KOSOVO: THE ROAD AHEAD

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20 intended as the first step in a serious campaign against major Albanian organized crime kingpins. A serious and successful campaign against organized crime would only be welcomed by the Kosovo Albanian people who, after all, are its chief victims. An ex-KLA contact, with an astonishing insight into the seamy secrets of the pre-and post-war Albanian armed underworld, told me that one of the three KLA figures detained by the international police was a notorious serial rapist of Albanian women. This contact and others, however, told me that the problem of organized crime in Kosovo is not exclusively—or possibly even primarily—one of the ex-KLA. If international efforts against organized crime focus only on the ex-KLA they will fail to address the crime problem and alienate both ex-KLA figures and the broader Kosovo Albanian population, which has no particular love for organized crime but which regards the KLA as the leader of a justified national liberation struggle against Serb oppression. Veton Surroi told me he thought the problem of organized crime was the biggest threat to a democratic and prosperous future for Kosovo. According to Surroi, however, the major organized crime groups are only partially traceable to the KLA. The real crime powers, Surroi contended, go back to pre-1999 war Albanian criminal groups, which then had and probably still have today close ties with Serbian criminal groups, including those close to the Serbian police and military. Surroi called these groups "kontrabandisti" apparently because many of them were involved in smuggling (and sanctions-busting) even before the 1999 war. He said that these groups are now trying to "go legit," in some cases by moving into the media and politics. A knowledgeable Albanian source described to me in broad terms the activities of one such group, the Luka clan, based in Pec. This group, part family and part business group, engaged in a broad range of criminal and legitimate activities before the 1999 war, including cigarette and other smuggling and printing. The Luka clan has established a well-funded broadcast company, called Djukadjin, which is seeking a license to open a new private Kosovo-wide TV station. Djukadjin TV would be a powerful competitor to Surroi's TV station, Koha Vision which still depends in part on aid from George Soros. Djukadjin also reportedly hired away Baton Hadjiu, the former editor of Surroi's newspaper, Koha Ditore, which may account in part for Surroi's concern about the growing influence of "kontrabandisti." Kosovo Protection Corps What to do about the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC), the 5,000 strong quasi-military emergency response force set up after the 1999 war to provide a home for KLA veterans, is one of those potentially explosive issues the international community is currently ignoring. In a meeting with KPC Commander, Lt. Gen. Agim Ceku, I found him concerned—almost angry—about the international community's approach toward the KPC. Ceku said bluntly that the international community needs to do more to support the KPC, both financially and with equipment, to allow it to carry out its existing mission. It also needs to help the KPC begin to evolve its structure and mission in accord with the
21 increase in self-governing authority in Kosovo, he noted. Ceku said the international community had never provided the KPC with sufficient resources or equipment to carry out its ostensible emergency response role. Ceku complained that the UN, which has responsibility for overseeing the KPC, is excessively suspicious of the KPC while at the same time failing to provide useful assistance to deal with what Ceku acknowledges are problems within its ranks. The KPC is under heavy international pressure to demobilize the 2,000 "reservists" serving in its ranks in order to bring its active duty strength to the figure of 3,000 foreseen in the 1999 agreement that formed the KPC. Ceku said he would like to carry out this demobilization but will not do so until the international mission finds jobs for the 2,000 "reservists." Turning these men out onto the street without jobs, he contended, would be a prescription for an increase in the illegal activities for which the international community already blames the KPC. Ceku admitted that there are some "bad apples" in the KPC, who "do not understand democracy" and may act "improperly." He said he is moving against the worst offenders but thought that in general it was better to have such people within the KPC where they could receive training to behave better and an eye could be kept on them. He said he would move against KPC members identified as having committed crimes but complained that the international mission in Kosovo has never given him any evidence against a single KPC member. Ceku acknowledged that he and most other Kosovo Albanians view the KPC as the embryo of a future Kosovo security force. At the appropriate time, probably in 2003, he intends to propose to the Kosovo Assembly his concept for such a force. He envisions it as a small, highly trained professional force. Its mission would be security, peacekeeping, and disaster relief. (Comment: Ceku is too guarded in his description of "bad apples" in the KPC, whose regional commanders have been identified as engaging in a range of improper activities including violence, intimidation, and shake-downs. I cannot verify his assertion that he has never received proof about such activities by specific individuals but it is at least plausible given the disorganization within the international mission and the inherent difficulties in using intelligence information for such purposes. End Comment) Nevertheless, Ceku's basic points about the international community's failure to provide the KPC either a realistic mission or sufficient resources are broadly accurate as is his assessment of the hostile attitude within the international mission to the KPC. A departing senior UN official with broad experience in the Balkans told me that after the economy he considered the KPC the biggest potential problem facing the international mission. In his view the starting point for any solution was to take authority for the KPC away from the UN and give it to KFOR. This might help—Ceku said his relations with KFOR were good—but the basic problem is one of resources and vision. The international community needs to decide what to do
Page 1 and 2: 1 KOSOVO: THE ROAD AHEAD A Field Re
Page 3 and 4: 3 Kosovo Serbs: Serbs hold 22 seats
Page 5 and 6: 5 ASSESSMENT Government Crisis The
Page 7 and 8: 7 resolution of the crisis Kosovo S
Page 9 and 10: 9 president beyond the limited and
Page 11 and 12: 11 that the Serbian population was
Page 13 and 14: 13 The International Mission Michae
Page 15 and 16: 15 of violent incidents against Kos
Page 17 and 18: 17 and information flowed without h
Page 19: 19 The senior international police
Page 23: 23 About Louie Sell A retired Forei

KOSOVO: THE ROAD AHEAD

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