F OCUS - American Foreign Service Association

L E T T E R S
gressional authority in the stead of
under-resourced civilian agencies. Reestablishing
the proper authorities to
State and USAID will begin to repair
this problem. Congress must also give
civilian institutions the personnel, funding
and guidance necessary to reclaim
the execution of non-military activities
and oversight of non-combat operations.
To achieve our top foreign policy
objectives, the U.S. government must
use all its elements of power. To do
otherwise risks furthering the perception
that American foreign policy is
principally implemented with the bayonet.
Ron Capps
FSO, retired
Bethesda, Md.
Editor’s Note: Mr. Capps, the 2007
co-winner of AFSA’s William R. Rivkin
Award for constructive dissent by a
mid-level Foreign Service officer, is a
program manager for peacekeeping
with Refugees International.
The Military Should Run PRTs
Despite all the good advice in Captain
Sean Walsh’s article in the February
Journal (“Improving the PRT-Military
Professional Relationship”), its
basis is a bit shocking to this veteran of
the pacification program in Vietnam
(1969-1971). Specifically, why aren’t
the Provincial Reconstruction Teams in
Iraq embedded within the military
brigade structure?
In the July-August 2008 Journal, we
learned from William Maley’s article
(“NATO and Afghanistan: Made for
Each Other?”) that in establishing the
PRT program in Afghanistan, we drew
upon the Civil Operations and Revolutionary
Development Support model
from Vietnam. In Vietnam, all State,
USAID and military personnel in
CORDS worked for the commander
of the Military Assistance Command
Vietnam: General Creighton Abrams,
and his deputy, Ambassador William
Colby. But in Iraq, apparently the decision
was made to separate reconstruction
operations from military
operations, at least in terms of the
chain of command.
Much of Capt. Walsh’s good advice
about getting along with the Army
would pertain regardless of the PRT organizational
model. But given counterinsurgency
strategy, where the Army
mission of security rightly comes first,
having separate chains of command
makes no sense. The PRT and its mission
should be “organic” to the brigade
structure. This means the brigade
would “own” the PRT just as it “owns”
its artillery capability.
By making the PRT organic to the
brigade, the brigade then owns, and is
responsible for, the success of its mission,
eliminating any need for the team
to “bum” rides or other brigade support.
However boneheaded a brigade
commander may be about the
need to win hearts and minds, he will
respond to such requests if he knows a
general is going to ask him how his PRT
is doing.
In The Gamble, the new book on
Iraq by Thomas Ricks, we see that it
was Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld’s
decision not to support the PRTs.
That alone is probably a very good reason
to consolidate the counterinsurgency
mission in Iraq.
Alfred R. Barr
FSO, retired
Washington, D.C.
The Ground Truth About
Virtual Presence Posts
Shawn Dorman’s January article,
“Global Repositioning in Perspective,”
includes a brief and mostly balanced
description of Virtual Presence Posts.
The article accurately notes that the
relative success of a VPP fundamentally
depends on each mission’s commitment
to increasing outreach to important
locales with no permanent U.S.
diplomatic presence.
The article also includes an anonymous
remark from a “Washingtonbased
FSO” who questions the value of
VPPs. The officer is not accurately informed.
Over the last five years, posts
through their own serious and sustained
efforts have established 56
VPPs, up from only five in 2003. Moreover,
over just the past year, posts have
established 21 VPPs, including at least
one new VPP in each regional bureau.
Twelve new ones were created in China
alone.
The significant growth in the use of
Virtual Presence Posts reflects the recognized
benefits and real-world results
associated with a well-run VPP program.
For example, VPPs provide
posts with the means for more organized
and focused mission travel, for better
interagency coordination and for
more strategic application of program
and outreach resources.
Another point of clarification: the
Journal article reports that “in some
countries, the VPP model does serve as
a substitute for the American Presence
Post.” This has been true at a few posts,
yet VPPs are always more than just
stand-ins for APPs. VPPs help coordinate
the mission, involving all relevant
sections with a mix of traditional diplomacy
(travel, programs, exchanges) and
modern technologies (branded Web
sites, electronic communication) in
reaching out to important cities, communities
or countries. For this reason,
VPPs have been used as a “bridge”
prior to launching an APP, ensuring
8 F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L / A P R I L 2 0 0 9