODELS Methods, Theory and
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This Volume is Dedicated to the Mem
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Contents Tom Oskar Martin Kronsjo:
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Tom Oskar Martin Kronsjo: A Profile
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Tom Oskar Martin Kronsjo students t
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About the Editor Prof. Dipak Basu i
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Contributors Athanasios Athanasenas
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Contributors Victoria Miroshnik, is
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xx Introduction type of model is ve
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4 Olav Bjerkholt Among these was al
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6 Olav Bjerkholt method, searching
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8 Olav Bjerkholt context, but one o
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10 Olav Bjerkholt be modified in th
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12 Olav Bjerkholt through a number
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14 Olav Bjerkholt memoranda. These
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16 Olav Bjerkholt hopelessly ineffe
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18 Olav Bjerkholt References Arrow,
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24 Alexis Lazaridis A straightforwa
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26 Alexis Lazaridis where ⎛ ⎞ j
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28 Alexis Lazaridis Estimating the
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30 Alexis Lazaridis 5.1. Testing fo
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32 Alexis Lazaridis by applying the
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34 Alexis Lazaridis Nevertheless, t
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36 Alexis Lazaridis Table 2. Residu
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38 Alexis Lazaridis Table 3. Critic
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40 Alexis Lazaridis Figure 4. The s
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42 Alexis Lazaridis Perron, P and T
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44 Dipak R. Basu and Alexis Lazarid
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148 Victoria Miroshnik Fujino, T (1
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152 Anna-Maria Mouza of salaries of
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154 Anna-Maria Mouza Table 2. final
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156 Anna-Maria Mouza Table 4. Worki
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158 Anna-Maria Mouza 3.2.2. Personn
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160 Anna-Maria Mouza where X 43 , a
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162 Anna-Maria Mouza Thus, the tota
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164 Anna-Maria Mouza 6. Some Altern
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166 Anna-Maria Mouza increase for e
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168 Anna-Maria Mouza The solution o
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174 Fabrizio Iacone and Renzo Orsi
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202 Athanasios Athanasenas 2. The C
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204 Athanasios Athanasenas to asset
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206 Athanasios Athanasenas I end up
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208 Athanasios Athanasenas consider
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210 Athanasios Athanasenas Table 1.
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212 Athanasios Athanasenas vector:
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214 Athanasios Athanasenas in relev
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216 Athanasios Athanasenas The esti
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218 Athanasios Athanasenas and ⎡
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220 Athanasios Athanasenas run, cre
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222 Athanasios Athanasenas Lown, C
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224 Index fiscal expansions, 91, 92
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Economic Models - Convex Optimization

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