Economic Models - Convex Optimization

Economic Models - Convex Optimization Economic Models - Convex Optimization

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The Advantages of Fiscal Leadership in an Economy 81 Consequently, the United Kingdom appears to use fiscal policy for stabilization in a minor way as claimed, while the Euro economies seem not to use fiscal policy this way at all. Confirmation of this comes from the responses to interest rate changes, which are positive but very small and statistically insignificant in the United Kingdom, but negative and near significant in Europe. This implies that the British fiscal policies are chosen independently of the monetary policy, as suggested by our weak leadership model. But, if there is any association at all, then both the fiscal and monetary policies would be compliments and weakly co-ordinated. The UK results are therefore inconclusive. They are consistent with independent policies, or fiscal leadership — the latter, despite the insignificance of the direct fiscal-monetary linkage, because of the significant output gap term in the fiscal equation which, given the same effect is not found in the monetary policy reactions, suggests fiscal leadership may in fact have been operating. In any event, there is no suggestion of monetary leadership; if anything happens, the results imply independence or fiscal leadership. In the Eurozone, the results are quite different. Here, the significant result is the conflict among instruments in monetary policy (and essentially the same conflict in the fiscal policy reactions). Hence, the policies are competitive, which suggests that they form a Nash equilibrium (or possibly monetary leadership, since the coefficient on fiscal policy in the Taylor rule is small and there is no output gap smoothing). This suggests weak monetary leadership, or a simple non-co-operative game. 5. Theoretical Evidence: A Model of Fiscal Leadership 5.1. The Economic Model and Policy Constraints The key question now is: would governments want to pursue fiscal precommitment? Do they have an incentive to do so? And would there be a clear improvement in terms of an economic performance if they did? More important, would the fiscal leadership model be more advantageous, if fiscal policy was limited by a deficit rule in the form of “hard” targets (as in the original stability pact) or “soft” targets? To answer these questions, we extend a model used in Hughes Hallett and Weymark (2002; 2004a;b; 2005) to examine the problem of monetary policy design when there are interactions with fiscal policy. For exposition purposes, we suppress the spillovers among countries and focus on the following three equations to represent the economic structure of any one

82 Andrew Hughes Hallet country 13 : π t = π e t + αy t + u t (3) y t = β(m t − π t ) + γg t + ε t (4) g t = m t + s(by t − τ t ) (5) where π t is inflation in period t, y t is the growth in output (relative to trend) in period t, and πt e represents the rate of inflation that the rational agents expect to prevail in period t, conditional on the information available at the time expectations are formed. Next, m t ,g t , and τ t represent the growth in the money supply, government expenditures, and tax revenues in period t, and u t and ε t are random disturbances, which are distributed independently with zero mean and constant variance. All variables are deviations from their steady-state (or equilibrium) growth paths, and we treat trend budget variables as pre-committed and balanced. Deviations from the trend budget are, therefore, the only discretionary fiscal policy choices available. The coefficients α, β, γ, s, and b are all positive by assumption. The assumption that γ is positive is sometimes controversial. 14 However, the short-run impact multipliers derived from Taylor’s (1993a) multicountry estimation provide an empirical support for this assumption (as does the HMT, 2003). According to Eq. (3), inflation is increasing, as the rate of inflation predicted by private agents and in output growth. Equation (4) indicates that both monetary and fiscal policies have an impact on the output gap. The micro-foundations of the aggregate supply Eq. (3), originally derived by Lucas (1972; 1973), are well known. McCallum (1989) shows that aggregate demand equation like Eq. (4) can be derived from a standard, multiperiod utility-maximization problem. Equation (5) describes the government’s budget constraint. In earlier chapters, we allowed discretionary tax revenues to be used for 13 Technically, we assume a blockwise orthogonalization of the traditional multicountry model to produce independent semi-reduced forms for each country. The disturbance terms may, therefore, contain foreign variables, but they will have zero means so long as these countries remain on their long-run (equilibrium) growth paths on average (all variables being defined as deviations from their equilibrium growth paths). 14 Barro (1981) argues that government purchases have a contractionary impact on output. Our model, by contrast, treats fiscal policy as important because: (i) fiscal policy is widely used to achieve re-distributive and public service objectives; (ii) governments cannot precommit monetary policy with any credibility if fiscal policy is not pre-committed (Dixit and Lambertini, 2003), and (iii) Central Banks, and the ECB, in particular, worry intensely about the impact of fiscal policy on inflation and financial stability (Dixit, 2001).

82 Andrew Hughes Hallet<br />

country 13 :<br />

π t = π e t + αy t + u t (3)<br />

y t = β(m t − π t ) + γg t + ε t (4)<br />

g t = m t + s(by t − τ t ) (5)<br />

where π t is inflation in period t, y t is the growth in output (relative to trend)<br />

in period t, and πt e represents the rate of inflation that the rational agents<br />

expect to prevail in period t, conditional on the information available at the<br />

time expectations are formed. Next, m t ,g t , and τ t represent the growth in<br />

the money supply, government expenditures, and tax revenues in period t,<br />

and u t and ε t are random disturbances, which are distributed independently<br />

with zero mean and constant variance. All variables are deviations from<br />

their steady-state (or equilibrium) growth paths, and we treat trend budget<br />

variables as pre-committed and balanced. Deviations from the trend budget<br />

are, therefore, the only discretionary fiscal policy choices available. The<br />

coefficients α, β, γ, s, and b are all positive by assumption. The assumption<br />

that γ is positive is sometimes controversial. 14 However, the short-run<br />

impact multipliers derived from Taylor’s (1993a) multicountry estimation<br />

provide an empirical support for this assumption (as does the HMT, 2003).<br />

According to Eq. (3), inflation is increasing, as the rate of inflation predicted<br />

by private agents and in output growth. Equation (4) indicates that<br />

both monetary and fiscal policies have an impact on the output gap. The<br />

micro-foundations of the aggregate supply Eq. (3), originally derived by<br />

Lucas (1972; 1973), are well known. McCallum (1989) shows that aggregate<br />

demand equation like Eq. (4) can be derived from a standard, multiperiod<br />

utility-maximization problem.<br />

Equation (5) describes the government’s budget constraint. In earlier<br />

chapters, we allowed discretionary tax revenues to be used for<br />

13 Technically, we assume a blockwise orthogonalization of the traditional multicountry<br />

model to produce independent semi-reduced forms for each country. The disturbance terms<br />

may, therefore, contain foreign variables, but they will have zero means so long as these<br />

countries remain on their long-run (equilibrium) growth paths on average (all variables being<br />

defined as deviations from their equilibrium growth paths).<br />

14 Barro (1981) argues that government purchases have a contractionary impact on output.<br />

Our model, by contrast, treats fiscal policy as important because: (i) fiscal policy is widely<br />

used to achieve re-distributive and public service objectives; (ii) governments cannot precommit<br />

monetary policy with any credibility if fiscal policy is not pre-committed (Dixit<br />

and Lambertini, 2003), and (iii) Central Banks, and the ECB, in particular, worry intensely<br />

about the impact of fiscal policy on inflation and financial stability (Dixit, 2001).

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